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tPREFACE
The "New Deal" has brought to the United States many signi-
ficant social and economic changes during the past two and one-
half years. Among these is the provision in the Banicing Act of
1933 for guaranteeing bank deposits.
Bank deposit guaranty provides a challenge for every though
ful citizen and student today. It not only affects the business
of banking as conducted in the United States, but it creates
problems of concern to every citizen and bank depositor.
This treatise on bank deposit guaranty brings together much
of the significant information upon the subject on the basis of
which it has been possible to draw several conclusions.
Material dealing with the recent federal law was abundant,
whereas that pertaining to the history of bank deposit guaranty
and certain other aspects of the subject was not at all plentiful
Among the many authors on the various phases of bank deposit
guaranty, the writer is particularly indebted to Mr. Thomas B.
Robb, the author of "Bank Deposit Guaranty"; Mr. Thornton Cooke,
for numerous articles in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, and
Mr. John G. Blocker, author of "The Guaranty of State Bank De-
posits" .
In addition, the writer wishes to thank the officials of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in Washington, D.C.,
for furnishing current information pertaining to the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation.

A debt of gratitude is also due Professor Charles P. Huse,
Chairman of the Department of Economics, Graduate School, Boston
University, for suggestions and criticisms
Cto^uS. kL^rrrbu>

}PART I
Chapter One
There are in the United States today over thirteen thou-
sand banks and banking institutions. When we stop to think of
the part played in the community by these banks and their ser-
vices, as vie were obliged to do during the national bank holiday
in March, 1933, we realize that our entire commercial and in-
dustrial structure is just as sound as is our "banking system".
Not only does the soundness of the commercial and industrial
structure of the country depend upon the soundness of the bankir
system, but it is also true that the soundness of the banicing
structure of any country depends, to a large degree, upon the
general business conditions prevailing in the country at any
given time. Because of the chronic industrial situation exist-
ing in the United States at the beginning of the year 1933, many
banks which v/ould command the confidence of the public in
ordinary times, were subjected to extraordinary circumstances.
These banks not only had to meet unusual demands for deposits
on the part of the customers, but were forced to meet so-called
"runs" or heavy withdrawals by vast numbers of people who feared
for the safety of their bank accounts. In addition, the banks
were obliged to "write off" large shrinkages in investments
which had been made in good faithj the market value of these
securities having declined. A fourth factor was the necessity
of the banks carrying along or renewing notes of the customers
which would be paid eventually, but which could not be turned
1
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.
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into cash in a short time.
The combination of these factors and many additional ones,
placed the banking network of the country in such serious strait^
that it became necessary, in early March 1933, to declare, by
presidential proclamation, a national bank holiday. This holida
lasted for some days pending the attempt on the part of the
bankers to put their houses in order. During this period both
the National and State Governments had to enact some emergency
legislation to provide relief to the depositors in the closed
institutions, to safeguard the depositors and other creditors of
the banks, as well as to protect the interest of the general pub
lie
.
The experiences of the bank holiday in March 1933 left no
doubt in the minds of many of the country’s legislators in
Washington that something had to be done to prevent the recur-
rence of a similar situation. Out of many proposals for build-
ing a banicing system that would not be at the mercy of the
depositing public in times of severe stress, there grew a
movement in favor of "insuring" or "guaranteeing" the payment
of bank deposits to those having deposits in banks.
This idea of attempting to guarantee the payment of deposi-
tors was not new. It had been tried by several of the western
states within the same quarter century period, and had had an
historical precedent in the nineteenth century when New York had
its "safety fund".
On June 16th, 1933, the President of the United States

approved the Banking Act of 1933 which provided for the creation
of a Federal Deposit Insurance Corooration. This Cornoration
(had for its purpose the building of greater public confidence in
the banks of the United States by providing insurance against
the loss of deposits in banks.
The deposit guaranty program of the United States has been
in operation for a relatively short period of time, but already
the law has caused much discussion and controversy. Many ques-
tion the wisdom of its enactment; others question the value of
its retention upon the statute books of the country; some doubt
if it would be a real safety valve in time of stress; others
wonder how long it can continue, and what its future course will
be when it has passed the formulative stages.
It is important, therefore, to make a study of bank deposit
guaranty in the light of what information we have about it, for
the value of any program is seen only when it is carefully
studied and observed, after which some conclusions may be for-
mulated in terms of certain facts and circumstances.
The following pages will be devoted to the presentation of
the distinction between deposit guaranty and deposit insurance;
the insurance of commercial deposits and savings deposits; the
historical background of deposit guaranty; the arguments for and
against a guaranty system; the Federal Deposit Insurance program
its organization, operation, and significance to banking opera-
tions in the United States.

BANK DEPOSIT GUARANTY
AND
BANK DEPOSIT INSURANCE
Ever since the proposal and enactment of bank deposit
guaranty lav/s there has been considerable controversy as to
whether or not any scheme which is designed to protect deposi-
tors against loss when a bank fails should be named a bank
deposit guaranty system
,
or a bank deposit insurance system .
Some feel that such systems are purely "guaranty systems" having
none of the usual aspects of insurance because the funds to pay
depositors of closed banks are obtained by assessing other banks
while others feel that even the assessment of banks to cover
losses is a special type of insurance and within the meaning of
the word "insurance". For example, Mr. Robb in his book "The
Guaranty of Bank Deposits", has attempted to prove this latter
contention. 1 Others think that the insurance element is com-
pletely lacking unless adequate reserves are built up to take
care of losses. Furthermore, those who enacted the Federal lav/
protecting depositors against the loss of money when a bank
fails, talked In terms of "bank deposit guaranty" and "bank
deposit insurance" as though both phrases were synonomous. In
addition, there is the question of there being an "insurable
interest" in bank deposits when viewed from the point of view
of the depositor.
To answer this question as to just what is "bank deposit
1
"The Guaranty of Bank Deposits", Thomas B. Robb, Houghton-
Mifflin Company, Boston, 1921 -- Pages 31-42

insurance", it is necessary to examine closely the fundamental
aspects of "insurance" and then see whether or not a deoosit
guaranty program can meet the requirements essential to place it
in the class of insurance. Furthermore, we must examine the cor L
tentlons of those who understand insurance fundamentals and stilt
claim "deposit guaranty" is "deposit insurance".
However, an analysis of the insurance features of bank
deposit guaranty must be based upon an understanding of the
fundamentals underlying insurance and insurable risk.
Insurance and Insurable Risk
Because there are so many risks in the economic world
today and because the majority of human beings have not suffi-
cient wealth to stand the loss of property and other forms of
wealth, there has grown up an enormous business whose function
it is to assume risks for others. For a fee determined in
accordance with the nature, degree, and value of the risk in-
volved, these concerns or individuals guarantee to others finan-
cial indemnification for loss of wealth or income.
A. H. Mowbray in his text entitled "Insurance, Its Theory
and Practice in the United States" defines an insurance contract
as follows: "Stripped of all the verbiage involved in desig-
nating the risk, and in defining how loss shall be proved, it is
a promise of one party (the insurer) that in consideration of
the payment, or the promise of payment, of a sum of money (the
premium) by the other party (the insured), the first party will,
in case the risk eventuates in loss of a cash value, pay to the
’.
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other oarty that cash value, usually up to an agreed maximum
Plimit.
In order to take insurance and have one’s policy valid, it
is essential that one have an "insurable interest".
C. J. Crobaugh in his "Handbook of Insurance" states the
following about insurable interest: "It is an important doctrin]^
in insurance that the person securing the benefit of the insur-
ance must have some real interest in the subject matter insured.
Such interests may be described in a general way as interests
which persons have in the subjects of the insurance so that they
will be benefited by the continued existence of the subject
matter or will suffer a direct and immediate loss by the de-
struction or injury of such subject matter. For example, a
person has an insurable interest if he stands in such a legal
relationship to the property as to benefit by its continuance
or be prejudiced by its being damaged or destroyed.
"The extent of the insurable interest in the subject matter1
insured may be measured by the amount of loss the person would
suffer if the subject matter were destroyed or damaged." 4
"Insurable interest is a more extensive term than the word
'property' or 'estate', for it refers to any benefit or advantage
which may be derived from the thing." ^
"It has been asserted that there is insurable interest wherte
there is a direct or reasonable degree of probability of pecuni-
ary interest to be secured from the continued preservation of
the subject of the insurance.
2
"Insurance, Its Theory and Practice", A. H. Mowbray, (McGraw
Hill Insurance Series), New York -- Page 49
3
"Handbook of Insurance", C. J. Crobaugh, McGraw-Hill, New York.
6. Pages 705-7094 Ibid. Ibid., Page 707 Ibid.

When one appreciates the real meaning of the term "insurable
interest" as defined by Mr, Crobaugh, there can be little doubt
in his mind about the insiirable interest of anyone who has a
bank account. The extent of this insurable interest is consider
able. Mr. Crobaugh says: "The extent of the insurable interest
in the subject matter insured may be measured by the amount of
loss the person v/ould suffer if the subject matter were destroyed
or damaged." Anyone who witnessed the untold. suffering of thos
who lost their entire savings by means of bank failures in 1932
cannot deny that there can be no safeguard too great to secure
the savings of those who have to rely upon the banks to protect
their life's savings. To those who have little wealth, the loss
of the savings of the family is an irreparable calamity leading
to untold misery in many instances; and even to the man who pos-
sesses great wealth, the loss of very much of his cash in the
bank causes him to make considerable adjustment in his mode of
living. It seems almost self-evident, therefore, that any owner
of a bank deposit has a very definite insurable interest. The
depositor has a direct and appreciable interest to be secured
from the continued preservation of the subject of insurance,
the bank account.^
Bank Deposit Guaranty and Scientific Insurance
Having determined that there is an insurable interest in
bank deposits owned by the general public as depositors, it is
now proper to inquire whether or not a system of bank deposit
guaranty can meet the requirements of scientific insurance. Thi
V
"Handbook of Insurance", C. J. Crobaugh, McGraw-Hill, New Yorbj^
Page 707
^ lb id
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may be determined in a satisfactory manner by a comparison of
bank deposit guaranty procedure with the principles of scien-
tific insurance.
A well administered insurance company has the constant aim
"to secure a homogeneous group". This is accomplished by classi
fying risks that are of the same nature into their proper cate-
gories. It is not always possible to have all the risks exactly
alike, but experience is helping insurance companies to make
better distinctions among risks. A classification of risks in
accordance v/ith the best judgment available has two outstanding
advantages in the administration of scientific insurance (1)
The administrative procedure of the insurance company is simpli-
fied in that the hazards of different risks are readily available
for purposes of setting the rates to be charged on a given sub-
ject of insurance. (2) The costs of insurance are more equitably-
distributed among those whose interests are being insured, thus
tending to distribute more v/ldely the benefits of insurance. 1(1
In addition to selecting risks, scientific insurance sets
up different premium rates for the different types of risk being
insured. This principle recognizes that the cost of the insur-
ance should be in proportion to the benefit derived by the person
whose interest is protected, as well as the likelihood of loss
so far as the insurance company is concerned. 11
In contrast to the foregoing procedure, a program of bank
deposit guaranty as practiced in those states having compulsory
systems, under which all banks must participate, all the banks
9
"The Guaranty of Bank Deposits", Thomas B. Robb, Houghton-
jj
Mifflin Company, Boston, 1921 -- Page 31
10 Ibid., Pages 31-42
11 Ibid.

are forced into the system and then the same rate is charged to
all. Such a procedure would seem to violate the requirements of]
scientific insurance. In the first place it appears that no
selection of banks is made, and that the rate is the same for
every bank whose deposit liabilities are guaranteed.
However, those who are familiar with the regulation and
supervision of banks, know that this is a way of mailing a selec4
tion of risks. The "rigid" supervision of banks made by the
state is a selection of risk. State supervision establishes a
minimum standard and then charges a uniform rate to all meeting
the standard.
It can be maintained, therefore, that the guaranty of bank
deposits under the compulsory system is a matter of insurance.
the deposit guaranty program being a compulsory insurance compar^
12
administered by the state.
The selection of risk by the insurance company is still
haphazard guesswork in many cases, insufficient materials being
available upon which to base sound conclusions. In the past
this kind of guesswork has determined much of our marine and
13fire insurance."1' Provided a state deposit guaranty system estflb
lishes a minimum, and provided it is properly administered, one
cannot say that it is any less scientific than other kinds of
insurance
.
The same arguments hold for the voluntary bank deposit
guaranty system, under which banks may participate or not at
their will because the system in operation is practically
12
"The Guaranty of Bank Deposits", Thomas B. Robb, Houghton-
Mifflin Company, Boston, 1921 -- Pages 30-33
'Bank Deposit Guaranty, The Insurance Aspects of the Problem
C. L. Jamison, Bankers' Magazine, Yol. CXXXVI (Jan. to June
1953) -- Page 453
13
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1
compulsory. Those banks which choose to become "guaranty banks"
are bound to be favored by depositors in that the depositor wants
to feel that his money is safe, thus other banks outside the
system are forced to join the system to hold on to deposits and
gain new accounts. - Furthermore, the same degree of selection
through supervision is made, and all pay the same rate.
This analysis and comparison between scientific insurance
and bank deposit guaranty may be carried further. A comparison
of deposit guaranty with scientific life insurance is highly
desirable because life insurance is the most scientific of the
insurance programs.
Life insurance companies establish minimum standards in
order to classify individuals into certain age and health groups
and then charge them a \miform rate according to the classifica-
tion. This is done in spite of the fact that no two lives were
ever created equal. On the other hand, no two banks were ever
created equal, but the subjects of insurance present less of a
risk hazard than the subjects of life insurance. When a person*
life is insured, he is not kept under constant supervision, as
is the bank, hut is turned loose to run at will. Vi/hen a man
knows that his family is protected against want in the event of
his death, he is apt to become less careful of his habits of
living, thereby increasing the element of risk to the company
insuring his life, whereas a bank deposit guaranty risk is kept
reasonably constant through supervision. Furthermore, just as
the life instirance company rejects the undesirable risk, so does
14 Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1913 -- Pages 69-11-

the JTaTc. refuse to guarantee the deposits of an insolvent bank,
while the constant regulation of banks continues to eliminate the
undesirables that were able to get under the ropes when the sys-
tem started. Once a man's life is insured, the insurance company
must carry the risk so long as the policy is not allowed to
lapse.
^
Just as the life insurance company has its physical exami-
nations, so does the state establish exact moral and ethical
Standards for men who desire to enter the banking business. In
addition, the state has definite figures to determine risk.
In the life insurance business, the payments to the bene-
ficiaries of the subjects insured increase as the life insurance
companies grow older, whereas in the case of a bank, the age ele-f
:nent is of no consequence; if anything, the hazard decreases with
age because the experience of the managers of the bank widens.
It can be pointed out that the amount of loss in life insur-
ance is definitely known, and the premiums so established as to
pay the losses, and cover costs of doing business; while the
losses of bank deposit insurance are not so easily ascertained.
However
,
when a bank fails it is because a person refuses to re-
pay what he borrowed from the bank. To what extent the credit
risk may be collected1 ^ and v/hen, is extremely problematical, but
lit is certain that all bad loans will not be a total loss. There
fore, this does not place bank deposit guaranty at a great dis-
advantage in that there is a chance that there will be no loss
kt all, the bank being repaid in full when borrowers in default
^
"Handbook of Insurance", C. J. Crobaugh, McGraw-Hill, New York
16 Pages
237-241
"Bank Deposit Guaranty, the Insurance Aspects of the Problem"
,
C. L. Jamison, Bankers' Magazine, Vol. CXXXVI (Jan. to June
1933) -- Page 453
-
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regain financial strength.
In conclusion, it can be said that although bank deposit
‘insurance is a compulsory program for all subjects when in opera!-
tion, it is not less scientific than is the life insurance pro-
gram, except for the fact that a definite amount of loss may not
be determined in advance. However, the failure to calculate the
amount of loss, does not detract from the value of comparing the
scientific aspects of the two.
ank Deposit Guaranty and Assessment Life Insurance
One of the fundamental principles of state bank deposit
guaranty systems is the creation of a fund from which to pay the
claims of depositors in banks which fail. Each bank participat-
ing in the guaranty system, is assessed a certain percentage of
its average deposits, for the purpose of creating this fund. Be4-
cause of this assessment feature of the deposit guaranty systems
a comparison of the insurance of bank deposits under a guaranty
system with assessment insurance companies cannot be neglected.
Some people believe that there can be no real insurance
when the system which is providing the insurance does not set up
some sort of a reserve fund to be placed at compound interest
and which is sufficient to meet each loss as it occurs. Those
who hold this view, state that deposit insurance is assessment
insurance and, therefore, is doomed to failure on the basis of
the experience of the assessment life insurance companies.
It is true that the assessment life insurance companies
have not met with great success. However, the fundamental cause

for this failure is removed in a bank deposit insurance program.
Assessment life insurance has failed because the risks that are
underwritten have increased as the age of the policyholders has
17progressed. As the companies grew older, the assessments
became intolerable. Such is not the case in bank deposit in-
surance. The age element does not affect the bank except to
increase its prestige, and to increase the experience of the
bank management.
Contrary to the apparent failure of the assessment life
insurance companies, there is another form of assessment insur-
ance which has had a marked degree of success. The fire insur-
ance program which is conducted by the "County Mutual Insurance
Companies" in the middle west has been successful. in these
County Mutual Insurance companies the risks are practically all
eqiial; they cover the same kind of property which, consists of
middle west farm properties for the most part. Furthermore,
the risks of the insurance are approximate in size and small in
amount in that the majority of these farm properties have about
the same number of buildings of the same type which are estab-
lished on a moderate scale. Another advantage of these risks
is the distance apart; thereby the danger of an excessive con-
flagration that might spread over a large area is minimized
Icons iderably . Therefore, it is not likely that these companies
will be subjected to indemnification of many losses at the same
time. In addition, the participants are not overburdened when
a loss occurs.
1 7
"The Guaranty of Bank Deposits", Thomas B. Robb, Houghton-
Mifflin Company, Boston, 1921 -- Page 33
"insurance. Its Theory and Practice", A. H. Mowbray, McGraw-
Hill Insurance Series, New York -- Page 319

In contrast, the insurance of bank deposits are practically
all unequal. The insurance of deposits in a small bank in Ver-
mont is not at all comparable to the insurance of deposits in a
large metropolitan bank. Not only are the number of depositors
and size of deposits in different categories, but the qualities
of the management are dissimilar. This inequality does not de-
feat the deposit insurance program, however, so long as each
bank contributes to the insurance fund in accordance with the
size of its deposits, or ability to pay. A failure of a large
bank might work a greater hardship on a small bank than it would
on another large bank, but this temporary inconvenience of meet-
! ing an extraordinary assessment can be overcome to a degree by
setting proper statutory limits upon assessments.
he Importance of Reserves in an Insurance Program
It has been stated already that some people believe that
the creation of reserves is absolutely fundamental to insurance.
It is important to examine this contention carefully.
The act of Congress in 1933 which created the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation termed its guaranty program "bank
deposit insurance"
. The use of these two terms synonymously
caused the Committee on Banking Lav; and Practice of the Associa-
tion of Reserve City Bankers to examine carefully the exact
meaning of this term "bank deposit insurance". The Commission
conducted a careful investigation, the results of which were
published in one of its bulletins. The bulletin contains this
statement: "In the law as written the guaranty plan is referred
19
Act of 73rd Congress entitled "Banking Act of 1933"

to not as a guaranty of bank deposits, but as an insurance plan.
There is nothing in the plan that entitles it to be classed as
insurance. Insurance involves an old and tried principle. The
essence of insurance is the payment by the insured of premiums
in actuarial relation to the risk involved . Under the terms of
the permanent plan, however, the costs or premiums are not
charged according to the risk. There is no penalty for bad
management. If the premium could be assessed according to the
hazard, the insurance plan might be used as an instrument of
reform. The cost to the badly managed bank or the uneconomic
bank would be so high as to force the changes, reorganizations,
or reforms necessary to secure lower premiums
.
It is pointed out also that the guaranty plan departs from
insurance principles in these ways: It brings the heaviest
losses upon banks during periods of adversity, while in periods
of prosperity there will be few failures or assessments. In
order to avoid overtaxing a bank in times of stress there shotilcl
be a reserve fund created as "would be the case under a true
insurance plan. M ^~
The foregoing statements by the Commission on Banking Lav/
and Practice of the Association of Reserve City Bankers not only
disagree with the foregoing contentions that bank deposit
guaranty is bank deposit insurance, but state that such plans
in order to be classified as insurance, should collect regular
premiums and create reserves for the payment of losses.
The insurance reserve fund, according to C. J. Crobaugh,
20 Bulletin No. 3, Committee on Banking Lav/ and Practice, Asso-
ciation of Reserve City Bankers -- Pages 27-28
Ibid., Page 28

t0
"is a sinking fund, accvimulated from premium payments and com-
pound interest for the purpose of meeting policy obligations as
they fall due the main reason for the reserve is to
maintain in trust for the exclusive right of policyholders a sun.
eq\ial to the unearned part of premium already collected. "22
In reply, to the contention of the Committee on Banking Lav/
and Practice that the creation of reserves to indemnify for
losses is fundamental to all insurance, it may be stated that
insurance that creates reserves from premiums is one kind of
insurance and may be called "reserve insurance", and this kind
of insurance does contribute the bulk of the insurance business
in the country. On the other hand, any system which protects
one against financial loss upon some predetermined basis is in-
surance. For example, even though reserves are not established
by the "County Mutual Insurance Companies" in the middle west,
the insurance program is successful. These companies insure
farms against loss from fire, and assess their losses against
the insured farmers.
Is Deposit Guaranty Deposit Insurance?
Fundamental to all insurance contracts there must be an
"insurable interest", and it v/as stated ea.rly in this discussion
that there can be little doubt about the existence of an insur-
able Interest in the deposit owned by the creditor of a bank.
Therefore, an insurance program exclusively for the bank deposi-
tor is not impossible under the lav/.
The question as to whether a system for guaranteeing bank
22
"Handbook of Insurance",
Page 1142
C. J. Crobaugh, McGraw-Hill,

deposits can meet the requirements of scientific insurance has
been discussed and it has been found that bank deposit guaranty
is conducted on a basis much like that of the scientific insur-
ance companies. The participants in a deposit guaranty system
must be subjected to the same classifications, standards, and
examinations before being accepted into the system as the sub-
jects for other types of insurance conducted on a scientific
basis. The fact that the guaranty systems are compulsory insur-
ance systems in name or status does not alter this conclusion.
Furthermore, it has been found that bank deposit insurance has
an advantage over ordinary insurance in that the subjects of
insurance under the latter programs are allowed to become lax
Iwhen the risk is covered, whereas the bank deposit guaranty sys-
tem keeps its subject under constant surveillance.
It has been concluded also that although bank deposit in-
surance is assessment insurance, this factor does not doom it to
failure. Assessment insurance has been and still is conducted
on a successful basis.
Finally, it has been concluded that reserves are not essen-
tial to an insurance program, the type of insurance which create
reserves being only one type of system providing protection.
Therefore, it can be concluded that bank deposit guaranty
is really bank deposit insurance. A bank deposit guaranty sys-
tem which assesses its losses against those whose deposits are
feeing protected, and to whom the benefits of the system accrue,
is similar to what is known as "assessment insurance".
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Chapter Three
THE GUARANTY OF TIKE AND DEMAND DEPOSITS
Introduction
The significance of a system for guaranteeing "hank de-
posits" cannot be fully appreciated until it is analyzed in the
light of the nature of the deposits which are being protected.
Deposit guaranty systems insure both "time" and "demand" de-
posits, but the two are quite dissimilar in their importance to
the banker and the public. The guaranty of deposits in the savf
ings bank field has no real significance outside of being a
promise to indemnify a depositor against loss when a bank fails,
while the guaranty of commercial bank deposits involves not
merely the protection of a different class of deposits, but it
affects commercial bank credit, commercial banking practices,
and check currency.
Therefore, in order to understand bank deposit guaranty in
its relation to banking and business, it is important to examin
carefully not only what is the banking business, but what are
its functions, and how these are affected by a guaranty system.
Banking
The term "banicing" is subject to much abuse, and is used
in a popular sense to designate almost any type of activity
which pertains to the handling of money, securities, mortgages,
etc.
When the term is properly used, it means the gathering
together of -funds, usually in relatively small amounts, to lend
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to industry and commerce. 23 Upon these amounts of money so
gathered together a rate of interest is paid which is ordinarily
below that received by the bank for its loans, the difference
or spread being the source of the bank's profit after it deduct:
its cost of doing business.
There are other agencies and institutions whose business
is tied up with banking, but to which the name "bank" cannot be
applied when it is used correctly. For example, an investment
house underwrites and sells securities which are bought by
banks. Even though these firms act as an intermediary for ob-
taining the capital wanted by industry, they are not banks, and
do not perform the services expected of banks.
Within the meaning of our definition, it is possible to
classify banking institutions into two broad classes: (1)
commercial banks and (2) savings (investment) banks.
The commercial bank has for its function the receiving of
funds on deposit subject to demand, and the making of short
term loans. By the expression "short term" is meant loans which
run for a duration of a few months (sixty to ninety days). The
proceeds of these loans are usually used to buy or move merchan-
dise, crops, etc., the loan being discharged when the transac-
24tion is completed.
The savings bank or savings department of a bank receives
funds on deposit which are expected to be left for a longer
period of time, and not subject to immediate withdrawal. A
large part of the deposits of savings banks are loaned to in-
23
"banking",
. A. Bradford, (Longman's Economic Series), Long"
mans Green Company (1933) -- Page 2
"Banking Theory and Practice", Harr and Harris, McGraw-Hill,
Page 11

idustry indirectly by means of purchasing securities, the maturi-
ty or due date of which may be several years distant.
The Guaranty of Time Deposits
There are two types of savings bank when classified accord-
ing to their purpose. One is called a mutual savings bank, and
the other is a stock savings bank. The mutual savings bank is
organized for the benefit and protection of depositors only.
The only capital it has consists of the deposits made by the
depositors and whatever income derived from these deposits that
has been retained for the protection of the organization. The
stock savings bank on the other hand has for its purpose the
earning of profits over and above expenses which will accrue to
the stockholders who have donated so-called paid-in capital to
the bank. The mutual savings bank profits accrue only to deposit-
tors as dividends after the payment of expenses and setting aside
certain necessary reserves. Interest (dividends) on deposits
25
for the mutual bank is a division of profits
,
while for the
stock bank it is a fixed expense paid for the use of capital.
For the mutual savings bank, a declaration of dividends in-
creases its assets, whereas a declaration of dividends for the
stock savings bank is a return on paid-in capital and a liability
of the bank to stockholders.^ 6
There are many factors which may contribute to bank failures
but in the last analysis, a bank failure is a condition of af-
fairs under which a bank owes more to its depositors than it has
good assets to meet these obligations. In other words, the
25 Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 168, Section 47
"Banking Theory and Practice", Harr and Harris, McGraw-Hill,
Page 13
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deposit liabilities of the bank exceed the assets, capital, and
surplus of the bank. When this situation arises, the bank is
declared insolvent, its regular affairs are ended, and the bank
is liquidated. The bank has failed to invest its funds in in-
vestments sufficiently sound to preserve the solvency of the
institution. In the majority of the investments made there is
no connection between the holder of a deposit and the investment!
of the deposit. Furthermore, when a savings bank invests money,
the amount that may be invested may not exceed the deposits,
guaranty, surplus, and other special funds, i.e. it cannot
create credit as does the commercial bank for the purpose of
mailing a loan or investment.
The guaranty of time or savings deposits, therefore, does
not require a careful analysis to ascertain what the significand
of the deposits may be, it is merely a promise to indemnify the
holder of a deposit right in a savings bank when the bank is
found to be incapable of meeting its total deposit liabilities.
Furthermore, the savings deposit has no place in the circulatior.
of currency used by the business world.
The Guaranty of Demand Deposits
The savings bank receives a deposit and acts as a mecha-
nism to place that money at the disposal of industry. It meets
industry's long term capital requirements. On the other hand,
there is the commercial bank whose sole function is to meet the
|
short term capital needs of business and industry. The commer-
!
cial bank may lend money which has been deposited with it for
•l

4safe keeping, but the major portion of its loans consist of an
extension of bank credit, i.e. the bank allows borrowers to draw
drafts upon it. A deposit is created and the drafts or checks
are drawn against it. The deposits of the commercial bank are
approximately equivalent to its loans, and in most cases the
deposit arises out of the loan.-'7
A clear understanding of the significance of demand deposit
guaranty requires a discussion of the nature of commercial de-
posits .
The Nature of Commercial Deposits
Those who are not familiar with commercial banking as it
is practiced in the United States are inclined to think of its
activities in a very narrow sense, and think that the commercial
j bank is merely an instrumentality for collecting together the
surplus funds of the community and lending them to those in neec
of "short term" loans, as opposed to the savings bank which
0
meets the needs of long term capital requirements. The commer-
cial bank does more than collect surplus funds; it collects
these funds and uses some of them as a basis for "bank credit"
which increases many fold the amount of purchasing power avail-
able to borrowers. One who borrows from a commercial bank gives
the bank his promise to pay which is secured by a pledge of
assets or collateral. In exchange for this promise to pay the
bank may give the borrower cash for his promise, or it may credit
the amount of the loan to his account against which the borrower
po
i
may draw checks
. in the latter instance the bank is creating
"Banking Theory and Practice", Harr and Harris, McGraw-Hill,
Pages 128-132
Ibid.
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a deposit or manufacturing bank credit. (At the same time, the
bank made a loan and created a checking account deposit.) To
the commercial bank this checking system is just a right to drav;
from one account to another.^ When the bank cannot make the
transfer on its own books, banks do it among themselves through
a clearing house. In this way the bank needs less cash to
operate, and can extend greatly its bank credit. The bank con-
tinues to loan in this way until its loans equal five or six
times the cash account on hand. If the borrower demanded cash
in every instance this system would not function at all.
From what has been stated already it would seem that a
commercial bank’s lending power must depend upon the amount of
cash deposits it receives and keeps on hand both as a reserve
and to meet demands for cash withdrawals. This situation is
true only for those banks outside of the Federal Reserve System.
To understand the limitation placed upon these banks which be-
long to the Federal Reserve System it is essential to discuss
in detail the nature of the so-called "reserve account" of mem-
ber banks. A member bank is a bank which has met the require-
ments of and joined the Federal Reserve System.
In the Federal Reserve System each District Bank acts as a
depository for the legal reserve against deposits required by
statute of the "member banks" of the system. For this purpose
each member bank maintains a "deposit reserve account" at the
30Federal Reserve Bank. For Central Reserve City member banks
the legal reserve against deposits is lSf' of deposits; for
29
"Banking Theory and Practice", Harr and Harris, McGraw-Hill
,
Pages 128-132
"Contemporary Banking", Willis, Chapman, and Robey, Page 582

Reserve City member barks the reserve is 10% of deposits; and
for other member banks this reserve is 1% of deposits. The
chief value (see footnote) of this reserve against deposits is
to check the expansion and contraction of credit of member banks
to customers. It is recognized that practically all commercial
loans result in the creation of deposits since the commercial
bank is allowed to set up for its customers "credits to account"
, against which checks may be drawn in exchange for customers’
promise to pay. Against these "created deposits" a reserve must
be kept. The balance in the member bank's reserve account de-
termines that bank's potential credit expansion or loans to
customers. For example, in the case of the Reserve City bank,
*7
"I
it is theoretically possible for this bank to expand its
credit approximately ten times the amount of its reserve account]
balance. A reserve account of ten dolia rs would allow credit
expansion or member bank loans to customers amounting to $>100.
(Actually deposits are expanded approximately six times the re-
serve account.) Now if a member bank of the Federal Reserve
System wished to increase its potential expansion of credit, it
could increase its reserve account by rediscounting some of its
eligible and acceptable paper’-’
,
or paper that meets the legal
and credit requirements of the Federal Reserve System. An in-
crease in the member bank's reserve against deposits above that 1
necessary to cover its present deposit liability makes possible
Footnote : The value of the legal reserve as a means of protect-
ing: the denositor is discussed on nae-es 47 40 cmri 4C
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Pages 128-132
1 32
Ibid.
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an increase in created deposits or loans. The rate of discount
charged by the Central Bank will determine whether or not it is
profitable for the member bank to discount this paper which has
been discounted by it for one of its customers. When the Federa
Reserve Bank discount rate is raised, member banks curtail their
discounting to build up their reserve accounts and the expansion
of credit or making of additional loans on the part of the banks
to their customers is curtailed, and conversely a lowering of
i the Federal Reserve discount rate encourages an expansion of
credit
.
The role of the reserve account in the control over credit
expansion and contraction is more clearly demonstrated in a dis-
cussion of its use in connection with the carrying on of "Open-
Market Operations". In the Federal Reserve System the "Open Mar
ket Committee" goes into the market and buys acceptances and
securities, for which it pays by checks drawn on the Federal
Reserve Banks. The recipients of these checks deposit them in
their respective private banks, and eventually they find their
way into "clearing" in the Federal Reserve Banks. The clearing
1 proceeds are added to the "reserve accounts" of the member banks
thus increasing the potential expansion of credit for the member
bank to whose account the clearing proceeds were added. The
member bank may refuse to use this excess reserve as a basis for
loans, and the whole program becomes ineffective. The contrac-
tion of credit is accomplished through the reversal of this pro
cedure. Bonds or acceptances are sold in the "open market" by
rz rz
"The Federal Reserve System in Operation", E. A. Goldenweiser
McGraw-Hill -- Pages 54-62 and 80-82
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the Federal Reserve Banks and are paid for largely by checks on
member banks. When these checks on member banks are cleared,
their respective reserve accounts are diminished, thus curtail-
ing the expansion of credit. This curtailment may be offset
somewhat by the member bank by a deposit of excess cash in its
reserve account or by discounting eligible and acceptable paper
held in its portfolio.
[he Significance of Demand Deposit Guaranty
More than ninety per cent of the payments which arise out
of business transactions today are settled by means of checks
34drawn against bank accounts."' These checks afford great con-
veniences to business men. One may write a check for an odd
sum; it is not necessary to keep on hand large sums of cash to
settle accounts, and, thereby, one can avoid the risk of being
robbed of his money. In addition, the check is made payable to
a specific person and serves as an excellent receipt when en-
dorsed by the payee. The business world has confidence in the
credit of the banks upon which these checks are drawn, whereas
a draft upon a person whose credit is not known would not be
accepted so readily. The commercial bank acts as a mechanism
for converting the credit of a business man which in his name
alone has limited acceptability into credit of greater accepta-
bility. At the same time the bank turns the non-liquid assets
of a business man into liquid assets v/hen it accepts his note
for a loan, the security for the note being the business and its
assets
.
34
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The discussion pertaining to the nature of commercial
deposits demonstrated that the commercial deposit is the basis
for a check currency used by the business world today. It fol-
lows, then, that a guaranty of the payment of these commercial
deposits is a guaranty of the check currency.
During the banking holiday of 1933, when the credit of most
banks was open to question, there was a hesitancy on the part of
business men to accept checks drawn upon certain banks. There
was a doubt concerning the time that would be required to col-
lect the face amount of the check. If there had been a bank
deposit guaranty system at that time insuring the bank account
of each depositor up to a certain limit, these doubts would have
been substantially reduced.
The guaranty of commercial deposits, therefore, is not
merely a guaranty of payment to the depositor but is a system
which insures the holder of a check drawn against such deposits
that it will be accepted and paid. It is a scheme for securing
the present day "check currency" . This scheme is quite compar-
able to the Safety-Fund System of New York State established a
century ago when the State of New York assessed banks to provide
a fund to assure the payment of bank note circulation (see Pages
64-74). It was important to business men then to know that the
medium of exchange would not entail loss when the bank issuing
it failed and, therefore, would not circulate at a discount or
be refused as money altogether.
It is not desirable at this point to discuss the desirabili
.-
-
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of guaranteeing the payment of commercial deposits. It is d
sired only to indicate here the significance of a commercial
deposit program under a system where such deposits make up a
large part of the circulating media.



Chapter One
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THE PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC’S INTEREST IN THE BANKING
BUSINESS OTHER THAN BANK DEPOSIT GUARANTY
. —
I Introduction
Ever since the enactment of legislation pertaining to the
organization, regulation, and conduct of banks and banking
institutions there has been a growing tendency on the part of
those to whom the making of such lav/s are entrusted to give
increased protection to the bank depositor. In fact much of
the legislation which pertains to banking is a recognition of
the public’s stake in the banking business. The conduct of
banking on a sound and conservative basis is a matter of great
concern to every citizen, for without confidence in the banking
structure, the nation cannot carry on its business in an ac-
customed and normal manner. On the other hand, there are a
great many laws which are designed to protect the bankers, such
as laws to prohibit too many banks in one locality, which would
’ make profitable operation impossible.
The laws which regulate the banking system of any country
are a product of evolutionary development. They recognize cer-
tain conditions which exist or have existed in their relation
t to the conduct of banicing.
The guaranty of bank deposits by law had its origin in the
desire of the legislators to instill greater public confidence
in the banking structure of a particular state or, more recently
a nation. For example, the enactment of the legislation providing

for the establishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion in 1953 cane at a time when public confidence in banks had
been badly shaken, and one must admit that such legislation v/as
not entirely unwarranted. Banks could not stand additional
"runs "
.
However, the significance of Deposit Guaranty Lav/s and the
philosophy underlying their enactment may be better understood
1 if one is better acquainted with the attempts of the law making
bodies in this country to protect the interests of depositors ii)
American banks.
It is difficult for the average citizen to appreciate the
many safeguards that are set up for his benefit and protection
in his dealings with his bank. In the first place, the regula-
tory authorities do not allow anyone who so desires to enter the:
banking business, nor do they allow those who can meet the re-
quirements and become bankers under the law to conduct their
business wherever they desire. The establishment of the bank
at a place where banking facilities are needed must be done by
compliance with strict rules and only after the accumulation of
a specified sum of "capital", and the election of responsible
men to manage the institution. As soon as the bank is estab-
lished, the state specifies to varying degrees how it shall be
run, and carefully regulates the institution by making periodic
examinations in order to assure itself that the law is being
complied, with insofar as the operation of the bank is concerned.
(The degree to which banks are regulated and supervised varies
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with the state; some states are extreme in regulation of hanks
and others are lax, while the majority follow a middle course
which allows relative free rein to the hank under careful super-
vision until something goes wrong.)
Finally, when a bank fails to comply with the law in regard
to its operation or becomes insolvent, it is taken over by the
state which proceeds to run or liquidate the bank in the best
interests of the depositors.
In order to understand exactly how the regulatory authori-
ties protect deoositors from suffering losses at the hands of
careless or unscrupulous bank managers, it is desirable to
examine in detail some of the statutory provisions which pertairi
to these matters.
i?he Regulation of Bank Organization
In the organization of a savings bank in Massachusetts, the
.following procedure is necessary: Twenty or more persons must
associate themselves by an agreement in writing for the stated
purpose of forming a corporation, giving the proposed name of
the corporation together with its purpose and the city, town, or)
district where it intends to transact business. To this agree-
ment each party must subscribe his name, occupation, residence,
and post office address. 0 '-'
The subscribers to the agreement notify the Board of Eank
Incorporation of their intention to form a savings bank and
apply for a certificate "that public convenience and advantage
will be promoted" by the establishment of the proposed bank.
36
Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 168, Section 7
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Upon receipt of the application, arrangements are made for a
time and place for a public hearing, and for three weeks prior
to this hearing the would-be incorporators must publish a form
of notice of the proposed incorporation furnished by the Board
-
of Incorporation in one or more newspapers in or near the tov/n
where it is proposed to locate the bank. (If the certificate
of incorporation is refused after these proceedings, the appli-
cation may be renewed subject to the same conditions after one
year from the date refused.
)
After it is known that the certificate of incorporation
will be granted, it is necessary that the subscribers to the
agreement of association meet to elect officers as soon as pos-
sible, and thus provision is made in the statutes for calling a
"first meeting". At this meeting a temoorary clerk is elected
and by-laws are adopted. In accordance with the provisions of
the by-lav/s, the trustees, a president, and a permanent clerk
and other officers are elected. The president-elect and a
majority of the trustees elected at the first meeting sign and
make oath to duplicate copies of the agreement of association
the names of the subscribers and the name, residence, and post
office address of each of the officers of the new organization,
together with the date of the first meeting and successive ad-
journments thereof, if any. One copy of the agreement, etc., is
sent to the Board of Bank Incorporation and the other, together
with the records of the proposed corporation, to the Commission*
of Corporations and Taxation. If the Commissioner of
r
II
Corporations and Taxation finds that the statutes have been com-
plied with satisfactorily, he endorses his approval on them.
The approved articles are then filed with the Secretary of State
who has them recorded after the payment of a fee of five dollars
L
37Thereupon, he issues a certificate of incorporation.
Certain aspects of this procedure for oganizing a mutual
savings bank in Massachusetts v/arrant comment. It was stated
that the would-be incorporators have to make application to the
Board of Bank Incorporation for permission to incorporate a bank,
This Board is a body whose sole function is to attend to the in-
corporation of banks. The Board must prevent undesirable citi-
|
zens from incorporating a bank and to prevent the organization 04
a bank where an additional banking facilities would not b enef it
a community. When a town is served by too many banks it becomes
lifficult for any to make a profit, and the result is two or
three weak banks instead of one strong one. (This factor is
recognized by the Federal authorities also and even though a
community has no National Bank, the Comptroller of the Currency
refuses to allow the incorporation of a National Bank in a place
where the community is already well served by a State institu-
tion, and the addition of a National bank would only serve to
weaken the bank already established. ) The National authorities
always consult the State authorities regarding the establishment
of a National bank.-'
It was stated also that the State of Massachusetts requires
ohat a public hearing be held subsequent to a three-week public
57 Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 168, Section 7
"Banking Theory and Practice", Harr and Harris, McGraw-Hill,
Page 29
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»notice of the intention to establish a bank in a certain place.
This hearing is a recognition by the State authorities that
there are people whose interests may be jeopardized by the in-
corporation of a new bank. for a community where there is a bank
or which is served by a branch institution. At this hearing the
people so affected may appear and their contentions are considers
carefully before the permission or the denial of permission to
incorporate is given. Any complaints about the character of the
incorporators may be expressed at such a hearing also. The in-
terest of the depositors is foremost in the minds of the law
makers; the depositors are being protected against exploitation.
Rep;ulations Pertaining to Personnel and Directors of Banks
d
The care that must be exercised in the selection of the
personnel of the bank may be demonstrated by an illustration
from the Federal law pertaining to National banks. The Federal
law provides: "Every director must during his whole term of
service be a citizen of the United States and at least tliree-
Fourths of the directors must have resided in the state, terri-
tory, or district in which the association is located, or within
Fifty miles of the location of the office of the association, for
at least one year immediately preceding their election, and must
be residents of such State or within a fifty mile territory of
the location of the association during their continuance in
office. Every director must own in his own right shares of the
capital stock of the association of which he is director, the
aggregate par value of which shall not be less than S1000, unless
'
431
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the capital of the bank shall not exceed $25,000 in which case
he must own in his own right shares of such capital stock the
aggregate par value of which shall not be less than $500. Any
director who ceases to be owner of the required number of shares
of the stock, or who becomes in any other manner disqualified,
,,39shall thereby vacate his place.
The foregoing excerpt from the McFadden Bill of February
192#| shows the degree of care which must be exercised in making
a selection of directors. The directors must be citizens and,
therefore, subject to rrosecution for violations of the law in
the United States or State Court; in addition, they must be resi-
dents in a locality which is within a fifty mile radius of the
location of the bank and, therefore, cannot very well evade
responsibility for the management of the bank because they are
absent from its locality. When a director is near his bank, he
can see to its conduct more satisfactorily. Finally, this Act
states that he must be financially interested in the institution
for which he is a director. This provision assures that a
director will not fail to see to the proper management of the
bank because he has his own money at stake in the venture.
"The Supreme Court of the United States has held that
directors of a National bank must exercise reasonable care and
prudence in the administration of a bank, and this includes some
thing more than officiating as figure heads. They are entitled
under the law to commit the banking business, as defined, to the
duly authorized officers; but this does not absolve them from
39
"Banicing Theory and Practice", Harr and Harris, McGraw-Hill,
Page 29 (McFadden Bill, Act of February 25, 1927, Section 17
,
•>, j. r.-Ub»-m tI 3fl
9 '
-
Z
rV
»
the duty of reasonable supervision, nor ought they to be per-
nitted to be shielded from liability because of want of knowledge
Df wrongdoing if that ignorance is the result of gross inatten-
tion." 40
The directors of a national bank are informed of their re-
sponsibilities and the penalties which may result from negligence
in performing their duty. Furthermore, the director is subject
to financial assessments under the double liability feature of
the stock of his national bank. (See Page 56 )
The above provision states that the directors may delegate
;;he business of banicing to the personnel of the bank. However,
:he law is careful to state that a commission of authority to
mother is not a removal of responsibility.
The conduct of the banking business by the personnel of a
National bank is carefully outlined in statutes which pertain to
such affairs and here, as in the organization of a bank or the
selection of directors, the law protects the depositor insofar as
.t can do so against loss of his money. However, no law can give
i man intelligence or make him completely honest. It can help
tjiim to avoid mistakes.
The Federal authorities who supervise the national banks of
;he United States declare the following in regard to the personne
:>f the bank: The examiner who is looking into the establishment
if a new bank will investigate (1) "The general character and
ixperience of the organizers and of the proposed officers of the
Lew bank; (2) the adequacy of existing banking facilities, and
1
i
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the need of further banking capital; (3) the outlook for the
growth and the development of the town or city in which the bank
is located; (4) the methods and banking practices of the exist ini
banks or bank, the interest rates which they charge to customers
and the character of the service which as quasi-public institu-
tions they are rendering to the community; (5) the reasonable
41prospects for success of the new bank if efficiently managed.”
Regulation of Capital Requirements
In regard to the capital requirements which must be met
before the business of banking may be commenced, the statutes
regulating the national banks state the following: "National
banks with a minimum capital of 325,000 may be organized in any
place, the population of which does not exceed 3,000; with a
minimum capital of $50,000 in any place, the population of which
does not exceed 6,000; with a minimum capital of 100,000 in any
place, the population of which does not exceed 50,000; and with
a minimum capital of $200,000 in cities with a population of
over 50,000.
"
42
These capital requirements prevent people who have no
financial responsibility from entering the banking business.
Furthermore, when the Federal Government specifies that National
banks located in communities having population of a given size
must have a minimum capital of a certain amount, it is merely a
recognition that the capital of a bank should have a definite
relationship to the amount of deposit liability that a bank may
be expected to have. In other words there should be an investme nt
"Banking Theory and Practice", Harr and Harris, McGraw-Hill,
Page 27 (Instructions of the Comptroller of the Currency
Relative to the Organization and Powers of a National Bank
4P 1926)
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of owners’ capital sufficiently large that the sum of this capi-
tal, plus the assessments that may be levied against it (double
liability) together with the investments made by the bank, v/ill
be sufficient to pay off depositors in full in the event of a
failure of the bank. It is inconceivable that all the invest-
ments of a bank should be bad at the same time and, therefore,
even though a bank failed to remain solvent, the depositors should
derive an appreciable portion of their money from the liquidation
or assumption of the bank’s portfolio.
The State of Texas was the first state to attempt to estab-
lish an arithmetical relationship between deposits and the
capital of a bank. The relationship was established by the laws
of Texas as follows:
Capital
$ 10,000 Five
Deposit Liability
Times Capital and Surnlus
10,000 - 20,000 Six t» it ti „
20,000 - 40,000 Seven u ti it tr
40,000 - 75,000 Eight it it ti n
75,000 - 100,000 Nine it ii it ti
100,000 or over Ten tt it ii ti
The Texas law provided in addition that if these deposit
liability limitations were exceeded, the bank must increase its
capital twenty-five per cent within sixty days.^3
At least fifty per cent of the capital stock of a national
bank must be paid in before a national bank may commence business
45 nThe Guaranty of Bank Deposits”, Thomas B. Robb, Houghton-
Mifflin Company, 1921, — Page 15
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and the remaining capital must be completely paid in within six
months from the time of beginning business. - These require-
ments afford protection and safety to the depositor also. There
was a time when banks could organize by meeting very small capi-
tal requirements and, moreover, practically no provisions were
made for the payment of this capital to the bank. As a result,
the capital of many small banks in the middle west in the 1840’s
and 1850’s consisted of mere promises to pay the organizers, and
these proved wortiiless many times when the banks failed.
Regulations Pertaining to Bank Management
The degree of care that must be exercised in the operation
of a bank is also provided for by statutory enactments. It is
recognized that many organizers of banks have had little or no
experience in managing financial institutions so the law attempt)^
to set up guide posts and restrictions for the protection of
bank depositors. For example, the Massachusetts laws pertaining
to the investments which may be made by the mutual savings banks
is an excellent illustration of the restriction which may be
iL
k
placed upon the use of funds. - The chart on Page 48 serves to
illustrate the diversity of investment which must be achieved.
In the case of each investment the savings bank may not place
more than a certain percentage of its assets in the particular
security or property. No savings bank in Massachusetts may in-
vest more than 70$ of its deposits in first mortgages on real
estate, and no mortgage may exceed 60$ of the value of improved
property, nor more than 40$ of the value of unimproved property4
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The degree of care which is given to the depositor in the
mutual savings hank in Massachusetts may be illustrated by the
provisions which pertain to the investment of funds in railroad
47
securities. A savings bank may invest in the bonds or notes
of a railroad corporation incorporated in the Commonwealth and
operated in whole or in part within the boundaries of the Com-
monwealth which has paid in cash dividends to the amount equal
to four per cent of all its capital stock in each of five fiscal
years prior to the purchase of the bond or note. Secondly, a
savings bank may invest in the assumed bonds of a railroad cor-
poration incorporated in any of the New England States, at least
one half of which railroad is located in these states. Such
bonds must be a first lien and such corporation must have paid
in cash dividends equal to four per cent of its outstanding
capital stock over the preceding five-year period. In addition,
the bonds of such corporations are not deemed to be a legal in-
vestment unless during each fiscal year preceding the date of
investment the corporation shall have paid dividends on its
capital stock equal to one-third of the total amount of interest
paid on all its direct and assumed funded indebtedness. Thirdly,
the mutual banks of Massachusetts may invest in the bonds of
railroads in the states of the United States provided: (1) that
either such railroad owns 500 or more miles of standard gauge
track excluding sidings or portrays gross earnings of not less
than $15,000,000; (2) that such railroad has paid all the prin-
cipal and interest due on all its bonds issued previously; (3)
47 Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 168, Section 54
I.
that such railroad has paid in cash dividends an amount equal to
four per cent of its outstanding capital stock; (4) that such
railroad has earned from the operation of its own system (includ-
ing income from the sale of coal from mines it owns or controls,
or railroads leased and operated or controlled and operated)
gross earnings five times the interest due on its outstanding
indebtedness, rental charges, interest on all lines operated
and controlled by this railroad whose securities are being in-
vestigated.
There are many more provisions regarding the purchase of
railroad securities, but the regulations stated are sufficient
to demonstrate the adequacy of the law and the protection af-
forded the depositor. One striking requirement is that which
provides that "a railroad must have paid cash dividends of not
less than four per cent each year over a period of four or five
years, depending upon where the railroad is located. Anyone who
is acquainted with the payment of interest and dividends knows
that interest must be paid before dividends and that railroads
must pay the interest upon several classes of bonds such as firs
and second mortgages, junior liens, etc., and then pay dividends
\ipon the preferred stock before any dividends may be declared
upon the common. The bank is buying only those obligations whic
receive first consideration. Furthermore, a railroad might well
!pay interest every year for a number of years and still fail to
pay any dividends. But the Massachusetts law says that common
stock dividends (the last to be paid), and to an amount of not

less than four per cent of the capital stock outstanding, must
have been paid for four or five consecutive years. This means
that if a railroad corporation fails to pay a quarterly dividend
only once during a four-year period, its securities may not be
bought by a Massachusetts savings bank. Any depositor can ask
for little more protection for his money than such requirements
as those just stated.
Regulations Pertaining to Bank Supervision
In most states the supervision of banks is delegated to a
bank commissioner, superintendent, or bank commission. These
officials are delegated certain specific power by the respective
legislatures of the states. The appointment or election of an
official whose sole function it is to supervise the conduct of
banks, check up on the manner in which they are complying with
the lav;, and in the event that circumstances warrant take over
the operation of banks that seem to be insolvent, is a recogni-
tion of the factor that the average citizen is not capable of
judging the soundness of a bank nor the integrity of its manage-
ment and, therefore, it is essential for that individual to rel^
upon the state to protect his or her interest in the sound opers
tion of banking institutions.
In Massachusetts the Commissioner of Banks is delegated
specific powers which enable him to keep close watch over all
institutions carrying on a banking business and, when the occa-
sion so demands, he is empowered to take action in behalf of the
citizens of the Commonwealth.

53
>:>
A O
The Commissioner of Banks has these powers: (l) Approve
the by-laws of the bank or banks; this power enables him to pre-
vent bank officials from overstepping the authority delegated
them by statute. (2) The Commissioner may prescribe forms and
records for the banks ; this power enables the Commissioner to
simplify his supervision of banks by standardizing their records
accounts, and accounting procedures, and it also prevents the
possibility of unnecessary expense in keeping the records of the
banks. (3) The Commissioner may compel reports from banks; this
is an essential power if he is to make periodic checks upon the
financial status of the state banks
. (4) He can remove officers
for reasons; this power makes it possible for the state to take
action against incapable and dishonest men who are not acting in
the interest of the .depositor
. (5) The Commissioner may super-
vise the payment of dividends; another power which makes it less
likely that a bank will declare dividends to stockholders (or
depositors in the case of the mutual savings banks) when such
funds should be placed aside to build adequate reserves and sur-
plus funds which are so essential to the protection of depositor^.
(6) The Commissioner may compel the verification of passbooks;
this power is essential if protection is to be given the deposi-
tors. It is possible for a bank clerk to have less money credit
to the account of a depositor on the records of the bank than is
credited in the depositor’s pass-book. The writer knows of an
instance where a clerk kept a double set of cards. On one set
he recorded the
48
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proper amount of money, and this card only corresponded to the
pass-book balance. On another card in the bank's files he
recorded a much smaller sum. He was thus able to take cash from
the bank and speculate. This system worked only so long as he
waited upon the customer, and so long as the customer did not
demand the full payment of his deposit account. It is not at
all an unheard of thing for bank employees to "borrow" a sum of
money from an account that seems to be relatively inactive. (7)
The Commissioner of Banks is empowered to make periodic examina-
tions of banks at the expense of the bank being examined. This
is a pov/er which the Commissioner must exercise to determine the
solvency of a bank as well as the degree to which the bank is
obeying the law. (The Commissioner is required to examine every
bank at least once in a period of one year.) 4^ (8) The Commis-
sioner of Banks has the authority to pass upon the establishment
of branches by a bank, and (9) the amount of money that is being
expended for buildings. This latter power is essential to pre-
vent the use of too large a proportion of the bank's assets for
jbuilding purposes. Many bankers would defeat the possibility of
iprofi table operation by such a procedure. Furthermore, the bank
must provide adequate facilities for the protection of its cash
in the vaults and its investments. (10) The Commissioner must
rule upon the legality of certain investments, and (11) he must
take over insolvent banks. The last power is to prevent the
wasting away of assets that should be used to repay the deposi-
tors and creditors of the bank.
49
Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 167

55"
Regulations Pertaining to Bank Liquidations
The interest of the depositor is given final recognition in
the statutory provisions regarding the liquidation of banks and
the taking over of insolvent banks by the Commissioner of Banks.
The statuto.ry provisions in Massachusetts regarding the liquida-
tion of banks are: A savings bank of the Commonwealth is not
allowed to liquidate its affairs without having made an attempt
to enter into negotiations with other savings banks located
within a twenty-five mile radius with a view to consolidation or
merger. If no consolidation or merger can be arranged and if
the Commissioner of Banks is satisfied that the savings bank
desiring to liquidate has given at least thirty days notice to
each other savings bank, the bank may be liquidated. This may
be done only in the event that the liquidation is authorized by
two-thirds vote of its incorporators at a meeting especially
called to consider the subject, and that prior to such vote the
Commissioner shall have approved in writing the proposed liqui-
dation as being in the interest of the depositors.
The liquidation of the bank may be conducted by a committee
of three directors elected for the purpose under such rules as
the Commissioner may prescribe.
One cannot examine the statutory provisions regarding the
organization, conduct, and supervision of banks without being
impressed with the degree of care which those engaged in the
banking business must exercise in the interest of depositors.
The fundamental reason back of practically all legislation which
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pertains to banking is to afford greater protection to the de-
positor whose ability to select his bank for its goodness and
the quality of its management is greatly impaired by his ignor-
ance about banking matters.
In addition to the foregoing statutory provisions which
give the depositor a good measure of protection, there are many
other protective devices which could be cited to supplement the
illustrations given, but the provisions stated serve to demon-
strate the protection afforded the depositor. However, a dis-
cussion of statutory provisions which are designed to safeguard
the public's stake in the banking business cannot overlook the
matters of "double liability of bank stock" and "reserves
against deposits".
Double Liability of Bank Stock
Until recently practically all the bank stock which was
sold to those subscribing to the capital of a bank through the
purchase of its stock had a double liability clause.
In purchasing the capital stock of an ordinary corporation
one is liable for the debts of the corporation to the extent of
the face (par) value of the stock only. That is, it is possible
to lose one's entire investment in that particular business
through bad management of its affairs, and the liability in the
venture ceases there. However, in the case of one who purchases
bank stock, provided it contained the double liability feature,
the holder is liable not only to the creditors of the bank to
the amount of his investment, but he is subject to an assessment
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of a sum equal to the par value of the stock.' 0 This feature is
incorporated in bank stock to give the depositors a margin of
protection against loss of deposits in the bank in the event tha
the bank becomes insolvent, furthermore, it is intended to dis-
courage those persons who are not financially responsible from
becoming stockholders or owners of a bank. The banks whose stoc
carries the double liability feature are the National banks,
stock savings banks, and trust companies.
Legal Reserves Against Deposits
In the establishment of legal reserves against deposits,
the interest of the law making bodies in the safety of the de-
posits entrusted to a bank is again recognized. The legal re-
serve is a banking principle which is peculiar to this country.
The legal reserve today is not regarded as being so important as
a guaranty for the repayment of deposits, as a means of restrict
ing the amount of deposits which a bank might receive and thus
preventing the bank from building a deposit liability out of
proportion to the size of the bank and sound administration.
To be sure bankers should always keep a reserve of cash on
hand, and this should be used to satisfy attempted runs on the
bank or to instill public confidence in the ability of the bank
to pay its obligations. It is this latter function that is per-
formed by the legal reserve. It is a kind of bluff. A bank has
the reserve and it must be so large regardless of the bank's
location, size, type of business, etc. Furthermore, whenever
the bank has occasion to use the reserve in an emergency it may
50 Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 172, Section 24
,
not do so. When a bank's legal reserve is below the minim-urn
specified by law, the bank is violating the banking laws of the
state and is subject to being closed.
In addition, it must be pointed out that the legal reserve
can be a serious handicap to a bank in that it can tie up funds
in idle reserves which should be used to earn income for the
bank, and the amount involved in the reserve may be large enough|
to determine whether or not the bank is able to earn a profit.
Under the old National Banking System, the National banks
SI
of the country were divided into three classes
: (1) Central
Reserve City Banks, (2) Reserve City Banks, and (3) other banks.
The Central Reserve City Banks had to keep a reserve of twenty-
five per cent against all deposits, all of which had to be in
the bank's own vault; the Reserve City Banks had to have a re-
serve against deposits of twenty-five per cent also, but one-ha!]
of this could be deposited in a Central Reserve City bank. The
other banks of the country had to have a reserve of fifteen per
cent, of v/hich three-fifths or nine per cent could be deposited
in a Central Reserve City bank or Reserve City bank. With the
establishment of the Federal Reserve system, the banks of the
country were classified in the same manner, but the reserves
that had to be maintained against deposits were changed to
thirteen per cent for Central Reserve City banks, ten per cent
for Reserve City banks, and seven per cent for other banks.
There could be no depositing of reserves in other banks, and al3]
reserves had to be kept in the Federal Reserve bank of the
-'
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district where the bank was located.’ 2
In the States
,
the system of keeping reserves was similar.
For example, in Massachusetts the trust companies located within
a three-mile radius of the Statn have to keep a reserve of
twenty-five per cent of the total deposits received, whereas
the trust companies outside of the three-mile radius have to
keep a reserve of only fifteen per cent of deposits. Certain
trust companies are designated by the Commissioner of Banks to
receive the reserve of other trust companies on deposit.
Regardless of the percentage of reserve which must be kept
against the deposits of a bank, the same idea of affording pro-
tection to the depositor is present. The amount of the reserve
that must be kept prevents the bank from receiving an excessive
53amount of deposits. In the case of the commercial bank where
the majority of deposits arise out of loans, the amount of the
reserve that must be maintained restricts the amount of lending
of the bank.
Primary and Secondary Reserves
Whenever the public is given any cause for doubting the
liquidity of a bank, the reaction is likely to be a "run" on
the bank by those who have deposits in the institution whose
soundness is questioned. It is very easy for people who do not
understand the business of banking to misinterpret some conduct
of the bank or some statement of an official and thereby start
a run that will force the bank to close its doors and ultimately
liquidate its investments to pay depositors. In such cases
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there is usually considerable shrinkage in the value of the
assets, and the result is unnecessary loss to the depositors.
In order to avoid these unfortunate occurrences, ' which
every bank must be ready to confront, the bankers have developed
a ratio of primary reserves to secondary reserves. A primary
reserve means funds of the bank that are either in the form of
cash in vault or in investments so relatively liquid that the
bank can obtain cash for them in a short time. These invest-
ments that may be counted as part of the primary reserve include
(1) Commercial paper that meets the credit and legal require-
ments of the Federal Reserve System and which, therefore, may be
converted into cash by discounting them at the Federal Reserve
Bank; (2) demand deposits at the Federal Reserve Bank which may
be obtained in cash for the asking; (3) bankers' acceptances
which have a ready market and may be sold for cash, and demand
deposits with other banks which may be counted upon to produce
54ready cash.
Secondary reserves consist of such things as high grade
commercial paper called bonds 0 "
f Government bonds, etc., and
these are considered legitimate short term investments for a
commercial bank, but are not so liquid as are the primary re-
serves.
The proper ratios of primary reserves to secondary reserves
cannot be determined except in the case of a given bank when one
knows its business, its demands, its size, and its peculiar prob-
lems. However, it is important to note that the banks themselve
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are alive to providing this protection to their depositors. The
bank which keeps itself in a position to meet unusual demands
and circumstances is serving the needs of its depositors. 56
There is no legislation on the proper relationship between
primary and secondary reserves, but the factors to be considered
in determining the right ratio for the individual bank are made
available to banks through the American Banker’s Association.
;
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PART III
HISTORY OF BANK DEPOSIT GUARANTY IK THE UNITED STATES
Introduction
It has been shown already that the legislators of the vari-
ous state governments as well as those in Washington have recog-
nized the necessity of safeguarding the public’s money in banks
and banking institutions, and have placed certain safeguards and
limitations upon the operation and conduct of the various bank-
ing systems created. These laws which regulate banks, define
their powers, limit their investments, etc., are designed to
assure greater confidence in the banks on the part of the public
and at the same time to prevent the bankers from carrying on
practices of a questionable nature and which might result in
economic chaos and loss of the savings of innocent people.
It was pointed out also that a desire to assure even greats
public confidence in the banking system of the country resulted
in the creation of bank deposit guaranty schemes. During the
last century there have been several schemes proposed. All of
them have been similar in purpose, but different in certain de-
tails of their operation. It will be helpful to a better under-
standing of the subject of "The Guaranty of Bank Deposits" to
review briefly these various guaranty programs. It is not in-
tended that we should examine in detail all the attempts that
have been made in this country, but only those of significance
in contributing ideas for the development of any guaranty pro-
gram.

The first attempt in the United States to guarantee the pay'
:nent of creditors of a bank was that of New York State in 1829,
This program was known as "The New York Safety Fund".
The New York Safety Fund System was the first attempt at
bank deposit guaranty. After the failure of the safety fund in
New York State there were no significant attempts at guarantee-
ing the payment of bank depositors in failed banks until the
State of Oklahoma passed a lav/ providing for the guaranty of
Dank deposits on a state-wide basis shortly after the admission
Df Oklahoma to the Union as a State.
It is of real value to trace the history of the bank de-
posit guaranty scheme that Oklahoma put into operation, as well
as plans adopted by other states that followed Oklahoma's exam-
ple. In these are found the principles which helped formulate
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in 1932. The experi-
ence of these deposit guaranty plans, their popularity with the
aanks and the public, their influence upon the growth of deposit
in state and national banks, and, finally, their success are all
jof importance in throwing light upon the future life of the re-
pent Federal law.
—
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Chapter One
THE NEW YORK SAFETY FUND 57
Introduction
The place of the New York Safety Fund in the guaranty of
bank deposits is a peculiar one. Certain banking practices in
vogue at the time that the Safety Fund was established and some
of the evils of which it was designed to remedy, brought the
Fund into existence. It was designed to secure the circulation
of the banks of the state of New York and through a technicality
in the law, it became a deposit guaranty system, and this out-
come of the law caused its failure thirty-seven years later.
In order to appreciate the significane of the Safety Fund
system, it is desirable to compare the commercial banking prac-
tices at the time of the enactment of the Safety Fund legisla-
tion with practices in commercial banking today.
When one borrows money from a commercial bank today, it is
customary to accept a "credit to account" at the bank against
which checks may be drawn. The conveniences of these checks
have been pointed out. Furthermore, when a man receives the
proceeds of a loan at a bank in the form of cash in hand rather
than as a credit to his account, there is no question aboiit the
exchange value of the money because the Government has provided
adequate safeguards for its universal acceptance such as redemp'
tion privileges, collateral security, etc.
However, in the first half of the eighteenth century the
borrower from a commercial bank was not able to obtain a credit
0
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to account. The bank gave him its own bank notes in exchange
for his note or draft. Hot only did this type of currency lack
all the conveniences that the modern check currency possesses,
but because of overissue and lack of confidence in the banks,
the notes were not always accepted at face value, and there was
a refusal on the part of the public to accept the notes of the
closed bank at all. This refusal to accept the bank currency
proved embarrassing for innocent holders of these notes, and
often caused business no little amount of inconvenience. These
factors, among others, gave rise to the so-called Safety Fund
System in New York. It was no less important to have public
confidence in the notes of these banks, which constituted the
medium of exchange of the time, than it is important today to
have public confidence in the safety of the commercial deposits
which are the basis for the great volume of check currency of
today.
In a sense, therefore, the guaranty of the bank circulatior
a century ago was a security provided the public which is com-
parable to the guaranty of the cominer icial bank deposits of
today.
The Safety Fund
It was not until 1829 that the New York Safety Fund plan
began to take shape. As a result of the approach of a time
when many of the charters of the banks in the State of New York
would expire, certain members of the State Legislature seized
upon the time as opportune to put an end to many dishonest and

undesirable practices which had existed in the banking world
prior to this time. In reviewing the banking situation it was
58
stated by one Hr. rorman in a letter to Governor Van Buren of
Hew York (this letter was enclosed in his message to the New Yor
Legislature pertaining to the banicing situation) that (1) exist-
ing banks were organized without adequate capital and were man-
aged dishonestly; (2) banks that were organized honestly were
often bought by swindlers who plundered good assets and sold
fictitious stock to the public; and (3) there was no control upocji
the issue of circulation which caused as much financial disturb-
ance by being suddenly contracted in amount as by being suddenly
and excessively expanded. Mr, Forman argued "that the loss re-
sulting from solvent banks due to injudicious management even
,59
exceeded those incurred by failures" ; and in substantiation of
this argument he stated that: (1) The proper proportion of circu
lating medium Is intimately connected with the products and com-
modities of a country, (2) paper that is redeemable in coin is a
^ood as coin itself, and (3) an undue issue of paper currency
has the effect of increasing prices. In elaborating upon this
third point of consideration, Mr. Forman stated that when prices
are increased as a result of there being too much paper money in
circulation, there is no profit in exporting so that the domestic
market becomes glutted and stagnation occurs. This stagnation
makes less need for the circulating notes, and they are returned)
to the banks for redemption. Banks press their debtors, and
prices fall as everyone is anxious to sell. When the prices
"History of Banicing in the United States”, John Jay Knox,
Bradford-Rhodes and Company (1900)
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drop, exporting begins and banks again put out excessive issues,
and the same cycle is repeated.
As a remedy for these evils, it was suggested that legisla
tion be passed to accomplish the following^. (p) insure the
payment of capital; (2) limit the loans and discounts; (3) pre-
vent the issue of bills other than those payable on demand; (4)
prevent speculation by bank officers in the depreciation of thei p
paper currency; (5) prevent the transfer of assets to preferred
creditors in anticipation of insolvency.
It was proposed in addition that the banks should be re-
quired to secure the safety of their circulation. In support of
this proposal it was stated that the banks had the sole right to
issue and take profits from the issuing of circulation and,
therefore, the banks should guarantee the currency.
As a means of accomplishing this guaranty of the circula-
tion it was proposed that funds be raised by annual assessments
of all banks according to their capital to be applied to the
payment of the debts of such banks as shall fail. In addition,
it was proposed that whenever the fund became diminished, it
should be brought up by further contributions on the part of the
banks. In order to insure the functioning of the plan it was
proposed that the state should refuse to Incorporate additional
banks unless they came under the proposed scheme for insuring
the safety of the circulation. It was also provided that no
bank should be incorporated until the Bank Commissioner certifie
to the Secretary of State that the capital stock was actually
"History of Banking in the United States", John Jay Knox,
Bradford-Rhodes and Company, (1900), Page 401
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paid in.
When the Safety Fund plan actually became lav/, it was known
as "Judge Paige’s Bill". Although the origination of the ideas
incorporated in the Bill was attributed to various people, in-
cluding Mr. Forman and another member of the New York Legisla-
ture, Abijah Mann, the latter claimed that he obtained the idea
in conversations with a Mr. Eenton in regard to English Joint
Stock Lqn&s.
On April 2, 1829, the New York Safety Fund became law. L'~
The law provided that every bank created subsequent to its
passage must contribute to a common fund a sum equal to one-half
of one per cent of its capital stock paid in, the payments to be
continued until every corporation had contributed to an amount
equal to three per cent of its capital stock.
It v/as provided that the Fund should be in charge of the
Comptroller and Treasurer of the State, the former being in-
structed to invest the Fund and from the income derived thereby
! to pay the expenses of the Bank Commissioners of the State of
New York. When the income derived from the investment of the
Fund was more than sufficient to pay the expenses of the Com-
missioners, the Comptroller v/as to return the remainder to the
contributing banks. Furthermore, it was provided that when the
Fund was reduced by payments on account of insolvency, the banks
were to be required to contribute to the Fund until it reached
the three per cent limit.
Among other provisions of the Act of April 2nd, it v/as
61
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provided that each bank should be examined once in each four
months, and no new bank could commence business until the pay-
ments of the capital had been proven to the satisfaction of the
three Bank Commissioners provided for in the Bill. It was also
provided that any three corporations could request the special
examination of any bank. In regard to the amount of notes that
any bank might issue, it was provided that banks could issue
notes only to double the amount of capital of the bank, and
loans could not exceed two and one-half times the amount of
capital of the bank. Finally, it was provided that when a bank
became insolvent, the Chancellor of the State must determine the
amount of money to be paid from the Safety Fund.
The Safety Fund in Operation^
When the Safety Fund got under way there was such a number
of applications to incorporate new banks under the Safety Fund
that state authorities were faced with the problem of determin-
ing how many banks could be established and considered to be
prudent investments. In addition, the stock of the new banks
was eagerly sought after both locally and out of the State. In
1832 there were fifty-two banks in operation under the safety
system, while there were twelve banks operating outside of the
system. It was a common opinion at this time that all the
safety-fund banks were sound, even though it was recognized that
there had been a great increase in capital stock and circulation,
By 1835 the number of safety-fund banks had increased to seventy'
|
six, and by 1841 there were ninety banks under the Safety Fund
^
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system.
A letter written by Mr. Forman presenting his proposed
Safety Fund System stated that the Safety Fund should be used
to pay "the debts of the banks" and it was this phrase that
caused the disaster of the system. By this phrase he meant that
the Fund should be used to redeem the circulating capital of the
banks, and not to secure other creditors of the bank. This
phrase was incorporated in the Safety Fund Act and the error was
soon discovered by many unscrupulous bank managers who contracte
debts in the name of their respective banks for the "emolument"
of the bank managers.
In "The History of Banking in the United States" by John
Jay Knox it Is stated: "In 1842 an act was passed devoting the
safety fund exclusively to the redemption of circulating notes:
but within the six months previous to the passage of this lav;,
six banks with a circulation of $1,408,000 had failed and in-
junctions were obtained by the creditors of these institutions
to prevent any payments from the fund to redeem the circulation
of banks subsequently becoming insolvent until all the debts of
banks failing prior to 1842 had been paid. The act of 1837
authorized immediate redemption of bills but required that one-
third of the safety fund was to be reserved for 'debts’." °
It seemed quite contrary to the intentions of those who
were instrumental in the establishment of the safety fund that
it should be used for purposes other than a mere protection for
the holders of bank notes, i.e. that it became a deposit guarant
L
;
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1system, the legality of which was upheld by a technical error in
the act of the legislature which created the fund. Mr. Millard
Fillmore who was Comptroller of the State of New York in 1S48
stated: "Since 1829 the contributions to the fund had been
$>1,876,063, the whole circulation redeemed from the insolvent
banks was 1,548,558, leaving a surplus of .327,505 which with
the amount obtained for the six per cent State Stock had been
swallowed up to meet other debts of the institutions. ’It is,
therefore, apparent that the safety fund would have proved ample
indemnity to the bill holder had it not applied to the payment
of other debts of the bank than those due for circulation'."
Mr. Fillmore thought that the safety fund was a proper device
for securing bank c irculation, but he saw no reason why the func
should be created for the purpose of' securing depositors and
64
other creditors.
In 1848 the Comptroller’s report stated that the safety
fund had long since been exhausted, and that it had been nec-
essary to mortgage future contributions to it by the issue under
an act of 1845 of §900,828.47 of six per cent. State bonds to pa}/
the debts of banks which had failed and the obligations of which
6 6
exceeded the amount of the safety fund.
The safety fund system was finally terminated in 1866 when
the last of the charters of the banks incorporated under its
plan expired. In that year the legislature passed an act stat-
ing that all the claims due from the safety fund should be paid
and the funds remaining after the discharge of these debts shoul ml
6/i
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be paid into the State Treasury.
Insurance of Deposits and Circulation
The New York Legislature regarded note issues of the com-
mercial banks and the deposits held by the banks as being dis-
tinct in nature. There seemed to be a feeling that the insuranc
of bank deposits and the insurance of bank circulation had no
relationship. It was held to be essential to insure bank notes
while the safety of deposits were a matter for the individual
and the bank to settle to their own satisfaction.
In fact, the distinction between bank deposits and bank
notes which the New York Legislature made has no real foundation
The two are essentially the same.
Irving Fisher states: "Beside lending deposit rights, banks
also lend their own notes called 'bank notes', and the principle
governing bank notes is the same as the principle governing
deposit rights. The holder simply gets a pocketful of bank note
instead of a credit to his bank account. The bank must always
jbe ready to pay, on demand, either the note holders, i.e. to
'redeem its notes’, or the depositors, and in either case the
bank exchanges a promise for a promise." ''
The legislators base their arguments in favor of the pro-
tection of only bank notes upon the grounds that the people of
small means have few bank accounts and have to rely upon bank
notes for circulating media and, therefore, since these people
cannot judge the soundness of a bank, the State must throw safe-
guards around the notes of banks. 67 Furthermore, It is held that
^
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the depositor can select his bank and assure himself of a rneasur
of protection. In other words, the legislator regards the note
holder as an involuntary creditor, while it regards the depositojr
as a voluntary creditor. Finally, there is the argument that
because checks are presented for payment at once, while bank
notes stay in circulation for some time, that the bank may grow
careless about providing redemption of its notes.
To the bank it is immaterial whether it lends bank notes
or bank credit. And since the bank credit came to be recognized
as being more convenient in a business world growing more com-
plex, the check currency has superceded the bank note currency.
It can be stated, then, that even though there was a feelin
on the part of many that the payment of all debts by the safety
fund, including deposits, brought failure to the safety fund
system, the guaranty of the bank notes alone was security of
bank credit as is a deposit guaranty system that secures bank
credit.
The failure of the safety fund cannot be used as evidence
against the likelihood, of success of a deposit guaranty system.
Even though the law became a deposit guaranty system, the intent
of the lav/ was to accomplish the security of bank cirulation and
not to guarantee the payment of deposits of failed banks. It is
quite possible that the safety fund would have been a successful
device for securing bank notes if it had not been for the mis-
take in v/ording the lav/ establishing it which placed a burden
upon the system which it v/as not intended to carry. Unfortunately
i
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Chapter Two
THE GUARANTY OF BANK DEPOSITS BY STATES
Introduction
The history of bank deposit guaranty in the United States
subsequent to the New York Safety Fund System is an interesting
chapter in American banking history. During the period between
1907 and 1930 eight of the so-called prairie states enacted laws
to protect the depositors in banks within the boundaries of the
particular state against loss from bank failures.
The deposit guaranty idea originated as a political party
issue, and was made law in most of the states because of party
pledges to the voters of the respective states. Moreover, the
issue was advocated and sorely contested in states neighboring
or bordering upon those which had advocated or enacted deposit
guaranty laws. However, only eight state legislatures were suc-
cessful in making possible the operation of a deposit guaranty
plan for state banks.
The following pages trace briefly the history of the origin
of deposit guaranty lav/s, the characteristics of the lav/s, their
legality, the character of the deposit guaranteed, the assess-
ments, the administration of the guaranty funds, and the payment
of the depositors in closed or failed banks.
The Populist Movement
The guaranty of bank deposits by states had its origin in
the Populist Party movement of the late eighties and early nine-
69ties
. During the Populist days, guaranty lav/s were part of the
^
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campaign platform of this party. There had. been a great many
bank failures in the State of Kansas and. adjoining states during
the years following the crop failures which began in 1887, and
still more in the years following the depression of 1893. Dur-
ing the period from 1892-98, seventy-five state banks suspended
(operations, and during the period from 1890 to 1900, thirty-two
national banks were closed. The remedy for this malady in the
banicing situation was seen in bank deposit guaranty legislation
by the Populists.
In 1898 the Governor of Kansas called a special session of
the legislature for the express purpose of considering the enact--
ment of a deposit guaranty law. A law was proposed and passed
the Senate, but failed to pass the House by four votes.
Parallel to the action being taken in Kansas, the States of
Oklahoma and Nebraska undertook the agitation for guaranty of
deposits in state banks. This movement in all three states lost
headway, however, when better crops and rising prices in 1897
changed the economic situation in these states and silenced the
Populist demands. In 1908 the movement was revived, and the
demand for deposit guaranty legislation crystallized. Oklahoma
passed a law on December 17, 1908, which had been introduced in-
to the legislature only twelve days previous to this time.
Kansas followed two years later, having failed in 1908 by a small
margin to get the required support for a deposit guaranty bill,
but in March 1909 Kansas succeeded in enacting a deposit guaran-
ty law.

haracteristlcs of the State Guaranty Funds Laws
Each of the state guaranty plans provided for the creation
of a guaranty fund to which the solvent banks of the state had
to contribute regular and special assessments. This fund w as
drawn upon to cover the difference between the claims of the
depositors in failed banks and the amount realized from the
liquidation of the insolvent banks' assets. In no case did the
state guarantee to pay the claims of depositors, assume the lia-
bilities of the guaranty fund, or to attempt to meet any debts
70
of the fund through general taxation. The state acted solely
in an administrative capacity.
Legality of the C-uaranty Fund Plans
In all of the states the national banks located within the
particular states were allowed to participate in the guaranty
schemes. Many of these national institutions took advantage of
the opportunity in order not to be placed at a disadvantage in
attracting and holding deposits. The participation by the na-
tional banks was short-lived, however, because Attorney-General
Bonaparte ruled that the national banks had no right to submit
to state legislation. It was his opinion that the Oklahoma law
required a bank to guarantee the obligation of a third party,
and that such a privilege was denied the national banks by
71federal banking laws. The constitutionality of the guaranty
fund laws was contested in three states: Oklahoma, Kansas, and
Nebraska. The three cases were reviewed together, and in a
decision handed down on January 2, 1911, the guaranty laws were
J° Ibid., Page 12
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,
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declared to be constitutional.'^
Character of Deposits Guaranteed
The state guaranty funds excluded the protection of all
.73deposits except those of individuals
,
and, in addition, all
deposits which were secured in some other manner were excluded
from protection. It was provided further that the guaranty
funds should not protect discounted bills endorsed by the banks,
bills payable, and money loaned to officers. In the majority of
the states the law declared specifically that deposits upon
which the rate of Interest paid v/as higher than that approved b^
the Bank Commissioner should be classified as money borrowed and
not guaranteed.
Assessments
In all the states except South Dakota both regular and spe-
cial assessments were required.' 4 Regular assessments were
collected semi-annually in Nebraska, and annually in the seven
other states. These assessments ranged from one-twentieth of
one per cent of the average daily deposits in Kansas to one per
cent of average daily deposits in Washington. The special asses
ments for emergency situations ranged from one-fifth of one per
cent in Oklahoma to two per cent of average daily deposits in
Texas. The maximum assessments ranged from one-fifth of one per
cent of average daily deposits in Oklahoma to two per cent in
Texas. In addition to regular and special assessments, the
State of Washington had a contingent fund to pay the expenses
incurred by the Guaranty Fund Board of the State. The continger py
72
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fund assessment was one-tenth of one per cent of average daily
deposits eligible for guaranty in the preceding year, with a
maximum of three per cent of eligible deposits.
Additional Requirements
In addition to the foregoing special and regular assess-
ments for the creation of a guaranty fund, the states of Oklahoma
Texas, Washington, and Mississippi required from each bank a
deposit in cash, securities, or other valuables as evidence of
good faith and a guarantee that the bank would pay assessments
when due. In Oklahoma, Texas, and Washington this was one per
cent of average daily deposits, and one-half of one per cent of
average daily deposits in Kansas and Mississippi. For banks
which were organized subsequent to the establishment of the
guaranty fund the requirements were different. In Oklahoma and
North Dakota new banks had to pay Into the fund an amount equal
to three per cent of their capital stock; in Texas, an amount
equal to three per cent of the new bank’s capital stock and sur-
plus; while in Nebraska and South Dakota, the assessment for a
75
new bank was four per cent of the capital stock.
Investment of Guaranty Fund
The investment and custody of the different guaranty funds
was not alike in all the states. '
'
J In Nebraska, North Dakota,
and South Dakota the member banks were given the custody of the
funds. The State Banicing Board was required to notify the banks
of the amount of the assessments due, and then the bank was re-
quired to set aside this amount of money which was to be held
i
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payable on demand.
The States of Kansas and Mississippi required the State
Treasurer to collect the assessments and deposit the same in the
state depository banks subject to the order of the Bank Commis-
sioner. In Oklahoma the scheme was much the same, except that
the fund was invested in securities and twenty-five per cent had
to be held by the Banking Board of the State as a ready fund.
In Texas and Washington a portion of the deposits were
ieposited with the State Treasurer, and the remainder was cred-
ited on the books of the bank liable for the assessment to the
Banking Board or Commissioner.
Duties of Guaranty-Fund Administrators
The states having deposit guaranty laws placed them in
charge of a board or commission whose function it was to do the
following: Levy and collect the assessments, act as custodian
of the fund, receive and approve claims of the depositors in
failed banks, liquidate the assets of the closed banks protected
by the fund, issue certificates or warrants of indebtedness, and
7publish periodically reports concerning the status of the fund.
Methods of Paying the Deoositors in Failed Guaranteed Banks
In the states of Oklahoma, North Dakota, and South Dakota
it was the duty of the Bank Commission of the State to take
charge of an insolvent bank and distribute the cash on hand in
the bank to the depositors in the bank immediately. ^ When this
cash proved to be insufficient to meet the deposit liabilities
of the bank which had failed, the balance was to be paid from th
J
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guaranty fund. The Commissioner then liquidated the assets of
the closed bank and reimbursed the guaranty fund to whatever
extent possible from the amount realized from the liquidation
of the assets of the bank.
In addition, when the guaranty fund and the maximum assess-
ment together proved to be insufficient to pay the depositors,
it was the duty of the banking board or other proper authority
to issue interest-bearing warrants or certificates of indebted-
ness to the depositors. Many times the warrants or certificates
were sold to the public in order to obtain the cash needed to
pay the depositors. The subsequent assessments made for the
benefit of the guaranty fund were used to retire the certificate
issued in the order in which they had been issued. This pro-
cedure was really using the guaranty fund as security to borrow
money to operate the system.
In the states of Kansas, Mississippi, and Washington it was
the duty of the Bank Commissioner to take charge of closed banks
and issue immediately interest-bearing certificates to the de-
positors having claims upon the closed banks. These certificate
were redeemed or paid as fast as the assets of the closed banks
could be liquidated. When the liquidation proceedings provided
insufficient money to cancel the certificates, the State Treasur
er paid the balance from the guaranty fund, and if the guaranty
fund plus the special assessments allowed failed to provide the
amount necessary to pay all the depositors, the depositors re-
maining unpaid were to be paid on a pro-rata basis and balance
5
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paid when the next assessments became available.
In the State of Nebraska the law provided that the Guaranty
Fund Commission's expenses were to be levied against the banks
whose deposits were protected. The expenses could not exceed
015, 000 in any one year, nor more than $10. per day for a member
of the board for any working day.
In regard to the payment of depositors, the law provided
that . when the Department of Trade and Commerce became convinced
that the capital of the bank was Impaired or that the bank was
insolvent for any reason it should take over the bank in ques-
tion. The Department of Trade and Commerce had to turn over the
bank to the Guaranty Fund Commission whose function it was to
examine the bank and then close or operate it as it deemed wise
for the interest of the depositors.
If the stockholders of the bank would agree to assign their
stock to the Commission temporarily, the bank could be operated
as a going concern, and if the bank's operation proved successful
it had to be turned back to the original owners.
In order to prevent closing banks and to conserve the
7©guaranty fund, there was created a "Bankers’ Conservation Fund" w
which v/as established by the assessment of any guaranty bank to
an amount equal to one-fourth of one per cent of its average
daily deposits in any one year. This Fund could not exceed one-
third of the average daily deposits of a bank at any one time.
The Fund so created was to provide the capital needed to operate
a bank taken over by the Guaranty Fund Commission. The bank be-
79 Ibid., Pages 20-21

Ing operated by the Commission could not be returned to the orl-
jginal owners until the money borrowed from the Bankers’ Conserva
tion Fund was repaid in full with interest at five per cent.
If the Guaranty Fund Commission decided to liquidate the
bank, a receiver was to be appointed and the process of liquida-
tion begun. The receiver was empowered to issue receiver's
certificates in an aggregate amount not exceeding the amount
required to supply the deficiency for the payment of depositors
in any failed bank. )0
The certificates so-issued were to bear interest at a rate
determined by the courts, and could be Issued to pay depositors
in the failed bank or to reimburse the Guaranty Fund.
In the State of Texas it was provided that certificates
were to be issued when a bank failed. The depositor received
all the cash available in the failed bank at once, and the
Guaranty Fund was drawn upon for the rest until the Fund was
depleted. The receipts from the liquidation of the bank were
Q“1
to be used to reimburse the Guaranty Fund.
COMPULSORY AIID VPITUITARY GUARANTY PLAITS
The state deposit guaranty systems put into operation were
of two distinct types: (1) the compulsory guaranty system
whereby all state banks had to become "guaranty" banks, and (2)
the voluntary guaranty system
,
under which a state bank was at
liberty to choose between becoming a "guaranty bank" or remainirj.g
outside the state guaranty system.
SO
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There were five states which adopted the I! compulsory" sys-
tem. The following table shows the name of the State and the
year when its guaranty system became lawc *
:
State Year Law Passed
Oklahoma ' 1908
Nebraska 1909
Mississippi 1914
South Dakota 1915
North Dakota 1917
Three states elected to set up "voluntary" guaranty plans.
These states and the year of the establishment of the plans were 1
Kansas • 1909
Texas 1910
Washington 1917
The tables show that there were really two periods when the
state deposit guaranty plans were most popular. The first perio<
was that directly following the enactment of the Oklahoma law
which had its origin in the panic of 1907. The Oklahoma plan
seemed feasible and the States of Nebraska, Kansas, and Texas
adopted the deposit guaranty idea within a short time and before
it had had an opportunity to prove its worth.
The second period of interest in the deposit guaranty idea
^ame shortly after the beginnings of the prosperity wave which
resulted from the World War. The prices of commodities had be-
^un to rise and because the banks were sharing in this improve-
nent in business conditions, the deposit guaranty systems which
lad fallen into disrepute a year or two before, seemed to be
working out of their difficulties and getting on a sound basis.
The States of I.iississippi, South Dakota, North Dakota, and
to
^
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Washington enacted laws at this time.
COMPULSORY GUARANTY SYSTEMS
Of the compulsory guaranty systems, the Oklahoma law was the
most outstanding. It was the first one to he enacted and had the
characteristics: (1) the law was compulsory -- all state banks
had to qualify and come under its supervision — and (2) the
depositors in failed banks were to be paid at once.
The law provided that the funds for meeting the requirement:
of the law should be obtained by an assessment of the capital
stock of banks and trust companies. The original law provided
for an assessment equal to one per cent of the average daily
deposits, and when the deposits of a bank grew, the bank had to
jpay into the guaranty fund a sum equal to one per cent of the
Increase in deposits. This was changed by an amendment to a
fund equal to five per cent of the average daily deposits; one
per cent was to be paid in during the first year of membership,
and the remainder to be paid in annual installments equal to one--
fourth of one per cent of the average daily deposits until a fun<:
of five per cent was accumulated. This was changed finally to
(two per cent in 1913.
Whenever the guaranty fund became depleted, the funds nec-
essary to pay the depositors in closed banks were to be derived
by a special assessment levied against every bank. At first
34
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special or extra assessments amounting to two per cent of the
average daily deposits were allowed, but during the year 1914,
1915, and 1916 the banking board was restricted to an assessment
of not more than one-fifth of one per cent of the average daily
deposits, and after 1916 the special assessments were prohibited
altogether. It was found that these were too great a tax upon
the banks and could not be made when the banks found it conven-
ient to pay. Instead of the special assessment it was provided
that when the fund proved to be inadequate to meet the demands
for payment of depositors in closed banks, such funds should be
derived by the sale of notes bearing six per cent interest. Thes 5
were secured by the capital stock, surplus, and undivided profit 3
of each and every bank. The notes were to provide cash essentia L
to the demands of the closed bank depositors, or could be used t)
pay a depositor. Of course such notes or certificates were read
L
sold and accepted because the solvent banks themselves were will -
ing to accept them as deposits and were eager to obtain them for
investment
.
The Oklahoma lav; made a rather unusual provision for the
payment of the assessments was to be made by non-interest bearin i
cashiers' checks which were to be held by the board until needed,
To secure its liability to the fund each bank was required to
deposit a bond or w arrant equal to one per cent of its deposits,
but not less than £500. It was provided that seventy-five per
cent of the fund was to be held in state warrants, and twenty-
five per cent to be held by the banking board for ready cash.
ly
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The custody of the fund and the administration of the law
was originally placed in a board consisting of the Governor, the
Lieutenant Governor, the President of the Board of Agriculture,
the State Treasurer, and the Auditor. It can be seen at a glanc
that this board was purely political and likely to prove incompe
tent when it came to dealing with the intricacies of banking and
particularly bank liquidation.
It is not at all surprising, then, that the banks clamored
for a more competent board when they began to feel the pinch of
assessments because of bank failures. It was proposed that the
board be placed in the hands of bankers and their representa-
tives who would serve without pay. This proposal was accepted
in 1913, and a new board was created as follows: Each bank was
to have one representative in an association of state banks, and
this association was to select an executive council of not less
than nine nor more than fifteen members. The council was to
recommend to the Governor the names of nine men competent to
serve on the board, and from these nine names submitted, the
Governor was to select the names of three men to make up the
Board with the Commissioner of Banks and the Assistant Bank Com-
miss ioner
.
The duties of the new board were as follows: (1) to render
an account of the collection of the depositors’ guaranty fund;
(2) show all collections from the assessments and the assets of
closed banks; (3) make disbursements from the fund to pay cer-
tificates of indebtedness and other obligations; (4) send each
5
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bank a quarterly financial statement showing the exact condition
of the depositors' guaranty fund.
It was provided by law that when a bank failed, the Bank
Commissioner should take charge. After due examination of the
bank, he was instructed to take possession and liquidate its
assets to pay depositors in full. Whenever the funds from liqui
dation were found to be inadequate to pay the depositors in full
it became the duty of the Banking Board to draw upon the fund to
pay the depositors in full. Up until 1916 the Board was em-
powered to make extra assessments to provide funds for the pay-
ment of depositors whenever it was found that the guaranty fund
was inadequate. (When the assets were found to be so inadequate
that a loss v/as to result from liquidation of the bank, the
guaranty fund had to stand the loss.) Furthermore, it was pro-
vided that whenever the guaranty fund and the special assessment
were insufficient to pay the depositors in closed banks in full,
the Banking Board was to issue certificates (notes) bearing six
per cent interest. These cotild be issued to anyone.
When a bank complied with the Oklahoma law it was entitled
to receive from the Commissioner of Banks a certificate stating
that its deposits were guaranteed by the State Guaranty Fund.
The bank was allowed to advertise this fact and display the
certificate.
The Oklahoma law provided that deposits otherwise secured
were not to be protected by the State system. Furthermore, it
provided that the State Guaranty Fund did not apply to deposits

upon which more than four per cent interest was paid.
Trust companies were admitted to the Guaranty plan in 1911
and had to pay into the fund a sum equal to three per cent of
their capital stock.
The Oklahoma System in Opera tio
"The Quarterly Journal of Economics’' for November 1914 pub-
lished an article by Thornton Cooke of Kansas City in which the
0failure of the Oklahoma deposit guaranty system was predicted.
Mr. Cooke was intimately acquainted with the operation of the
system. It was his opinion that the Oklahoma system was doomed
to failure at its inception because of the payment of depositors
Of!
as soon as the bank closed its doors.'" Furthermore, the law
came at an inopportune time in the history of the State. This
fact is well substantiated in a letter from the Eank Commissionelt’
in Oklahoma to Mr, George H. Shibley, Director of the American
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Bureau of Political Research, Washington, D.C.
:
June 29, 1914
Mr. George H. Shibley
Director American Bureau Political Research
Bliss Building
Washington, D.C.
Dear Sir:
In reply to your letter of the 26th instant rela-
tive to the operation of the depositors guaranty fund
in this state, I desire to advise you that at the time
our guaranty law became effective banking conditions
in this state were very chaotic, as the state banks in
the Indian Territory section had not been subject to
examination.
Another thing, this was a new country and property
fluctuated considerably, and w e had almost a crop failure
C\0
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in this State for three successive years. On account
of adverse conditions, the first few years of operation
of our depositors’ guaranty law proved very expensive
to our banks, which no doubt caused a number of them to
nationalize. However, at this time we feel that our
guaranty fund is now established on a solid and siib-
stantial basis, and we feel that the future success of
our guaranty lav/ is assured. Our last legislature
passed several amendments to our guaranty law which
have proven very beneficial.
I am herewith enclosing you a list of the aggre-
gate individual deposits of our State banks on the data
of each call since statehood. If there is any other
information that you desire relative to our laws, please
advise me.
(Signed) R. C. Stuart
As a result of these conditions in Oklahoma, the State
Banking Department kept open many State banks v/hen they knew
they were insolvent
,
merely to make a showing for the guaranty
program. Within a period of five years there were thirty bank
failures, almost all of which came during the first three years
of the existence of the guaranty system. This was the period of
collapse following the boom of the early days of statehood, and
many banks were caught in the crash. For example, the Citizen’s
Bank of Mountain Park failed in April 1911 and it was found that
twenty-five per cent of the notes of this bank represented fraud
lent transactions of the bank’s officers.' ^'
It wovild have been possible under the Oklahoma system to
pay some depositors by issuing six per cent interest-bearing
warrants to the depositors when a bank was found to be insolvent
[The law provided that such warrants should be issued when the
guaranty fund was found to be inadequate to pay losses resulting
ih-
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jfrom failures. Instead of following this course banks were kept
open until, as a last resort, they had to be closed, and then th<j
banking board of the State pledged the guaranty fund to borrow
[money to pay depositors cash, issuing warrants against the fund.
jThere was no authority in the law allowing this, but it was done
in order to pay depositors in closed banks in cash as soon as the
bank failed.
When the Columbia Bank and Trust Company of Oklahoma City
failed, the Banking Department paid immediately all the deposi-
tors without troubling to ascertain the losses of the bank. This
action of the banking board seems almost incredible when it is
Realized that this bank was the largest failure the fund ever had.
to withstand both from the point of time and amount of assets inj
volved. When the affairs of the bank were finally looked into,
it was found that there was a discrepancy of $70,000 between the
books end notes of the bank.
There is snother example that demonstrates more clearly the
extremes to which the banicing department went to make a good
showing for the guaranty fund: The Planters and Mechanics Bank
of Oklahoma City became insolvent and was kept going long after
the condition v/as known to the department, but instead of closing
the bank, the Banking Board bought some of its poorest securities
to help out the condition of the bank.
In the year 1914 the annual assessments of deposits in
Oklahoma banks amounted to about one per cent of the total de-
posits. In June of 1914 the condition of the guaranty fund v/as
"Quarterly Journal of Economics", November 1913, Page 79
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far from satisfactory. The fund owed 419,926.56 in unpaid
91
warrants, and had only i
ii
;35,000 on hand to meet these.
During a period of four years ending in 1914 the assess-
ments upon certain hanks in proportion to their capital were as
follows
:
Caoital Paid Assessments
$50,000
' 50,000
10,000
15.000
5,000
30 . 000
$15,000
15.000
1,300
3,000
2,255
20.000
Many of the banks attempted to escape the assessment bur-
dens by relinquishing their state charters and becoming national
banks. This proved futile, however, because the court held that
a national bank is liable for all assessments made prior to its
nationalization. In the year 1911 sixty-five banks nationalized
In January 1910 there were two hundred and nineteen national
banks, which number had increased to three hundred and twenty-sijjc
in 1913. This was a substantial increase, but it did not includ
all the state banks under the system capable of becoming nationafL
banks
.
In view of the heavy losses which the Oklahoma system had
sustained, and in view of these conditions which have been
described, Mr. Cooke concluded in 1914 that the Oklahoma system
would fail. He stated six reasons why he believed this to be
inevitable:’' 9 (l) The Banking Department of the State had been
in politics for a long time and this meant the continuation of
unsound practices such as those described. If it were considere
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politically expedient to keep a bank open, this would be done.
(2) Unsound banks had been admitted and guaranteed at the outset
of the system. These banks were bound to cost the system a larg'j
sum of money when it should have been building up reserves. (3)
The record of bankers running banks had not been properly traced
when banks were admitted to the system. A guaranty system does
not make honest bankers dishonest, but it encourages the dis-
honest to get into the banking business. (4) The banking board
had procrastinated in the face of losses, and had shown timidity
in the face of losses. There was no reason, in the opinion of
Mr. Cooke, why the Oklahoma Banking Board could not have closed
the insolvent banks and issued interest-bearing warrants to the
depositors rather than paid them in cash when the banks v/ere
closed. (5) The Oklahoma guaranty system came into existence
under adverse economic conditions. The system was born in the
panic of 1907, and conditions were not greatly improved for
several years thereafter in the State of Oklahoma. (6) The
guaranty of deposits relieved depositors of all necessity for
care in selecting banks. This lack of interest in good banking
encouraged the undesirable institutions. There was no premium
on good management in the eyes of the public. In predicting
failure of the Oklahoma system, Mr. Cooke stated that the cause
would not be the guaranty system alone (paying depositors immedijf
ately)
,
but the system plus ineffective examinations, insufficie
scrutiny of the previous records of bankers, unfavorable economic
conditions following the period of settlement, and rapid growth.
4it
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Such conditions encouraged dishonest hanking.
Mr. Cooke stated that he did not believe the first four of
his arguments were good arguments for the failure of all deposit
guaranty systems. It is possible to eliminate politics from ban
supervision, to find out the records of men wishing to organize
a bank, to have efficient examinations of banks, and to close
weak banks without temporizing. In substantiation Mr. ^ooke
pointed out that in states where conditions are more settled
than in Oklahoma, the losses from bank failures are few.
Failure of the Oklahoma System94
In 1923 the Oklahoma deposit guaranty system law was re-
pealed. In the fifteen years of its existence, the giiaranty
fund had not been able to get sufficient foothold to withstand
the steady tide of failures that began soon after the law was
enacted and put into operation and which continued after its
removal from the statute books.
Oklahoma had shared in the boom which resulted from the
sale of agricultural products to the European nations at war,
but the effects of the boom were too short-lived to give any
headway to the Oklahoma program.
Statistics of bank failures in the State of Oklahoma during
.95the period from 1913 to 1923 are as follows:
i
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Year
State National
Banks Year Banks Capital Deposits
1913-14 21 1919 1 v 25,000 $ 382,869
1915-16 6 1921 3 325,000 1,551,155
1917 4 (Reopened 2 225,000 1,313,510
1918 2 1922 3 500,000 2,274,582
1919 5 (Reopened 1 100,000 314,129
1920 8 (Second Failure 1 200,000 929,662
1921 27 1923 3 200,000 2,008,712
1922 32
1923 16
In 1914 the guaranty fund owed ,419,926.56 in unpaid war-
rants, and had only 35,000 on hand to meet these ( see page 73 )
The growth of state bank deposits and the decrease in bank fail
ures enabled the guaranty fund to catch up with its obligations
and on March 1, 1920, the fund had $75 ,000 in the treasury. Dur
ing this period from 1916 to 1920 thirty-one national hanks tool;:
out charters; these hanks had a total capital amounting to four
million dollars.
Unfortunately, however, the war had not saved deposit
guaranty in Oklahoma. Economic conditions after the war changed,
abruptly from what they had heen. The change in income to the
c
Oklahoma farm population may he readily seen from these figures:
1919 1920
Wheat Crop $107,000,000 73,000,000
Corn " 94,000,000 42,000,000
Cotton " 209,000,000 96,000,000
(In 1920 100,000 acres of the cotton crop remained unpicked.)
It was impossible to have such a drastic curtailment of in-
come in a state where a large part of the income was derived frc
farming operations without its being felt keenly by the banks of
the state. This unexpected change in market conditions made it
Q6
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impossible for the farmers who had borrowed, heavily from banks t<
finance their crops to pay their notes at the banks.
In the year 1921 it was necessary to issue warrants for
,2,196,000 to cover the deposits in thirteen banks. Cn November
1st of the same year the Bank of Commerce at Okmulgee failed,
involving deposits of 1,732,540. This failure was too much for
the guaranty system to shoulder and it broke down completely.
The situation in which the guaranty fund found Itself is
veil portrayed by these figures m’7
Warrants Issued
n 2, 196, 000
One-half Deposits of
Other Failed Banks
(Loss Estimate) 1,158,000
Liability of Fund '.3,304,000
6% Interest On 5 201,340
The total deposits subject to assessment for the benefit of
the guaranty fund amounted to only .156,000,000 at this time.
Jnder the provisions of the guaranty law it w as possible to make
a. maximum assessment of one-fifth of one per cent of these de-
posits. This assessment would produce only 0 (312,000 anmially,
thus giving 5111,000 to apply on the principal annually. At thij
c’ate it would require twenty years to repay the depositors in
failed banks, provided no more failures took place.
In 1922 there were thirty-two more bank failures involving
leposits of ..'7,230,000, not counting four banks which failed and
ceqpened. -
The condition of the guaranty fund in 1921 caused forty-fiv<
,
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state banks to convert to national charters, which number was
increased by fifty-nine additional banks in 1922, and still
) 5 .
ty banks had fallen to 453, having deposits of 178,000,000.
In January 1923 the Democratic party in the State of Okla-
homa campaigned on a platform favoring the continuation of the
guaranty law. The depositors were promised the return, at the
earliest possible date, of every dollar claimed "at no expense
to the tax payers’’.
A bill was proposed in the legislature of that year to issu
bonds to pay off the depositors, the principal and interest of
the bonds to be payable out of the assets of closed banks and
from certain taxes and fees. This bill failed passage on the
grounds that the State held no obligation to pay depositors in
closed banks.
On karch 31, 1923, the guaranty fund law was repealed by
the State Legislature and pronounced a failure as a plan for pro
tec ting depositors.
In the fifteen years of deposit guaranty to January 1, 1923
the system had cost Oklahoma banks ,3,647,486.32. The fund it-
self contained only f85, 000, and outstanding against it were
warrants of 1,336,999.27. The deposits in banks closed before
the repeal of the lav/ and still in liquidation amounted to
9,373,117.23. The assets were nominally stated at 13,027,559.
and capital at ,1,267,000. -

ii '
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THE NEBRASKA SYSTEM100
The second of the compulsory deposit guaranty systems was
established under an act of the Nebraska Legislature in March
1909. The law became effective on July 1st of the same year.
The "original act" provided that any state bank or trust
company or corporations doing a banking business (not excluding
banks) were eligible to join the system, provided they had been
in business for a period of three months prior to making appli-
cation to become a guaranty bank. It was provided also that a
bank which joined the guaranty system could not withdraw its
membership.
The Fund
Under the Nebraska system there was no limit to the amount
of the fund that could be created to guarantee deposits. It was
provided in the first lav/ that each bank should pay four assess-
ments amounting to one-quarter of one per cent of its average
daily deposits to the state banking board between July 1, 1909,
and January 1, 1911. This meant that each bank had to pay to
the state banking board assessments amounting to one per cent of
deposits within a period of two years. Beginning on January 1,
1911, each bank was to be assessed an amount not in excess of
one-tenth of its average deposits, which assessments were to be
paid in two installments of one-twentieth of one per cent averag
deposits on a semi-annual basis. It was provided also that
special assessments not in excess of one per cent of average
deposits per annum might be levied when the guaranty fund became
in
,
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1 01less than one per cent of average daily deposits. (For other
provisions see chart on page 215.)
Under the Oklahoma system it was provided that the assess-
ments should be paid to the guaranty fund board, while in
Nebraska the act stipulated that assessments payable to the
guaranty fund should be retained by each bank in the system.
Each bank had to credit the total of its payments to the fund
to the state banking board, payable on demand.
This plan of allowing the banks whose deposits were being
guaranteed to keep the guaranty fund inlfitfrov/n hands was
feature of the Nebraska system. Unfortunately, the idea spread
and was adopted by other states. The danger is summed up well
in a statement by Mr. Thorntcn Cooke in his report on the state
guaranty systems for the National Monetary Commission in 1911:
"This is an arrangement which might easily lead to trouble. In-
surance premiums, for that is what these assessments are, should
be paid over to the insurer, not held by the insured, subject to
all sorts of claims and processes if the insured happens to thinjc
102his insurance is proving too expensive."
Payment of Depositors in Failed Banks
Under the Nebraska guaranty law all the deposits of banks
operating under the system were insured. When any one of these
banks failed, it was provided that the depositors should be paid
in full as soon as the deficiency in the cash of the failed bank
was ascertained by Its receiver. The funds necessary to meet
the deficiency had to be obtained by drawing checks against the
102
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' Mifflin (1920), Page S.33
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"assessment accounts" standing to the credit of the guaranty
fund in all the state hanks.
When the fund became depleted it was necessary to levy the
special assessments not in excess of one per cent of the average
deposits of any one bank for any one year. The original law
made no provision for the payment of depositors when the special,
assessments proved to be inadequate to meet the demands of de-
positors in failed banks. (For other provisions see chart on
Page 213
.
)
103Bankers * Conservation Fund
The Nebraska plan of deposit guaranty provided for the
establishment of a fund known as "The Bankers’ Conservation
Fund". The purpose of this fund v/as to conserve the Nebraska
guaranty fund. It belonged to the banks contributing to it,
and each contributing bank had to hold subject to demand its
payment to the fund. The annual assessments of the Conservation
Fund could not exceed one-fourth of one per cent of the average
daily deposits of each contributing bank, and the Fund could no - :
exceed one-third of the average daily deposits of contributing
banks
.
The Fund was to be used to sxipply capital for banks oper-
ated by the Guaranty Fund Commission. Moreover, no bank could
be closed or returned to owners until the loan from this Fund
had been repaid with interest at five per cent. It was hoped
this Fund would make it necessary to close less banks and,
therefore, bring less burden upon the State guaranty program.
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Additional Banking Legislation4 ^' 4
At the time the deposit guaranty system was created, the
Nebraska Legislature took steps to strengthen the regulation and
supervision of "banks in the state. The capital requirements for
organizing a new bank were increased, and the qualifications to
be met in becoming a bank director were made less liberal. In
some respects the requirements exceeded those for national banks
Finally, the state passed a law forbidding individuals and firms
the privilege of carrying on a banking business.
How Deposit Guaranty Worked in Nebraska
The Nebraska deposit guaranty system was one of the last of
the state guaranty plans to be repealed. In its operation it ha<
differed from the others in the operation of a so-called Bankers
Conservation Fund, and was generally considered to be one of the
better deposit guaranty plans put into operation. Its failure
was significant. The Bankers Magazine for April 1930 carried
this statement : "Since the Nebraska lav/ is rather carefully
drawn, it seems reasonable to conclude that its failure was due
to the fact that the principle itself was unsound.
The Nebraska guaranty system went through two periods. For
nine years it was a great success. From June 1911 when the law
became effective until June 1920, the system had created a fund
of .2,367,000 and the drafts against this fund had been only
3239,330. ' This amounted to a utilization of about ten per
cent of the fund to pay in full the depositors of five insolvent
banks. The second period of the plan's operation was a stormy
,
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one and lasted for ten years.
During the first period of the operation of the guaranty
system, the banks of the State of Nebraska had increased in num-
ber fifty-five per cent, while deposits had increased four hundr
and fifty-seven per cent. During this same period, the state
banks in the nation had increased only thirty-three per cent, an
deposits in these banks, one hundred and twenty- six per cent.
The guaranty plan in Nebraska was given all the credit for the
phenomenal growth, and money poured into Nebraska banks from all
the neighboring states.
During this same period, national banks in the State de-
creased from 231 to 175, a decrease of twenty-four per cent.
Deposits in national banks increased less than seventy-four per
cent, one-sixth as fast as the guaranteed deposits of state
banks. 107
There were in 1920 1,090 persons to a bank as compared to
1,360 when deposit insurance began. A hamlet of one hundred
people might have a bank with a capital of ^10 ,000 . Two-thirds
of the banks had less than ,20,000 capital.
At the end of the nine-year period prices began to fall.
Nebraska is a State having agriculture as its industry. In 1929
it was the second hog producing state, third corn producing stat
and third winter wheat state for five consecutive years ending
in 1929. The State had no mineral resources, and the manufactur
were in the food industries group. It was to be expected that
declining prices for agricultural commodities v/ould have a serio -
5d
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effect upon banking conditions.
In 1920 there were two hundred and ninety-one million dol-
lars worth of deposits protected by a guaranty fund of less than
two and one-half million. In 1921 the assessment of state banks
amounted to $2,300,000. In 1922 there was ah additional assess-
ment of $1,970,000. In 1923 there was 2,050,000 more,
the fund was bankrupt and hopelessly so in 1923.
-
The number of state bank failures by years beginning in the
1 noyear ending June 30, 1921, were as follows:
1921 16 1926 23
1922 23 1927 19
1924 19 1928 44
1925 11 1929 106
In 1922 the state bankers formed an Agricultural Loan Asso-
ciation which sold $2,000,000 worth of stock to member banks
,
an^L
used the fund so created to pay depositors in failed banks, the
assets of which banks were taken over by the Association. This
Association attempted to operate some of the crippled banks whicjj).
did not seem to be beyond repair.
In the year 1926 it seemed that the crisis was past. There
were thirty-eight banks being operated by the Loan Association
and the losses to be met for failed banks were estimated at
$6, 000,000^ . It seemed possible to pay off this amount in
three years time. However, in 1927 the crisis came when the
bankers lost faith in the value of the guaranty fund certificate^
and refused to invest further in them. There was no means left
to raise money except through special and regular assessments.

By 1929 there were one hundred and thirty-five hanks in the
hands of the Guaranty Fund Commission with unpaid deposits amount-
ing to 025,000,000 of which sixty-one were in receivership by
court order.
In February 1929 there was sent to each bank in the state a
questionnaire which asked, "Do you favor repealing the guaranty
law as a whole?" Five hundred and ten banks answered and of
these, three hundred and seventeen votes were for repeal and one
lundred and sixty-nine against.
The following table shows the total assessments paid to the
guaranty fund by Nebraska banks expressed as a percentage of the
total capital investments in these banks for the years 1911-29:110
1911 1.0% 1920 1 . 1%
1912 2.0 1921 6.7
1913 1.4 1922 5.9
1914 0.7 1923 6.2
1915 0.6 1924 3.1
1916 1.7 1925 5.3
1917 0.8 1926 5.5
1918 1.0 1927 5.7
1919 2.2 1928 3.2
These statistics are sufficient to show the impossibility
bf operating a bank profitably and still continue to meet the
(requirements of a compulsory guaranty system.
The will of the bankers was recognized by the legislature
bf the state and the law was repealed in March 1930. The fund
pas insolvent at repeal, and had been for eight years. It had
111
unpaid liabilities amounting to nearly j20 ,000 ,000'
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Outcome of Other Compulsory Guaranty Systems
The following pages will outline briefly the results of
compulsory deposit guaranty programs put into operation in the
States of Mississippi, South Dakota, and North Dakota.
Because of the similarity of all of the state plans estab-
lishing compulsory deposit guaranty systems, the complete detail
of the laws enacted in these states will not be presented except
in chart form as found on Page 213* This chart shows the funda-
mental points of each of the state plans and gives the reader an
opportunity to make a comparison of the various state guaranty
laws
.
Deposit Guaranty in Mississippi
The Mississippi lav/ creating deposit guaranty was passed
on March 9, 1914, but did not become effective immediately. It
was compulsory for all state banks on May 15, 1915. (See chart
on Page 213
.
)
From 1915 to 1920 only seven banks failed, and the highest
levy made upon member banks was one-fifth of one per cent in
1916. However, as was the case in the other systems, the depres'
sion of 1920 and the years directly following proved to be the
undoing of the system. During the years 1921-1922 fourteen stat
banks failed, and the maximum assessment was levied each year
which was five assessments of one-twentieth of one per cent of
average daily deposits, in addition to the annual assessment of
one-half of one per cent of average daily deposits less capital
Up
and surplus
.
\
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By April 15, 1925, guaranty fund certificates to the amount
of $3,162,748 had been issued. In June of that same year there
was outstanding $1,940,766. During the period from 1915 to 1925
the assessments for the benefit of the guaranty fund system had
been $1,395,979. The depositors had been paid $1,766,769, the
difference being the amount of assets that were realized. The
certificates outstanding in June of 1925 were a deficit of the
fund, and it was estimated that it would take six to seven years
to retire these provided maximum assessments were made each year
In 1925, the deposits in state banks in Mississippi aggre-
gated to $134,900,000. They rose to 153,500,000 in 1927 and In
1928, and fell to $'.134,900,000 in 1929. By 1930 they had fallen
still lower to $132,200 ,000
.
114
In March the deficit of the guaranty fund had risen to
$5,000,000 because of increased bank failures and Interest on
certificates held by the depositors. These certificates were
field by about 125,000 depositors in thirty state banks. This
state of affairs led the state legislature to suspend the
guaranty fund. This action put an end to the issuing of addi-
tional certificates but continued the assessments amounting to
one-fourth of one per cent less capital and surplus for the
liquidation of the certificates outstanding. 1 ''
This suspension law also levied a tax of three per cent
against the capital and surplus of the state banks, the total
revenue from which source could not exceed 300,000 in any one
year. This sum was to protect deposits in banks failing
i
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subsequent to the elimination of deposit guaranty. The plan was
not accumulative, there being no carry-over of such deficits and
surpluses as might arise. The state banks were given other tax
exemption privileges because of this special assessment.
The fundamental cause for the failure of the Mississippi
system was the failure to create a sufficient reserve against th
risks involved. During the period 1915-1925 the assessments of
all banks amounted to about 1.2 per cent of all their capital.
The deficit was $1,940,766. In order to have created a reserve
adequate to take care of this sum it would have been necessary
to levy annual assessments equivalent to abotit 2.65 per cent of
the capital of the state banks. To take care of the 1930 defici
the creation of an adequate reserve would have caused an annual
assessment amounting to three and one-half per cent of the capi-
tal of the banks.
Deposit Guaranty in South Dakota
The South Dakota bank deposit guaranty lav/ was passed in
March 1915, and until June 24, 1921, there were only three bank
failures. The lav/ v/as hailed as a great success. In 1922 tv/o
banks failed, and by Jime 30, 1923, the guaranty fund had fallen
to (?94,000, all the depositors being paid in full in thirty days!
During the next two years one hundred and thirty-nine banks
failed and the fund became insolvent . -LX '
The 1925 legislature repealed the law effective January 1st
^
1926. however, prior to this time the state held an election an
there was a referendum on the repeal of the guaranty law. The
p6 Ibid. , Pages 25-26
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\law was sustained.
By 1927 two hundred and ninety-seven banks had failed with
deposits protected under the law. Of these failed banks, two
hundred and forty-four remained closed. 54,000,000 of certifi-
cates had been issued to depositors and it was estimated that thp
assets of the closed banks would reduce these certificates by
thirty to fifty per cent. The annual income of the guaranty funjl
derived from assets could not exceed .’250,000. In addition there
was an annual interest charge of two and one-half million dollars
to be paid.“-' :
In 1927 the South Dakota lav/ v/as amended to state that
depositors in banks failed after July first of that year should
be protected only by a guaranty fund to be established by each
state bank individually. However, other changes were made in
the banking laws which provided little in the way of relief to
the banks of South Dakota. The guaranty assessment of one-fourth
of one per cent of average daily deposits was retained and had
to be paid before any distribution of profits could be made to
the stockholders of the state banks . It provided that these pay
ments should be held by the State Treasurer for the credit of
each bank, and could be invested under the direction of each pay[<
119ing bank for Its account. When the interest on the assess-
ments so held and the additional assessments became equal to the
paying bank’s capital stock, no more payments by It were require}!
and the additional earnings of the accumulated fund were to be
paid to the bank. The capital sum remained the property of the
118
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3ank and in case of failure the sum so accumulated was to be
applied toward paying depositors of the failed bank.
In the year 1930 the Superintendent of Banks for the State
of South D&kota stated that the deficit of the original guaranty
fund as of June 30th. of that year was 36,769,000. The new
legislation changed the liability of stockholders from double to
treble liability.
The Supreme Court of South Dakota declared in 1931 that the
guaranty fund was a complete failure. The conclusion of the
120lourt was in part:
J
"Whatever assets remain In the Insolvent
Danks wherein their deposits were made properly applicable to
that purpose will, of course, be received by the petitioners, bu -
ng can see no reasonable expectation of their receiving anything
from the guaranty fund beyond v/hat is therein The
guaranty fund in this, as in other states where it was attempted
las failed completely."
Deposit Guararty in North Dakota
The North Dakota law was passed and became effective in
1917. (See chart on Page 213 • ) North Dakota was the last state
to adopt a compulsory guaranty system.
Three years after the enactment of the law the depression
of 1920-1921 brought c .^strophe to the system. During the period
from November 15, 1920, to December 31, 1928, three hundred and
twenty-two state banks closed their doors. The assessment of
three hundred and thirty-seven solvent state banks had yielded
1)1,957,679.31 which sum was sufficient to pay only ten per cent
i
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of the depositors of the three hundred and twenty- two closed
banks . -irC±
At the end of the year 1928, the outstanding certificates
and claims eligible to guaranty amounted to .>25,072,302 against
which there were assets in the hands of the fund estimated to be
worth about $13,000,000, leaving a deficit of .12,000,000 which
v/as ultimately increased to 14,000,000. There was no provision
for the payment of interest on these certificates and claims
outstanding so the amount of the deficit remained fixed.
In 1928 the income of the guaranty fund was estimated to be
$140,000 and this sum was bound to decrease because the deposits
in state banks were rapidly shrinking. It v/as absolutely hope-
less to attempt to wipe out this deficit with the annual receipt
so small a fraction of the total obligation so a bond Issiie v/as
122proposed to pay off the depositors in closed banks. " The pro~<
posal was defeated by a large majority at the polls in 1928.
The guaranty law was repealed in 1929.
VOLUNTARY STATE DEPOSIT GUARANTY PLANS
The States of Kansas, Texi^] and Washington established
voluntary deposit guaranty plans. These plans were not differer
in fundamental principles from the other guaranty plans except
for allowing the banks to become guaranty banks at their own dis
cretion. However, this voluntary feature ceased to be such to
all practical purposes when one or more banks elected to become
guaranty banks. State banks which elected to remain non-guarant
banks were placed at a disadvantage in that the depositor w as
3
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inclined to maintain his account with the bank which guaranteed,
that his money would be repaid in the event of failure of the
bank, lew depositors were able to make a wise selection of a
bank, and to avoid the assumption of risk, followed the easier
course of electing to do business with a bank which protected
the depositor's interest under a state supervised plan.
The State of Kansas was the first to establish the volun-
tary plan. It is desirable, therefore, to examine carefully the
Kansas law guaranteeing deposits.
The Texas plan differed from the Kansas plan in that it wa
£
not only a voluntary system, but provided an optional system by
which a bank might elect to guarantee deposits by adopting one
of two plans.
The Washington plan lasted for only four years, enjoying
the shortest life of all the systems. The law provided that
all banks might withdraw by giving notice in writing and paying
obligations to the fund, which provision helped end the system
abruptly following a period of heavy assessments. The following
pages will be devoted to a presentation of voluntary bank depos:
guaranty as practiced in the three western states. (See Chart
Page 114) THE KANSAS SYSTEM123
t
In 1909 the State of Kansas enacted a law which was a radi-
cal departure from the Oklahoma law which had been enacted durir g
the preceding year. In the enactment of this law an attempt wai
made to overcome some of the objections to the Oklahoma system.
The Oklahoma plan was a compulsory system, all the banks of the
123
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State being obliged to adopt the guaranty plan; in addition, the
Oklahoma plan provided that all bank depositors should be paid
in full immediately when a bank failed. Under the Kansas system
a bank was free to choose its own course. If it chose to remair.
outside the guaranty system, there was no objection on the part
of the State authorities. Furthermore, it was impossible under
a voluntary plan to contend that the honest banks in the system
would have to pay the debts of the dishonest banks as was con-
tended by those opposed to the Oklahoma plan.
Another point of departure from the Oklahoma plan was that
the depositor in a failed Kansas bank was not paid in full
immediately upon closing the bank. This was desirable in that
a bank failure of considerable size could deplete the guaranty
fund and cause unnecessary burdens upon the remaining banks in
the system to replenish the fund.
Under the Kansas system it was essential for only one bank
to elect to become a guaranty bank in order to put the system
! into operation. However, it must have been expected that more
than one bank would become a guaranty fund bank because the ad-
mission of only one bank to the system would make possible a
situation under which the guaranty fund established would be
inadequate to take care of the losses that might result from
the failure of this one bank. There could not be any assess-
ments .
'he Fund
There was no need for the creation of a large fund under
the Kansas system since the depositors were not to be paid in
—

full as soon as the bank failed. An adequate fund would be one
jthat would ultimately pay for all losses. It was provided that
the maximum size of the Kansas fund should be 500,000, and that
the fund was to be built up by assessing the average deposits.
It was provided that the annual assessment for purposes of
creating the guaranty fund should be not more than one-twentieth
of one per cent of the "average deposits". In computing the
"average deposits" as a basis for the assessment, a bank was
allowed to deduct its capital and surpTus . This provision was
made in order to encourage the accumulation of capital and sur-
plus , The assessments were to be made anmially until the fund
equalled g500,000 after which time they were to stop until the
fund fell below that sum. It was stipulated in the law also tha
when the fund became depleted, additional assessments of not mor
than one-twentieth of one per cent could be made provided not
more than five levies were made in any one year.
The Kansas law provided that the fund should be held in-
state depository banks subject to the order of the Kansas Bank-
ing Commission.
Banks Eligible to Join Kansas System
It was provided in the law establishing the fund that only
those banks that were at least one year old and had a paid-up
and unimpaired surplus equal to ten per cent of their capital
would be considered as being eligible to join the Kansas system
except in places where there was no guaranty bank. The banks
which were able to comply with these qualifications were to be

carefully examined in order that a bank in an unsatisfactory
condition might be excluded from the benefits of the system. If
the examination proved to be satisfactory, the bank had to de-
posit with the State Treasurer, as evidence of good faith, §500
for each §100,000 deposits. (This ...'500 could be in cash, na-
tional, state, or municipal bonds.) This deposit was not in-
tended to take the place of the assessment for the fund itself,
but merely evidence of good faith in becoming a guaranty fund
bank, '.hen this depository requirement was complied with in
full, the bank commissioner of Kansas was empov/ered to issue a
certificate stating that the deposits of the bank were guaran-
teed.
It was recognized by those who enacted the legislation for
the Kansas system that a bank might wish to withdraw from the
system in order to avoid an assessment to meet payments due frorr
the fund. It was provided, therefore, that a bank could with-
draw from the system at any time when it had paid in full its
"quota" of the assessments made to pay losses from bank failures
occurring within six months period after the date of the appli-
cation to withdraw. When a bank had met satisfactorily all of
the requirements of the law pertaining to its withdrawal from
the guaranty system, the State Treasurer had to return to the
bank the- §500 deposit of cash or bonds held by the State as evi-
dence of good faith.
Procedure When a Bank Failed
The procedure for paying the depositors in the Kansas

guaranty system was a commendable one. It avoided the placing
of an unnecessary burden upon the banks of the State because of
heavy losses, and at the same time it permitted the depositor
to obtain his money almost immediately.
The law provided that the Commissioner of Banks in Kansas
should take over the liquidation proceedings of closed banks.
It was his duty to issue to each depositor of the closed insti-
tution a certificate of indebtedness equal to the amount of the
;
deposit involved; these certificates were to bear interest at
six per cent. (When the deposit for which the certificate was
issued bore interest at a contract rate, the certificate rate
of interest could not exceed this rate.) As soon as the funds
or assets of the closed bank could be liquidated satisfactorily,
they were to be applied to the retirement of the certificates
outstanding. When the assets of the closed bank proved to be
insufficient to pay all the depositors in full, the Commissionei
of Banks was compelled to certify the balance due the depositor?
to the State Treasurer who then paid the balance from the guarar
ty fund.
The certificates of the closed bank were readily accepted
by the depositors because they were in reality equivalent to
cash. The banks of the State sought after these certificates
eagerly because not only were they a good investment, paying a
return of six per cent interest, but they brought new depositor?
to the banks purchasing them or accepting them as deposits.

The Failure of the First Voluntary Deposit Guaranty Plan
At the inception of the Kansas system, it proved to he very
popular. Most of the larger banks and all the new banks estab-
lished subsequent to the adoption of the plan became guaranty
banks
.
"1
The following table shows the number of guaranty banks and
non-guaranty banks in June 1913 as compared to the number in
August 1923
June 1913
Number
Banks Guaranteed 472
Banks Not Guaranteed 446
All State Banks 918
August 1923
Banks Guaranteed 691
Banks Not Guaranteed 581
All State Banks 1072
Deposits
$ 71,040,906
42,707,957
$113,748,843
$181,088,518
65,412,082
$244,500 , 600
Prior to 1920 only two guaranteed banks failed, and the
depositors were paid $83,050 from the guaranty fund. Betv/een
1920 and 1926, however, one hundred and eight banks failed and
as they failed, certificates bearing interest at six per cent
had to be issued to the depositors. The modified report of the
State Bank Commissioner for the year 1926 showed the condition
of the fund as of January 1, 1927:
124
"Collapse of Bank Deposit Guaranty in Oklahoma and Its Posi-
tion in Other States", Thornton Cooke, Quarterly Journal of
_ oc Economics, Volume 38, No. 1, Page 121loo guaranty of State Bank Deposits", John G. Blocker,
Bur. of Business Research, No.'ll, July 1929 -- Page 27

Liabilities
Total Guaranty Certificates Outstanding
(10,644,244.05) Less ($4,484,902.08)
Certificates (Assets)
Additional Liability, Accrued Interest
on Guaranty Certificates (est.)
Additional Liability on Unfiled Claims of
Member Banks Admis sable to Guaranty Fund
Total Liabilities
(6,159,341.97
700,000.00
1,967,850.00
8,827,171.97
Deductions
Cash on Hand to Credit of Failed Guaran-
teed Banks Hot disbursed in Dividends
(3681,853.98) and Estimated Recovery From
Assets of Guaranteed Banks Hot in Course
Liquidation ($1,641,500.00)
Net Liability of Guaranty Fund
Guaranty Fund Assets
Cash on Hand Available for Paying
(3210,679.24) and Bonds Securing Guaranty
Fund Pledged by Member Banks ($904,153.34)
2,525,555.08
.$6,503,817.99
$1,114,832.58
To make this breakdown complete, several banks brought
suits in the State Supreme Courts to determine their liability
to the fund. On April 10, 1926, a decision was handed down
limiting the amount of the liability of each bank to the amount
of bonds or cash on deposit in the Guaranty Fund. The state
banks began to withdraw and forfeited their bonds to the average
amount of ;1600 each. On July 10, 1928, only forty banks continued
to pay the guaranty fund assessments
The Kansas law provided that the depositors of failed banks
should be paid in full in the order of the liquidation of the
banks holding the deposits.
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The State Supreme Court ordered the bonds held to be sold
and the depositors paid. As a result, twenty-six failed banks
were fully liquidated, but there was only enough money left fron:
the liquidation proceedings to pay in full the depositors of
nine of the banks. The tenth and eleventh banks were liquidated
on the same day so the remaining funds were divided equally amor
the depositors of the banks.
On February 18, 1929, the situation was as follows:
Certificates Outstanding in Hands of Depositors 813, 595,249. 19
Dividends Paid Depositors 6,419,955.64
8
Net Liability of Guaranty Fund $ 7,175,313.55
During the twenty years of existence of the gtiaranty fund
there were two hundred and four bank failures in the State of
iwhich one hundred and thirty-four were guaranty banks.- 1 While
the law was in force less than fifty-eight per cent of the state
banks had joined the system, but seventy-two per cent of the
total bank failures in the State had been guaranty banks. The
plan cost the bankers
..
2,658,000.
The number of guaranteed banks failed each year is shown
below
Year Numb
1910-1919 1
1919 1
1920 2
1921 8
1922 15
1923 25
1924 11
1925 15
1926 33
1927 19
1928 3
1929 1
_Iatal 134
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tFive of the guaranteed banks which failed paid depositors
in full out of their own assets. Twenty-nine additional banks
paid in full their deposits, two of which were paid partially
from the guaranty fund.
At the repeal of the law on March 14, 1929, thirty-one
State banks were still actively participating in the guaranty
system. These banks had paid all of their assessments to that
!
,time. The bonds and money held for the benefit of deposits paid
in by these banks totalled 1 24,000 which was deposited with the
State Treasurer as security for assessments. This was returned
to these banks.
THE TEXAS SYSTEM1°°
In 1909 the State of Texas passed a law creating a deposit
guaranty system. The Texas system. is a "compulsory optional
plan" under which all trust companies, banks, and trust companie
with banking and discounting privileges were obliged to protect
all deposits subject to check In one of two ways. A bank could
elect to protect depositors by complying with the requirements
of the "Depositors’ Guaranty Fund" or "Depositors’ Bond Security
3
System"
.
The Texas law provided: "Every state bank and trust com-
pany must elect to become a 'Guaranty Bond' bank or an 'Guaran-
ty Fund' bank, and must hold a certificate from the Bank Com-
missioner stating the method elected and in force. If a bank
advertises that its deposits are secured by any other means, or
by the State of Texas, that bank Is guilty of misdemeanor and
1
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punishable by law."
The Depositors' Guaranty Fund had these provisions regard-
ting compliance with and administration of the law. In order to
protect deposits under the Depositors' Guaranty Fund each bank
had to meet these requirements : Each bank and trust company had
to pay into the State Banking Board as an initial payment a sum
equal to one per cent of its avera.ge checking deposits for the
preceding year. Annually thereafter each bank had to pay an
assessment equivalent to one-fourth of one per cent. When the
fund amounted to 2,000,000 there could be no more assessments
until the fund was depleted. Upon the depletion of the fund
there could be emergency assessments of not more than two per
cent of the average checking deposits of any one year .
The law creating the Deposit Guaranty Fund provided further
that twenty-five per cent of each assessment had to be paid to
the State Banicing Board while the remaining seventy-five per
cent could be credited on the books of the bank. A new bank was
obliged to pay three per cent of its capital and surplus into
the fund, the amount to be adjusted at the end of the year on
the basis of average daily deposits.
It was provided that only those banks and trust companies
that were solvent could be admitted to the Depositors' Guaranty
Fund of which the Banking Board was the sole judge. The nationg
banks were allowed to participate.
The depositors of the failed "Guaranty Fund Bank" were to
be raid cash at once in full from the cash in the bank and the

guaranty fund. The guaranty fund had a first lien on the assets
of a closed bank. There v/ere no provisions for the issuing of
interest-bearing cert ificates
.
The second method of securing deposits in Texas was by
means of the "Depositors’ Bond Security System". The banks and
trust companies electing this system had to file with the Bank
Commissioner of the State of Texas on the first day of each
year "a bond policy of insurance or other guaranty of indemnity
equal to the amount of its capital stock, which bond or policy
insures to the benefit of the depositors of the bank." It
was provided that the Bank Commissioner should be the sole judge
of the security offered and he was empowered to accept or reject
such security.
Under the Bond Security plan the Commissioner was to take
charge of a bank when it failed and then proceed to liquidate th
bank. It was also his duty to notify the guarantors or those
obligated in the bond, and sixty days thereafter the bonds be-
came due and payable.
The State law provided further that when an obligor in the
bond was a Texas Corporation and refused to pay, its charter was
to be forfeited; and when any foreign corporation was obligor
and refused to pay, it v/as to be denied the privilege of trans-
acting business in the State of Texas. If after ninety days the
payment was still due, the Attorney General had to bring suit.
The Texas laws designed to protect depositors had another
provision that v/as unusual. It was provided that when a bank
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had deposits which exceeded six times the capital and surplus of
the bank it had to file additional security equal to the amount
of the excess.
In order to throw additional safeguard around the deposits
of its citizens in State banks, the State of Texas passed other
stringent laws designed to make for more careful management of
depositor's money. It was provided that no state bank or trust
company could own more than ten per cent of the capital stock of
any other banking corporation unless the purpose of such a hold-
ing was to secure itself against loss. Penalties for deplacatio 1
were provided. Furthermore, the state limited the amount of in-
debtedness of any director or officer to the bank. Finally, the
State of Texas made the first attempt to establish a definite
arithmetical relationship between deposits and the capital of a
bank ( see Page )
.
It is interesting to note that on March 1st, 1920, the Com-
missioner of Banks announced that the next assessment would caus i
the amount in the Depositor's Guaranty F-un.d to reach the
2,000,000 legal limit and, therefore, after that date no more
Jassessments could be made until the fund became depleted in
accordance with the statutory requirements.
The Results of Deposits Guaranty in Texas
The Texas law was formally repealed by the State Legisla-
ture in 1927 following its insolvency in September 1926.
During the first ten-year period of operation of the Texas
system seven hundred and fifty state banks entered the system.

%+
During this period the system enjoyed great success. From
January 1, 1910, to November 1, 1920, nineteen guaranty banks
failed. In order to satisfy the depositors of these banks
•-'881,594.85 had been withdrawn to pay the depositors, which sum
was an average of 350 a year to each of the one thousand or more
member banks during the period. The plan was, therefore, very
popular . 1^2
However, the depression of 1920 and the six-year perr'.od
following brought disaster to the guaranty fund. During the
period from 1920 to 1926, one hundred and fifty guaranty fund
banks failed in Texas. Of these some fifty- two were reorganized
but the depositors of the others cost the other solvent banks o!
the system $19,000,000 of which $4,000,000 was recovered from
the failed banks. The stockholders and depositors of the solver
banks became aroused and some of the state banks became national
banks. 153
In 1925 the guaranty fund law was amended and permitted the
state banks to get relief from liability to the fund by furnish-
ing bond to the amount of the capital stock of each bank. All
the banks except twenty-four withdrew from the system; i.e.
six hundred and fifty-four changed to the bond plan, and eighty-
eight became national banks. The twenty-four banks remaining ir
the system were too weak to furnish bond and were obliged to re-
main in the system to hold deposit accounts.
The guaranty fund became insolvent on September 29, 1926.
There was nothing left except formal sanction of the breakdown
t
u_
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of the system and on February 11, 1927, the law was repealed.
In 1929 there were nine banks with deposits of &900 ,000
remaining unpaid.
After the repeal of the law many national banks came back
into the system, and it was reported by the Banking Department
that the banking conditions of the State of Texas improved
greatly subsequent to the removal of the deposit guaranty law.134
WASHINGTON PLAN135
The State of Washington inaugurated a voluntary deposit
guaranty plan in 1917. It was provided that a guaranty fund
amounting to one-half of one per cent of the average annual
deposits eligible to guaranty should be created. The contribu-
tions of the banks under the law were not to be withdrawn from
the banks, but charged to the guaranty fund on the books of the
bank. Surprisingly this law did not provide that the amount
charged to the guaranty fund should be charged against the In-
come of the year the fund was established, nor did the law make
any provision for the amortization of this guaranty fund contri-
.
but ion. It was inevitable that the banks would have to bear
the expense when losses occurred, and these were likely to occur
when the banks would be least able to stand the assessments.
To secure the payments to the fund each bank coming under
the system had to deposit securities with the Guaranty Fund
Board of the State amounting to one per cent of the eligible
deposits
.
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In 1921 this law which passed in 1917 was changed. The
amount of the guaranty fund was increased to one per cent of the
eligible deposits, but still remained merely a book transaction
between a deposit guaranty member bank and the Guaranty Fund
Board. In addition, the deposited securities were returned to
the member banks.
A second fund was created which was known as a "Contingent
Bund" to be accumulated by annual assessments not exceeding one-
tenth of one per cent of the average deposits in member banks.
It was provided that the banks should make contributions
to the Contingent Fund in cash from which the expenses of the
Guaranty Fund Board were to be paid. (No salaries were paid the
nembers of the Board.) It was estimated that these contribution;
Df one-tenth of one per cent would be sufficient to build a fund
Df the proper size in a period of thirty years provided there we:
10 failures.
Bank Deposit Guaranty In the State of Washington
The deposit guaranty system inaugurated by the State of
136Tashington failed after a duration of only four years.
The law became effective on March 10, 1917, and in 1920
there were one hundred and sixteen banks and four branches opera -
Ing guaranty banks. During the operation of the system only aboi
thirty-nine per cent of the banks in the State joined it and the
total deposits subject to protection was '/;65,000,000
.
On July 1st, 1921, the Scandinavian-iknerican Bank failed.
rhis failure involved 315,834,624 in deposits . ^ ' ‘
<D
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At the time of this bank failure, the guaranty fund amount
e
to only $320,908. The Guaranty Board of the State made an asses;
-
nent of one-half of one per cent of average daily deposits, and
at the same time asked the banks to turn over the per cent alrea< y
credited to the fund on the books of the banks. These assessments
nade available a sum approximating $500,000, and a levy of one-
tenth of one per cent of average daily deposits for the contingen-
cy fund added 50,000. An additional special assessment of one-
half of one per cent added '250,000 more.
The assets of the Scandinavian-American Bank netted about
seventy-five per cent of face value when liquidated, which sum
Then added to the amount in the guaranty and contingency funds
nade possible a payment to depositors approximately eighty-five
per cent of claims. This failure broke down the system. The
guaranty fund law provided that all banks could withdraw from th<
system by giving notice in writing to the Secretary of the
Guaranty Fund Board six months in advance of withdrawal provided
a.11 payments, assessments, and obligations to the fund had been
net. All the banks withdrew, and the law became inoperative be-
fore January 1st, 1922. It was formally repealed by the State
Legislature in January 1929 effective June 11, 1929.
\^~l
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Chapter Three
THE RESULTS OF STATE BAI1K DEPOSIT GUARANTY
Significance of Historical Study
The study of the attempts at bank deposit guaranty by each
of the states which has undertaken to protect depositors against
loss when banks fail for one cause or another is valuable only
when the laws themselves and the facts pertaining to their opera
tion are interpreted.
Each of the experiments put into operation by the western
states ended in disaster, and although each particular state
guaranty system failed in its operation because of particular
circumstances and events peculiar to the individual state, there
were factors which helped to cause these failures which were com.'
mon to all the guaranty programs
.
The writer has reviewed briefly the history and outcome of
each of the deposit guaranty systems. It is the purpose of this
chapter to derive some conslusions of a general nature regarding
the guaranty of bank deposits by states. These conclusions are
of value in formulating an opinion on the federal program for in
suring bank deposits inaugurated a little over a year ago.
The Political Factor
It lias been shown that the state deposit guaranty systems
had their origins in the political campaigns following the bad
crops of 1887 and depression of 1893-1897. The losses experi-
enced by the public because banks failed, and the concern arouse

by the people regarding the ability of bankers to care for their
savings and working funds, aroused politicians to seize upon the
problem as one which could be remedied by legislative action and
*
which, therefore, was a good political issue for attracting vote
for example, even after other states were having their difficul-
ties in making state deposit guaranty work, as well as his own,
the Governor of South Dakota campaigned successfully on the
deposit-guaranty issue.,
The politicians and bankers fought over the issue, and it
eventually became the subject of discussion when national party
platforms were being formulated. The politicians sincerely be-
lieved that they could legislate public confidence into the bank
ing system, and the bankers fought the idea because they knew
that public confidence was a matter of confidence in bank manage
rnent, and in the end the honest banks would just have to pay a
big bill to cover the practices of dishonest managers.
The President of the Kansas Bankers’ Association, hr. W. Ivl
.
Peck, stated at a meeting of the Association in 1909: "There
remains but one other subject concerning us bankers which I de-
sire to speak of. In Kansas we have had our grasshoppers, our
long unbroken droughts, our be-whiskered Peffer, our Mary Ellen,
our Carrie Nation, and now we have the latest and greatest of
„138
them all -- our bank guaranty lav;."
Banking is a business which must be exercised with the
greatest of care, and the success of any bank in the last analy-
sis rests with its management. It is impossible for the
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legislators to instill honesty and judgement in the minds of men
The laws of a state can be designed to place certain safeguards
Dn the operation of a bank, and such laws can serve only as guid^
posts and impose penalties for dishonest conduct. On the other
land, the action of the public can force dishonest bank managers
Dut of the banking business. When a depositor knows that the
safety of his money depends upon the safe management of his bank
le is going to exercise whatever degree of care in selecting his
lank that may be within his power. The bank that enjoys a repu-
tation for sound management, fair dealing, and conservative poli
cies is going to get the business.
V/hen the state sets up a deposit guaranty law it destroys
(all of this and virtually says to the public that one bank is as
good as the other, and that all managers are equal in ability.
[Tot only does this destroy the necessity for banks exercising
their best judgement to get business, but it encourages dishones
and speculative practices because the banker knows his depositor
who is aware that his money is not going to be lost, will not
question his practices.
Sound banicing is not wholly a matter of legislation; its
achievement is gained in just the same way as is the sound man-
agement of any business.
The decisions regarding legislation which pertain to banking
should be excluded from the political arena; it is difficult for
men whose experience and training is broad to determine what pat},
to follow. It is even more impossible for politicians whose
\3fc
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interests must be varied and v;hose opinions of public matters
are interpreted in the light of what they think the majority
want, rather than what seems best for all concerned.
139In speaking of the Kansas situation, Mr. .etlock says:
"The guaranty act contained nothing designed to prevent losses,
its aim was to repair losses .... The situation In Kansas was
further complicated by the fact that the guaranty act was drawn
and administered not by skilled actuaries and bankers, but
largely by persons chosen for political reasons.'
Effect of Deposit Guaranty Upon Banking Practices
One of the most unfortunate consequences of state deposit
guaranty was the stimulus it afforded to dishonest banking. It
has already been pointed out that the successful management of
any banking business depends upon the business integrity of the
bank's managers. In the State of Oklahoma It was found that
bank loans were made in certain banks without proper regard for
the security for the repayment of the loans. In discussing the
causes for the failure of the Columbia Bank end Trust Company of
Oklahoma City in Oklahoma, Mr. Robb states: 44^ "The main reason
was the fact that the Columbia's president was a member of a
clique of plunging oil and real estate speculators, and the
rapidly accumulating deposits of the Columbia were used to lubri
cate their ventures."
He states further "Among the uncollected assets were
five personal notes of W. L. Norton amounting to $211,563.69.
These notes probably represent loans from his bank to assist him
low
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in caring for his oil paper when it was thrown out of national
banks .
"
1 AOIn discussing the Kansas system, Hr. -etlock states: J
"The plan held in principle that deposits would be attracted by
reason of membership in the guaranty system, rather than on the
basis of skillful, conservative banking. The principle that
banking is a highly specialised activity was ignored."
It Is a wrong system which allows depositors to regard all
bank management in the same light. Just as no two businesses
are managed equally well, no two banks are equally well managed.
Some banks are bound to avail themselves of the opportunity to
insure depositors money in a system when depositors have doubts
about their security. In the end It is the honest banker who
must pay the bill. The solvent banks are assessed to pay the
losses of those failing. Not only do the honest bankers fail
to get credit deserved for their conduct by enjoying the confi-
dence of the public, but they must pay for the misconduct of
those who carry on illegitimate and unsound practices. The sys-
tem of guaranty in all of the states was to assess going concern;;
to pay the losses of those whose operations had ceased because
of dishonest practices.
The Growth of Deposits Under State Guaranty Systems
It is pointed out by the Economic Policy Commission of the
American Bankers Association that the deposits of state banks in
the guaranty group were inflated to a considerable degree. Such
inflation was caused in part by the false public confidence
1 42
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14created in guaranty banks as compared to the non-guaranty banks."
During the period from 1910 to 1920 the boom of banking
under the guaranty lav/s reached its heights, creating the situa-
tion which existed on the eve of the reaction which took place
in every system in 1920. In seven giiaranty states in 1910 the
aggregate deposits amounted to 400,100,000. By 1920, these de-
posits had grown to 81,468,600,000, an expansion of 81,068, 500, 0H)0
or two hundred and sixty-seven per cent. In this same period th
deposits of national banks in the same states grew from
•„ 336,400,000 to 8,966,800,000, an expansion of (, 630,000,000 or
one hundred and eighty-seven per cent. The deposits of state
non-guaranty banks increased one hundred and thirty-four per cen:.
In 1920 the reaction against the weak banks set in. In
June 1920 there were 5,306 banks in the States of Oklahoma,
Kansas, Nebraska, Texas, Mississippi, South Dakota, and North
Dakota. During the next ten years 1,624 of these banks closed
their doors. This number was 30.6 per cent of the banks in
these states. During the same period only 18.2 per cent of the
banks in the forty-one non-guaranty states suspended operation.
The guaranty group of states, comprising less than fifteen per
cent of the states of the country and containing twelve per cent
of the people of the nation and twenty-five per cent of the
banks, contributed thirty-six per cent of the bark failures in
1 44
the nation. ~ "
There can be no question but what the unsound expansion of
deposits and loose barking practices encouraged by the guaranty
J8-0 rr (pjTe Guaranty of Bank Deposits", Economic Policy Commission,
American Bankers Association, Pages 38-39
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laws contributed much to the conditions which brought about this
situation. These states were a weak spot in the nation’s banking
structure
.
The rapid growth of deposits indicated by the statistics
stated in the preceding paragraph is conducive to unsound expan-
sion of loans. A banker who sees his deposits increasing rapidly
is forced with the necessity of putting this money to work or
investing it. A rapid expansion of loans is conducive to unsoun 1
expansion. There is a tendency to be over-anxious to lend money
on ventures that would not justify loans in a period of normal
growth of bank deposits. A bank cannot operate and have money
idle. To this situation was added the boom of war years when
almost any project needing capital seemed bound to succeed. It
is not surprising that the bankers in these western states found
it difficult to collect loans when agricultural prices collapsed
following the end of the war period. The income to the farm
group was so curtailed that many good-intentioned farmers were
forced into bankruptcy through over expansion of the production
of a product for which the market was disappearing. Such in-
stances only weakened the banks lending the money for this ex-
pansion. Deposits grew because the loans were expanding, and
the loans became worthless, the deposits were lost.
Deposit Guaranty on a State-V/ide Basis
In each of the states setting up deposit guaranty systems
the extent of the operation of the banks participating in the
system was limited to the state 1 s boundaries. It is possible

for a bank to lend money on distant ventures, but usually the
majority of loans are made on projects close to home. The
banker wishes to be in a position to judge the character of his
borrower, and the worth of the project upon which the money is
to be used. Furthermore, men are suspicious of that which they
do not understand, and it is far easier to understand that which
happens in one’s own locality than something happening far away.
In the states having deposit guaranty systems the industries
lacked any great degree of diversification. For example, the
State of Nebraska is primarily an agricultural area; Oklahoma
divides its energies between oil and agricultural production;
Kansas is primarily an agricultural state; and so are the Dakotas
A principle of sound banking is that a bank should have a
degree of diversification among its investments and, therefore,
one type of business will not be sufficiently important that the
success or the failure of the bank will be determined by the suc-
cess or failure of this business.
Hr. F.obb points out that one very serious drawback to state
deposit guaranty is the "concentration of risk" such as the risk
which arises when a bank is located in an agricultural state and
makes the majority of Its loans within the state. A series of
crop failin'’ es may shrink the assets of the bank to such an ex-
tent that serious bank failures will result.
A further factor is that the banker relaxes his vigilance
in making loans because he realizes that the depositors will
suffer no losses when he makes mistakes. Such an attitude is

comparable to the man who insures his house and proceeds to be
come less careful about fire than he yjas before he obtained th
insurance, or the owner of an automobile who ceases to worry
about its theft when it is insured against theft.

Chapter Pour
OUTSTANDING- WEAK POINTS IN STATE GUARANTY SYSTEMS
The test of the State Deposit Guaranty Systems cairie In the
period following the World War when adverse economic conditions
forced them to make payments of considerable sums of money to
bank depos-itors of banks failing in rapid succession. It must
be recognized that any bank failure is usually the result of a
number of factors, both controllable and uncontrollable, and we
have examined already in part some of the causes for the bank
failures in the deposit guaranty states. It is now proper to
ask whether or not the guaranty systems could have withstood the
shock of these failures with better results, or if there were
any factors which might have helped to make them more effective
than they were.
There is no question that political influences helped cause
the failure of the systems. Banks were insured whose condition
was far from satisfactory. In Oklahoma the Bank Commissioner
stated that it had been impossible to examine carefully many of
the Indian Territory banks prior to their admission to the sys-
tem. These banks had not been subject to regulation before this
time and, undoubtedly, many of them should have been closed
rather than allowed to operate. Furthermore, in the systems
which provided for the payment of cash immediately upon the
failure of the bank, the desire of the politicians to show how
well the system could work, money was paid to depositors before
the real condition of banks which had been closed could be
-Ti
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ascertained. Governor Haskell did this in Oklahoma, It would
have been possible for him to issue certificates of indebted-
ness to the depositors pending an investigation, but his desire
to champion his system led him to borrow money and pay cash when
the first bank failed soon after the inauguration of the system.
The unwise lending of many banks stimulated an abnormal
growth of commercial deposits which were guaranteed as soon as
created; yet the banker had no security that the basis for the
deposit created or note given as security for the loan would be
repaid. This situation was bound to lead to catastrophe when
customers found that they could not repay loans. It was a one-
sided affair. The banker was not protected, but the depositor
could claim the amount of his deposit or have it applied as part
payment for his loan when the bank was liquidated.
The plan of allowing banks to maintain the assessments as
book credits for the guaranty fund was unsound. The banks had
the money and when banks failed in rapid succession, involving
many millions of deposits, it was extremely difficult for the
remaining solvent banks to make available to the guaranty fund
the amount of cash credited on its books. Many solvent banks
were almost forced into insolvency by these assessments. The
State should have collected all of the assessments periodically
instead of allowing them to accumulate in banks.
Another weakness of the guaranty systems was the failure to
discriminate betv/een banks as to risks involved. All banks paid
the same rate. If banks had been obliged to pay insurance rates
*<
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or assessments in accordance with the degree of liquidity, or
quality of loans made instead of on the basis of "inflated"
average daily deposits, there would have been greater care ex-
ercised in the management of banks, an elimination of many un-
sound institutions, and thereby less failures chargeable to the
system.
The failure to provide adequate banking lav/s in many states
hampered deposit guaranty in that the banks were allowed to
operate as guaranty banks when they should have been excluded.
Laws restricting the extension of the number of banks, lav/s
limiting deposits to a certain multiple of the amount of each
bank's capital, and laws providing for elimination of the "specu-
lative" investments would have helped.
Another weakness was the power given to the banking depart-
ments in some states allowing them exclusive power in determining
the establishment of new banks
,
the determination of interest
rates payable upon deposits insured, etc. When it is recognized
that such supervisors were politicians it is not to be wondered
that an unsound expansion of banks took place, and that bank
supervision was far from satisfactory.
The laws were put into operation too soon after adoption
and provided for the payment of depositors too quickly. The
depositors of many banks were insured against loss of their
money before the states had time to build up adequate reserves
to stand the shock of heavy losses. For example, the State of
Washington system was bankrupt almost as soon as it got under

way. Furthermore, depositors should have been issued certifi-
%
cates backed by an adequate reserve and the possibility of a
fair and orderly realization upon the value of the assets of
closed banks would have been accepted readily and would have
given the systems more chance to get headway. Rankers would
have been willing to give depositors money for the certificates
thus causing them no inconvenience, and liquidation proceedings
would have been far more satisfactory.
The guaranty of bank deposits on a state-wide basis was
a fundamental weal-mess of the state guaranty plans. The diver-
sity of business and the number of banks was too limited. This
made a distribution of risks impossible. It has been pointed,
out that this weakness can be overcome by a national guaranty
system. Such a conclusion is not substantiated by studies made
(see Pages 183-138).
There was no real scientific procedure in the setting up
of the state guaranty plans. Little knowledge of losses from
bank failures in any of the states was available, and there was
no attempt made to classify the risks which were being insured
according to such figures.

'm \
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Chapter Five
State Lav/s Protecting Deposits in Savings Banks
The States of Massachusetts, Wisconsin, and New York have
all adopted lav/s protecting depositors in savings banks located
within their boundaries. Since these plans do not include other
state banks, they cannot be compared with the guaranty plans
put into operation by the eight western states. Furthermore,
their significance in the history of deposit guaranty cannot be
known until they have enjoyed a few additional years of exist-
ence. However, the writer does not think that a treatment of
the history of deposit guaranty in the United States would be
complete without some mention of these plans and, therefore, a.
brief outline of the important features of each of the systems
is presented.
The Massachusetts plan is not strictly speaking a deposit
guaranty system in that a corporation was created to provide a
means of rapid liquidation for long term investments when the
occasion arose. The Wisconsin and New York plans, on the other
hand, created a fund for insuring deposits.
Mutual Savings Central Fund Incorporated
Massachusetts incorporated its Mutual Savings Central Fund
Incorporated in 1932 for a period of five years. Unless the
charter of the Corporation is renewed, deposit guaranty in
AMassachusetts for savings banks will end.
The Mutual Savings Central Fund Incorporated is net a
guaranty fund scheme as are the Wisconsin and New York plans.
It is a corporation, the purpose of which is to provide liquid!' y
A Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 44, Acts of 1932, Section
±—o

for the mutual savings barks of the Commonwealth. The purpose
Is stated in the 1952 Acts, Chapter 44, as follows: "It shall
be the purpose of the Corporation to assist such member banks
when they are temporarily in need of cash or hold investments
which cannot readily be liquidated by making loans to them or
any of them secured by pledge of mortgages or other securities
legally held by such member banks.
This Mutual Savings Central Fund is administered by offi-
cers consisting of a president, vice president, treasurer, clerl:
and board of fifteen directors. The officers are elected by the
directors and the directors attain office by member bank nomina-
tion and election. Each member bank is entitled to one vote in
each election for each ten million dollars of deposits. The
directors are elected on the following basis: Two from each of
the Counties of Essex, Worcester, and Middlesex; five from the
County of Suffolk; one from the County of Hampden; two from a
district composed of the Counties of Barnstable, Bristol, Dukes,
Nantucket, Norfolk, and Plymouth; and one from a district com-
posed of the Counties of Berkshire, Franklin, and Hampshire.
The directors of the Corporation are instructed to obtain
working capital for the Fund by assessing each mutual savings
bank in the State for a deposit in cash of not more than three
per cent of its deposits, excluding club deposits as shown by
its latest statement. The directors were authorized by the lav;
creating the Fund to call for five per cent of the assessment
allowed at the first meeting of the Corporation. In exchange
Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 44, Acts of 1952, Section
1-8
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for the assessment paid, the member bank was to be given a cer-
tificate of deposit. These deposits sre non-returnable except
| when each member mutual bank receives an equal amount.
I
The Corporation is empowered to borrow money for its pur-
poses on pledge of its own assets. In addition the directors
are empowered to declare dividends upon the deposits in the fun$
When the fund is no longer necessary for its purposes, it
is provided that its affairs may be brought to an end.
he Wisconsin Law Protecting Savings Bank Depositors
A brief summary of the important points in the Wisconsin
law follows:"-'
(1) All savings banks organized in the State subsequent to the
year 1952 must contribute to the crea.tion of a guaranty
fund. (See Footnote)
(2) The initial contribution of all such banks must be §5,000 in
cash, and such other contributions as may be deemed necessa:
by the Commissioner of Banks to preserve the solvency of
savings banks in the State of Wisconsin and to render it
safe for them to continue in business.
(3) The Wisconsin fund for savings banks may not be encroached
\ipon prior to the liquidation of any savings bank until it
exceeds ten per cent of the amount due depositors ^except,
however, to repay contributions made by the incorporators
or trustees.
Footnote : According to the Literary Digest for June 10, 1933,
the Wisconsin Plan suffered a §6,000,000 deficit
within six months of inception.
1TV
State of Wisconsin (Chapter 222)
,
The Banicing Law, Rev.
March 1, 1934

—(4) Contributions made to the guaranty fund by the incorporators
or trustees plus interest thereon from the date of contribu-
tion thereof at six per cent per year not compounded may be
repaid pro rata to the contributors from that portion of the
guaranty fund crested from earnings whenever such payments
will not reduce the guaranty fund below five per cent of the!
total amount due depositors.
The New York Deposit Guaranty Law
The State of New York adopted its guaranty fund law in 1954
It provided that seventy-five or more banks in the State having
fifty per cent of the deposits of all the deposits liabilities
of the savings banks in the State might enter into an agreement
subject to the approval of the Superintendent of Banks to create
a fund and make contributions to such fund for the purpose of
insuring deposits. The fund is to be handled by a corporate
trustee or board of trustees composed of individuals who are
trustees of the mutual savings banks of the State of New York.
The lav/ became operative and includes one hundred and
thirty-five out of the one hundred and thirty-eight savings
banks of the State, having ninety-two per cent of the deposit
liabilities of the savings banks of the State.
The law does not state the amount of contribution that must
be paid by the member banks. It is covered, however, by the
agreement which states that each member bank must pay to the
fund one-fifth of one per cent of its deposit liabilities as
shown by a statement to be submitted to the trustee. Thereafter

IJ
on ten days notice the trustee may call for an additional pay-
ment of one-fifth of one per cent. When both payments have been
made and the fund is insufficient to meet an emergency, the
trustee may assess the member banks additional amounts that will,
not exceed two-fifths of one per cent of their deposits.
An additional one-fifth of one per cent may be called for
by the trustee by a vote of two-thirds of the member banks
representing seventy-five per cent of all member bank deposit
liabilities
.
The total assessments that may be called for amount to one
per cent of deposits, and this is the maximum that may be callec
for in any one year during the term of the agreement.
Each year member banks are required to file with the
trustee a statement of their condition and at the same time
they must pay to the fund an amount equal to one-tenth of one
per cent of their deposit liability.
It is contemplated that the fund will become equal to
approximately 3100,000,000
,
or two per cent of the total de-
posit liabilities of all banks.
When the fund exceeds five per cent of the total deposit
liabilities of member banks, but by not less than a million
dollars, the trustees are required to make dividend disburse-
ments to all banks in the amount of the excess.-
^"Mutual Savings Banks Insurance Funds",
American Bankers’ Association Journal
18-19
Philip A. Benson,
August 1934, Pages
_



PART IV
POST-WAR DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO FEDERAL BANK DEPOSIT GUARANTY
Introduction
i
The "Banking Act of 1933", so-called, made provision for
the establishment of a corporation to guarantee deposits on a
national scale. The Act was passed by the Seventy- third Congres
as a compromise measure to pave the way for the passage of sever
al measures designed to remedy the banicing ills of the country
which were part of the cause for the collapse of the banking
structure in February 1933, and which it was found could not be
remedied by temporary banking legislation treating only the sur-
face difficulties.
At the time of the enactment of this deposit guaranty legi;:
lation by Congress there was almost unanimous opposition on the
part of the country’s leading bankers, as well as the Adminis-
tration itself. However, the Bill became law largely as a
result of an impetus given by the emotional wave which swept
the country following the investigations of investment bankers
by a Senate Committee since this Bill had incorporated in it
some remedies for these ills.
Before presenting the provisions of the Banking Act of
1933 relative to the guaranty of bank deposits, it is desirable
to trace briefly the events which led up to the situation mak-
ing this legislation possible and which influenced the character
of the legislation.
s

Chapter One
rrn n i
n
145
lie Collapse
The effects of the World War upon the banking structure of
the United States began to be felt in the period directly fol-
lowing the depression in 1920-1921. The unsound and inflat ionanjjy
financing of the War had left the banks of the country in a
weakened condition.
Beginning with the year 1922 bank failures became increas-
ingly alarming and indicated a disintegrating system. For the
most part these bank failures were not regarded as being im-
portant. Bankers and the public alike throughout the country
dismissed them by supposing that they were merely the result of
unsound credit expansion in a particular locality. The number
of bank failures as reported by the Comptroller of the Currency
is given in the following summary review of the period 1921-
1461930 :
Suspended
Reonened
All Banks
6,968
797
6,171
Rational
Banks
925
98
827
State
Member
Banks
257
27
230
State
Non-Member
Banks
5,786
672
5,114
Bank failures spread very rapidly throughout the states in
the middle west, and still practically no attention was paid to
the situation. This attempt to overlook the whole situation
was well evidenced in the formation of the National Credit Cor-
poration to provide mutual aid among banks in 1931. In this
same year the number of bank failures amounted to approximately
l-o
"The Banicing Situation" (American Post-War Problems and
Developments), H. Parker Willis and John M. Chapman,
Columbia University Press (1934) -- Pages 3-20
146 Ibid., Page 7

2,300 banks, or about fifteen per cent of all banks in number.
Such a condition existent in the banking world should have been
just cause for a thorough house-cleaning in the banicing system,
but instead it served as an impetus to give the situation addi-
tional relief.
In January and February of 1932 there was created the Re-
construction Finance Corporation. This organization made ex-
tended loans to banicing institutions in need of assistance, and
by the close of the year 1932 this Corporation had loaned banks
of the country approximately $850,000,000. The banking condi-
tions of the country were not being corrected by these loans, bi[
were merely being allowed to continue in an unhealthy condition
which was surely doomed to disaster in the end.
Senator Carter Glass, the Chairman of the Senate Committee
on Banking and Currency, was awake to conditions and proposed a
bill that would help the situation as early as 1931. This so-
called "Glass Bill" proposed many banking reforms that were
sorely needed, and provided also for the speedy liquidation of
failed banks which would avoid the necessity of making the de-
positor wait for his money. This Bill was not acted upon by
Congress in 1932, and it was apparent to those in touch with
conditions that the banking structure of the country was headed
for a collapse unless some substitute remedies could be brought
forward. The banks of the country were becoming less liquid ancf
thus were less and less able to meet the demands for funds on
the part of the depositors and, finally, many of these banks
I

found themselves unable to supply capital to business firms
dependent upon banking accommodations for their existence.
The seriousness of the situation in the banking world in
early 1933 caused many to wonder how and when the collapse of
the banicing structure would appear. It seemed to be right at
hand, and when it became apparent that Congress intended to pro-'
vide no relief beyond its previous measures, there seemed to be
left only the problem of guessing the form of breakdown that
would evidence itself first.
What was likely to happen had been pointed out by the State
of Nevada in October of the previous year (1932) when the Gover-|
nor declared by official proclamation that all State banks were
exempt from paying deposit liabilities for a period of twelve
.
1A7
days. This move gave official sanction to a condition in
banicing that was far from desirable. It was the first step of
this sort ever taken in the history of the country. This action
was followed by a short holiday for banks in Louisiana in early
February when the banks in New Orleans had to be helped by the
State
.
On February 14, 1933, the State of Michigan dealt the most
telling blow. The Governor of Michigan closed the banks of the
State for a period of eight days, and at the end of that time
extended the holiday for another four days.
This bank holiday idea spread rapidly among the states and
took the form of a compulsory holiday in some states, while in
other places the locality had the option of closing its banks,
147
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refusing to pay depositors or not.
The bank holiday idea was tolerated by the American public
because it felt that such action was for the interest of all
concerned. It is surprising, however, to find a people passive!;
accepting a condition under which it could not withdraw from
banks that which it had been educated to expect as an immediate
payment subject to the suspension or receivership of the bank.
The bank holiday idea spread rapidly throughout the country
and by March 1933 the banks in thirty-seven states had been
affected in some manner by it. In seven of the states affected,
there were actual bank holidays.
Subsequent to these holidays in these states, the legisla-
tures met and enacted legislation in a speedy manner to relieve
the tenseness of the situations and to provide people with money
1 4RThe legislation enacted was of three kinds: (l) Some states
forbade by executive order the payment of funds to depositors,
and this action was legalized by the legislatures
. (2) In other
states the legislation provided for the payment of depositors in
proportion to the liquidity of the deposits, this liquidity to
be determined in some cases by the banks and in others by the
banking departments of the respective states. (3) In still
other states the amount of deposits that might be withdrawn by
any one individual was limited, thus establishing a degree of
liquidity to be considered uniform for all the banks in the stat
The passing of the laws was complicated to an extent by the
lack of power of the state to control the national banks located
I
•
3
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within their borders. To remedy this. Congress passed an act
in February 1933 giving the national banks power to co-operate
with the authorities of states in meeting the local conditions.
In addition, the Comptroller issued a proposed draft of a uni-
form act and recommended it to the state legislatures desiring
to take action in favor of. national banks within the state’s
territory. (In some localities the national banks wished to
remain open to demonstrate their liquidity and solvency to the
public, and in instances these banks had to be coerced into
closing their doors for the protection of the less fortunate
banks in the communitv.)
The bank holidays and suspensions of payments to depositor^
made themselves felt particularly in the conduct of 'business.
There was a lack of currency to meet pay-rolls, etc., and it
became necessary to adopt some local medium of exchange. Sub-
stitute money made its appearance in the form of clearing house
certificates, as well as tokens and other mediums of local
effectiveness only. As the holiday spread, the intercommunity
trading ceased. A national currency was lacking, and the diffi-
culties of business grew as the days passed without definite
action of a national sort. The climax came when on March 5,
1933, President Roosevelt issued his proclamation declaring a
general banking holiday to last for four days.

Chapter Two
TEMPORARY RELIEF MEASURES
To meet the situation squarely, it was essential to insti-
tute immediate relief measures, the most pressing being a provi
sion for a medium of exchange that would enable business to
carry on its regular transactions.
The means for providing the temporary currency or circulat4
ing media, for business was the first task of the new Administra-
149
tion. There were several ways to do this: ~ It was possible
to allow the continuation of local currencies under the directidh
of local bankers' associations; it was possible to issue a na-
tional emergency currency; the Federal Reserve Banks could be
utilized to furnish the medium of exchange; and emergency cur-
rency could be issued within the Reserve system. It was decided
to use the Federal Reserve machinery to provide the currency. Or
the ninth of March a bill designed to meet the emergency was
presented to Congress. This measure ratified the national holi-
day action taken by the President, and authorized him to take
such measures again, when the situation warranted, as well as
giving him power to prevent hoarding.
The measure provided also for the issue of notes to be
known by a title of a former issue, "Federal Reserve Bank Rotes"
These new notes were like the former issue in requiring no specif
backing, but unlike them in that any assets approved by the
: ederal Reserve Banks could be used as collateral for their
149
issue. To provide for those banks which would not be able to
Ibid., Page 21
u
reopen at the end of the holiday period, the Act provided for
the appointment of conservators whose function would he to take
over these banks. Finally, the Bill provided for supplying new
capital to the national banks which would have to be reorganized
before being allowed to continue their operations. Such new
capital was to be provided by the sale of
.
preferred stock to
depositors of these banks who would convert their claims against
the bank into this stock on a basis to be worked out, or by the
sale of the stock to the public at large who might wish to help '
out the banks being reorganized. Moreover, it was provided that
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation might supply some of the
needed capital upon meeting specific requirements.
To determine what banks should be allowed to reopen and
which ones should be closed was a problem that could not be
answered because of inadequate information in the hands of the
Comptroller regarding the solvency of such institutions. More-
over, it would have required months to examine these banks and
determine which should be closed for all time. The solution to
this problem resulted in a classification of banks into three
150general classes: (1) Those authorized to open without reser-
vation and with the obligation to pay their depositors in full
upon demand. This group comprised only nine or i-'i
banks. (2) Those institutions which were allowed to
operate under their own management, but v/hich could not allow
withdrawals on an unrestricted basis. (In the case of each
depositor, his withdrawal was not allowed to exceed a certain
Ibid.
,
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Chapter Three
II. ADACUACY OF RELIEF I ~EASUP.ES
The closing of these banks of the United States had the
effect of contracting considerably the amount of money available
to the business world for carrying on its transactions. At the
beginning of March there had been about fourteen billions of
demand deposits and twenty-four billions of time deposits sub-
ject to withdrawal. This had dwindled to ten and fourteen bil-
lions respectively; i.e. from four to six billion dollars in-
deposits had been rendered unavailable to depositors, When the
total of deposits only partially available to depositors was
added to this, it meant that a.bout fifty per cent of the deposit
available to depositors prior to the holiday were not available
1 SI
at the end of March.
After a few weeks of operation other banks which had been
allowed to resume business were closed and conservators appoint#^
This tended to destroy the public confidence in banks and en-
couraged the continuation of hoarding which had been practiced
so widely before the bank holiday.
The lessened purchasing power of the community due to the
bank closings and limitations upon withdrawals, as well as the
continued hoarding by the people, made the banicing situation
show definite signs of weakening. The evidences of this weaken}
152ing were: ~ (l) Banks needing new capital as a condition of
reopening were hard pressed to get the amount needed. (2) Bank}
which had reopened had found themselves heavily drawn upon by
l si
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depositors because of the need of money to pay expenses, and
because there was little confidence in many of the banks still
open. (3) This need for cash caused the country banks to draw
upon city correspondents steadily and heavily. (4) Banks under
the direction of creditors or conservators were pressed to make
immediate cash payments of a part of depositors' claims, and
this caused them to try to sell securities in the exchanges.
Y/henever such sales were successful, the banks received settle-
ment by checks drawn upon city banks which meant that these
latter institutions were being obliged to help to a considerably
extent in the liquidation of the claims of depositors in the
country banks. This action weakened the metropolitan banks
.
Furthermore, the lull in business which had followed the
banicing holiday had not disappeared completely and funds normally
expended by communities came back to banks very slowly.
It was apparent to those in authority that some other ac-
tion had to be taken to restore the public’s confidence in the
banks if they were to continue normal operations. The "Glass
Bill" passed in February 1933 had proposed a liquidating cor-
poration to take over and pay off (in bank credit) the deposit
claims in closed institutions. This would have involved the
transfer of deposit payments of closed banks to those which had
remained open, thus giving the depositor in the closed bank the
amount of his deposit less an amount In proportion to the depre
elation of the assets of the bank which had failed. The failury
to do this was an implied admission of the limitation of the

buying power of the community. It was like building a darn and
then forgetting to shut the gates.
It was clear by this time that the temporary relief measure
were not adequate and that additional steps of a more rigorous
nature had to be taken. The underlying difficulties were not to
be remedied by surface treatment.
There were several weaknesses of the banking structure of
the country that had to be eliminated or improved such as the
reserve requirements against time and demand deposits, specula-
tion in bank stocks, affiliates, qualifications and numbers of
directors for national banks and holding companies of bank
stocks, branch banking, etc., but it is not the purpose of this
thesis to outline the remedies proposed or comment upon their
sagacity.

Chanter Four
THE EMERGENCE OF DEPOSIT GUARARTY LEGISLATION
In the early part of the first session of the seventy- thirc.
Congress there appeared a large brood of bills providing for the;
guaranty of bank deposits. This proposal had a big headway in
the House of Representatives and could not be ignored. 153 It
became evident to Mr. Class, Chairman of the Senate Banking and
Currency Committee, that one of these deposit guaranty bills was
sure to pass both houses. Therefore, Mr. Glass proceeded to in-
corporate the guaranty of deposits idea in his banicing bill in
|
order that the latter might be more certain of passage. He
seized this opportunity also to incorporate in the Banking Act
of 1933 certain measures that might be difficult to get by ex-
cept through a compromise with the proponents of deposit guaran1j;(y
The original liquidating corporation idea now appeared as a
"deposit insurance corporation", so-called. The purpose of thi^
corporation was to be the liquidation of insolvent banks and,
at the same time, to insure depositors against loss by assessing
solvent banks a certain percentage of their deposits to provide
money to pay the depositors in closed banks.
When the deposit guaranty idea began to take shape in the
House there were two variations of it: The first plan called
for the Treasury to assume the total cost of guaranteeing bank
deposits, while the second provided for a levy of solvent banks
to pay depositors in failed banks. The final plan was a com-
promise under which the Government was to provide one hundred
153
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and fifty million dollars capital for the new corporation which
sum was estimated to be equivalent to the amount of money col-
lected from the reserve banks as an excess earnings franchise
tax. The Glass Bill, therefore, included a bank deposit guaran-
ty plan which was not so extreme as some of the plans that had
been proposed but which, nevertheless, wa.s included much to the
jregret of Mr. Glass.
The Administration v/as opposed to the Bill when it was
finally completed and reported. In addition to the President’s
opposition, there was the opposition of the New York bankers who
had expressed themselves in a joint letter as unanimously oppose
to bank deposit guaranty and generally to the whole Bill. It wa
about decided to let the banking legislation await a more oppor-
time time, but an investigation of the relationship between the
investment bankers and the banks (investment affiliates) by
another Senate Committee and which was touched upon by the Glass 1
Bill in a small v/ay caused a general demand for the passage of
the Bill. -
~ The impetus of the investment-banking inquiry made
the Glass Bill law in the closing hours of the session. On June
16, 1933, Mr. Roosevelt signed the measure and announced that
the legislation was the best of its kind since the Federal Re-
serve Act.
It is unfortunate that such an important measure as a bill
dealing with banking legislation should be carried through Con-
gress on a wave of emotion, but such has been the procedure in
enacting banking legislation in the United States for more than
154
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•a century. Such methods are not conducive to prompt,
ICC
tive, effective, and adequate laws.
-
construc-
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Chapter Five
THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT IHSURAIICE CORPORATION
The Corporation
"The Banking Act of 1953" provides for the creation of a
corporation to he known as "The Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration". The purpose of the corporation is to carry out the
provisions of the Act which pertain to the Insuring of bank
deposits, and its principal functions are to purchase, hold, ancjl
liquidate the assets of national banks and state band’s which ar$
members of the Federal Reserve System which may be closed, and
156
to insure the deposits according to the provisions of the ActV’
Management
The management of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation})
is vested in a board of three directors consisting of the Comp-
troller of the Currency and two other persons appointed by the
President of the United States. These directors must be ap-
pointed for a period of six years, and the two members of the
board other than the Comptroller receive .10,000 a year for the
services. The Comptroller is not given any additional compensa
157tion because of his duties on the board.
Powers and Duties of the Corporation
The corporation has those powers customarily delegated to
corporations such as the power to make contracts, sue and be
sued, hire employees, establish by-lav/s, etc. In addition, it
is empowered to make whatever rules, regulations, and contracts
it deems necessary to carry out the provisions of the deposit
1 56
"Bank Deposit Insurance", Edited by John Edson Erady, The
Banking Law Journal, Cambridge, Massachusetts (1933) --
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The corporation is entitled to the free use of the mails,
and may make use of the information, services, and facilities
of any board, commission, or department of the United States
159with the consent of such board, department, or commission.
The corporation is required to render an annual report to
Congress as soon as practicable after the first of January of
each year. It is required to invest the money of the corpora-
tion when not employed in another manner in the securities of
the United States. (The board may deposit funds on a temporary
basis with any Federal Reserve Eank or with the Treasurer of
the United States. )
Capital
The stock of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
consists of three classes, all shares of which have a par value
of $100. The first class consists of the stock issued to the
United States for the capital supplied the corporation; the
second class of stock issued to the banks becoming members of
the Corporation, known as Class A stock; and Class B stock whic]
is issued to the Federal Reserve Banks.
The law provides that the shares of stock held by the Cor-
poration and by member banks may not be transferred or hypothe-
cated.
The Act provides that the United States Treasury shall pro
vide capital for the corporation to the extent of 5150,000,000,
and for which it must be given capital stock of the corporation
158 Ibid., Page 36
159 ibid.
"The Outline of the 'New Deal’ Legislation of 1933", Howard
S. Piquet, McGraw-Hill -- Page 3§
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in an equal amount.
The Class A stock is issued to those banks which are mem-
bers of the Federal Reserve System (compulsory participants) anc
non-member banks of the Federal Reserve System which may elect
to share in the benefits of the F.D.I.C.~ C:1 Upon mailing appli-
cation for the privilege of participating in the insurance plan
of the corporation, each bank must subscribe for Class A stock
to the extent of one-half of one per cent of its deposit liabili
ties
.
The Class B stock is issued to the Federal Reserve Banks ir
exchange for subscriptions amounting to one-half of the surplus
of these banks as of January 1, 1933.
It was estimated that the capital of the corporation wou.ld
be in the vicinity of ^490,000,000, FI50 ,000 ,000 being derived
from the Treasury, $140,000,000 (estimated) from the Federal Re-
serve Banks, and approximately $200,000,000 from the banks eleci
ing to become participants in the insurance program.
The Act provides further that those banks which are pro-
hibited by state laws from purchasing the stock of the corpora-
tion can fulfill the requirements of the Corporation for member-
ship by depositing with the corporation an 8-mount equal to the
amount which it would have been required to pay in for stock
upon joining the corporation; and the banks taking such a course
are considered as Class A stockholders. It Is provided that
interest must be paid on these deposits at the same rate as the
dividends paid on Class A stock outstanding. Such banks have tc
"Bank Deposit Insiirance"
,
Edited by John Edson Brady, The
Banking Law Journal, Cambridge, Massachusetts (1933) --
Pages 37-38
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subscribe for the stock within six months if the states in which
they are located grant the power subsequent to making the deposi
It is provided that only banks organized at the time of the
enactment of the legislation creating the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation may take advantage of the foregoing provisions.
Banks organized after June 16, 1933, applying for stock must
162purchase Class A stock to the extent of five per cent of the
new bank's capital, provided the application to buy the stock is
made within twelve months after organization. After the twelve
month period, the amount of stock subscribed for by such a bank
must be adjusted annually in the same manner as that of other
member banks.
Other Provisions Regarding Capital Subscriptions^ 2’0
After July 1, 1934, a state bank wishing to become a Federa
Reserve Member bank will be admitted only after it has subscribe
for the amount of Class A stock required of all participants in
the deposit insurance program of the United States. It is pro-
vided also that a national bank which fails to become a stock-
holder of the Deposit Insurance Corporation on or before July 1,
1934, must be taken over by the Comptroller of the Currency as
receiver or conservator for the bank. Furthermore, any state
bank which is a member of the Federal Reserve system and which
fails to become a member of the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration on or before July 1, 1934, cannot continue Its member-
ship in the Federal Reserve System.
The capital subscriptions of the Federal Deposit Insurance
j •
L
162 Ibid., Page 38
165 Ibid.
,
Page 40

iCorporation are payable to the Corporation in the following man-
ner: The yl50, 000, 000 subscribed by the United States is subjec
to call by the Board of Directors of the Corporation at any time
The subscription of the Federal Reserve banks (one-half surplus)
was payable to the extent of one-half of the subscription at the
time of subscription, and the balance subject to call by the
Board of Directors of the Corporation upon ninety days notice.
One-half of the amount subscribed by the banks becoming
shareholders of the Corporation is payable at the time the sub-
scription of the bank is accepted by the Corporation, and the
remainder is made subject to call from time to time by the Board
of Directors of the Corporation.
djustment of Stock to Deposit Liabilities
The Act provides that bSinks becoming shareholders of the
Class A stock of the Deposit Insurance Corporation must adjust
their holdings of this stock so that it will be equal In amount
to one-half of one per cent of the bank’s deposit liabilities.
t
This adjustment must be made at the beginning of the calendar
year, and the adjustment made for both increases and decreases.
(When deposits fall off during a year, the bank must surrender
a proportionate amount of its stock.) The payment for the addi-
tional stock required because of an increase in deposits may be
paid for on the same basis as the original subscription made for
the
must
164
stock of the Corporation. ~
It is provided in the Act that when a bank liquidates, it
surrender its stock in the Corporation. The bank liquidat
Ibid., Page 41

is entitled to receive its cash paid subscriptions plus dividenq
not exceeding one per cent per annum from the time of the last
! dividend less any liability to the Corporation.
1S5Certification for Membership"
When a bank applies for membership in the Corporation, the
Corporation is required to request the Federal Reserve Board in
the case of a state Federal Reserve member bank, or the Comp-
troller in the case of a national bank, to certify upon examina-f
tion that the applying bank has assets adequate to meet its
deposit liabilities as shown by its books. If/hen the certifica-
tion is negative, the application for stock must be denied.
ividends on Stock of F.D.l.C.
The dividends upon the Class A stock held by member and
non-member banks of the Federal Reserve System are fixed at six
per cent per annum or thirty per cent of the net earnings in an^
one year, whichever amount is greater. These dividends are
100
cumulative. The participation in the declaration or payment
of a dividend by an officer or director of a bank holding Class
A stock in the Corporation while any assessment levied against
the bank by the Corporation remains unpaid, is subject to a
fine of $1000 or imprisonment for a year or both.
THE TEMPORARY INSURANCE PROVISIONS
The Temporary Fund
The Act of June 16, 1933, provided that the Corporation
should open on its books a Temporary Federal Denosit Insurance
Fund to become operative on January 1, 1934, to insure to the
165
166
Ibid., Page 42
Ibid.
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extent of 82500 each deposit in any "bank which is a member
of the Fund, and which closes on or before June 30, 1934. (This
Temporary Fund could be made operative earlier by Presidential
proclamation.
)
The amount of insurance of deposits for each depositor was
increased to §5,000 by amendment to the original Act to be
effective July 1, 1934, for purposes of the October 1, 1934,
168
statement of Fund members which had to be submitted."
Member Banks of the Temoorary Insurance Fund
— —-M. —
-
....... —- -
-l /7Q
The following banks were compelled to join the Fund:
All banks that are members of the Federal Reserve system li-
censed by the Secretary of the Treasury by the first of January
1934; all banks which are members of the Federal Reserve System
,
and which are licensed after January 1st, 1934; all state banks,
trust companies, and mutual savings banks (see Page 178) and
each banking institution located in the District of Columbia
which becomes a member bank of the Federal Reserve System on or
after January 1st, 1934, must become a member of the Fund when
admitted to the system.
The following banks were privileged to join the Fund: Any
state bank, trust company, or mutual savings bank (see Page 175)
and any banking institution in the District of Columbia which is
not a Federal Reserve System member bank, provided the authority
having supervision of the bank grants approval, and provided
further that this supervisor or authority tenders a certificate
that the bank is in solvent condition and is found to be so by
16 1? Ibid.
,
Pages 42-43
Amendment to Section 12-B of the Federal Reserve Act of 1933
169
"Bank Deposit Insurance”, Edited by John Edson Brady. The
Banking Law Journal, Cambridge, Massachusetts (1933; --
Pages 42-43
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the Corporation. The hank must agree to comply with the regula-
tions of the Corporation and must pay to it the amount required
of Class A members of the Fund. (The Corporation is empowered
to examine the banks which apply for membership and which are
not members of the Federal Reserve System, the expense of which
may be assessed against the bank becoming a member.)
Statements Required of Llembers in the Temporary Fund
Prior to admission to the Temporary Insurance Fund, each
bank becoming a member of the fund must file with the Corporatio
a sworn statement showing the number of depositors and total de-
posit liabilities eligible for insurance as of the fifteenth of
the month preceding the month of admission of the bank as a de-
posit guaranty b ank . ^
The Act of June 16
,
1953
,
stated that each bank must file a
statement similar to that required for admission as of June 15
,
1934
,
and upon such other dates as fixed by the Corporation.
Payments and Assessments
When a bank is admitted to the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation's Temporary Insurance Fund it is obligated to pay
immediately an amount to the Temporary Fund equal to one-lialf of
one per cent of its deposits eligible for insurance. One-half
of this amount must be paid upon admission and the remainder
held subject to call at any time by the Corporation. When the
June 15
,
1934
,
statement rendered to the Corporation indicates
an increase in deposits, the bank whose deposits are insured mus
pay an amount equal to one-half of one per cent of this increase
^ ^ Ibid., Pages 43-44

The Act provides also that when the Corporation has need
of additional funds to meet the obligations of the Temporary
* und prior to July 1, 1934, each member bank of the fund is sub
ject to an assessment of a sum equal to the sum paid prior to
this time.
I
mount of Insurance
Under the original Act the member banks of the Temporary
Insurance Fund are provided insurance for the deposits in each
bank to the amount of 4'2500 . ~ ‘ ~ This provision applies only to
the deposits which have been subject to withdrawal in the usual
course of the banicing business since March 10, 1933. This pro-
vision on the amount of insurance was amended to insure deposits
to the amount of ','5,000 for each depositor in fund member banks
as per a statement of deposits and condition to be submitted to
172the Corporation showing condition as of October 1, 1934.
Procedure V/hen Member of Fund Closes
The law provides that the procedure to be followed when
a member bank of the Temporary Fund closes must conform to the
provisions in the Act pertaining to the action to be taken by
the Corporation when a national bank closes. The provisions
173pertaining to the closing of a national bank are as follows:
When a national bank which is a Class A stockholder of the Cor-
poration is forced to close its doors because of inability to
meet the demands of depositors, the Comptroller of Currency must
appoint a receiver for the bank. Following the appointment of
the receiver, a new national bank must be organized by the
Ibid.
,
Page 44
lj2 Amendment to Section 12-B of the Federal Reserve Act of 1932
"Bank Deposit Insurance", Edited by John Edson Brady. The
Banking Law Journal, Cambridge, Massachusetts (1933 ; --
Page 45

Comptroller to take over the insured deposits of the closed na-
tional bank and to receive new deposits.
The Corporation must make available to the new bank an
amount equal to the insured deposit liabilities of the closed
bank, and the new bank must assume all of the deposit liabilitie
of the closed bank. At the same time, the Corporation is re-
quired to take over the depositors’ rights in the closed insti-
tution.
When the receiver declares dividends to depositors in the
closed bank as a result of liquidating the closed bank's invest-
ments, such dividends must be paid to the Corporation until the
amount received by the latter equals the amount of the insured
deposit liability of each depositor. When this happens, subse-
qxient dividends may be paid directly to the depositor.
The Corporation is instructed by lav/ to liquidate the asset
of the closed banks, enforce the individual liability of each
stockholder and director, and to wind up the affairs of the in-
stitution in accordance with the laws of the United States per-
taining to the liquidation of national banks.
1 74he New Bank
The provisions pertaining to the new bank that must be
created as part of the procedure for protecting depositors in
closed banks deserve mention.
The Act provides that the organization of the new bank must
be directed by the Corporation. The articles of association of
the new bank may be executed by any persons designated by the

Corporation and following the execution of the articles of asso-
ciation, the Corporation may offer the stock of the new bank for
sale. The amount of the capital stock of the new bank must be
at least the minimum amount required for the organization of a
national bank in the place where the bank is located.
When the capital stock of the new bank has been subscribed
and paid for, the Comptroller of the Currency may issue a permi':
to begin business. Prior to this time, however, the affairs of
the new bank must be administered by an executive officer desig-
nated by the Corporation.
When the bank begins business under its own management it
must elect a Board of Directors to take over the management of
the bank.
Unless the capital stock of the bank is sold within two
years, or unless some bank takes over its assets and assumes
its liabilities within two years after its organization, the
Corporation is compelled to place the bank in voluntary liqui-
dation.
It has been stated that the Corporation is required to pay
to the new bank an amount equal to the insured deposit liabili-
ties of the closed bank. The actual payment consists of only
enough money to enable the new bank to meet demands for cash,
and the balance is credited to the account of the new bank on
the books of the Corporation. This credit to the account of
the new bank bears interest at three per cent per annum until
withdrawn by the new bank.

#The acceptance of deposits by the new bank must be done in
accordance with the regulations imposed by the Corporation also
These deposits, as well as the funds made available by the Cor-
poration, must be kept in cash on hand, invested in direct oblb
gat ions of the United States Government, or deposits with the
Corporation or a Federal Reserve Bank*
The new bank is required to keep on deposit with the
Federal Reserve bank of its district an amount equivalent to the
legal reserve requirements of the system, but this new bank may
not be required to subscribe to the stock of the Federal Reserve
bank in its district until its own stock has been subscribed anc
paid for in full.
nx
Procedure Then State Fember Bank Closes
When a state member bank closes its doors because it is
unable to meet the demand of its depositors, the Corporation
may be appointed receiver by the proper state authorities. The
Corporation then proceeds to make available to the new bank an
amount equal to the insured deposit liabilities of the closed
state bank, provided the Corporation is satisfied that it is
entitled to receive dividends resulting from the liquidation of
17bthe assets of the closed state bank. -
The procedure followed is exactly the same as in the case
»
of the national bank except that the rights of the creditors of
the bank must be determined in accordance with the lav/s of the
state where the bank is located. (The procedure is dependent
~
*

176the bank is located.)
Where the Corporation has no right to act as receiver of a
closed bank which is a Class A stockholder in the Corporation,
the Corporation must proceed to organize a new national bank to
take over the deposit liabilities as in the case of the closed
national bank. The affairs of the closed bank, however, are
[around up by a receiver appointed by the proper state officials.
The Corporation is authorized to purchase and liquidate any or
dll of the assets of the closed state bank.
Deposit Insurance Account177
The Corporation is required to open on its books a deposit
insurance account.
When a bank fails, the Corporation must estimate the amount
that it may expect to realize from the liquidation of the assets
of the closed bank to apply against the claims of the depositors
in the institution. If the amount that the Corporation has made
available to the new bank exceeds the amount of the estimate, th
.4
Excess must be debited to the deposit insurance account.
then the amount realized upon the assets of the closed bank
is less than estimated, the amount of the deficiency must be
charged to the deposit insurance account. If the amount so
realized exceeds the estimate, the deposit insurance account must
)e credited with the excess.
Assessments Against Class A Stockholders
The Act provides the following in regard to the assessment
of member banks. When the net debit balance of the deposit
.76
177
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178
Ibid., Pages 47-48
Ibid., Page 48
n3
"Tl

m*
ft
insurance account equals or exceeds one-fourth of one per cent
of the total deposit liabilities of all Class A stockholders in
the Corporation as of the date of the last preceding Call Report
the Corporation is required to levy upon each Class A stockholde
an assessment equal to one-fourth of one per cent of its total
deposit liabilities. The amount so collected is credited to the
deposit insurance account. The assessment contains no limita-
tion upon the number of assessments which may be levied.
1 70Deposits Payable at a Foreign Office
The deposits of a bank insured under the Temporary Insurance
Fund do not include deposits payable at a foreign bank or office
of a bank located in a foreign country. Such deposits, there-
fore, are excluded in determining the deposit liability of a
bank.
180
The Permanent Insurance Plan
The Act of June 16, 1933, provides that the deposits in all
member banks of the Federal Reserve System will be insured on
and after July 1, 1934, unless the President fixes an earlier
date by proclamation. All these banks were to be examined in
the meantime. The deposits of all non-member banks which are
Class A s tockholders of the Corporation will be insured on and
after July 1, 1934, unless an earlier date is fixed by the
President by proclamation. In the meantime, all such banks will
be examined. The insurance will continue until July 1, 1936,
when the bank must become a member of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem or relinquish its insurance benefits.
?
179 Ibid.
,
Page 48
1 Of)x Ibid., Page 45
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Amount of Permanent Insurance
Under the Permanent insurance plan, deposits up to vl0,000
will be fully insured. Deposits in excess of $10,000 but not
exceeding $50,000 will be insured to the extent of seventy-five
per cent, and all deposits in excess of $50,000 will be insured
to the extent of fifty per cent. It is provided further that
in determining the amount due any depositor there must be indue id
all deposits due him in his oto name or held in the name of
another for his benefit.
182Power to Issue Securities
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is empowered to
issue and have outstanding at any one time securities the aggre-
gate amount of which do not exceed three times the Corporation’
£
capital
.
The maturity and rate of interest of such securities is left
to the discretion of the Corporation. The securities may also
be redeemed before maturity at the option of the Corporation in-
such manner as may be stipulated in its obligations. The securi
ties of the Corporation may be secured by the Corporation’s
assets and the prices fixed by the Corporation. The Corporatior.
is empowered also to sell on a discount basis short-term obliga-t
tions payable at maturity without interest.
Fund for Mutuals 183
*
The original banking act has been amended to provide for an
additional Temporary Federal Deposit Insurance Fund to be known
as
181
182
185
"The Fund for Mutuals". The purpose of this fund is to
Ibid.
,
Page 45
Ibid.
,
Page 48
Amendment to Section 12-B of the Federal Reserve Act
*

provide separate protection for mutual savings banks wishing to
protect depositors under the Federal Deposit Insurance Law. It
is provided that the fund shall terminate on July 1, 1957*
A mutual savings bank may elect to become a member of the
Temporary Insurance Fund or a member of the Fund for Mutuals.
If the bank elects to become a Temporary Fund member it is ex-
pected to meet the requirements for membership in the fund and
bear all assessments that may be imposed upon all other banks
joining the Temporary Fund.
When a mutual savings bank elects to become a member of the
Fund for Mutuals, the law provides that its deposits shall be
insured to the extent of §5,000 for each deposit account in the
bank provided the bank closes on or After July 1, 1934. However
mutual banks electing to become Temporary Fund Members are en-
titled to insurance for each deposit account up to the amount of
M2500 unless the board of directors of the fund elects to grant
coverage to the extent of ;5000 for each depositor in the par-
ticular bank.
Mutual savings banks that have been members of the Temporary
Fund and wishing to transfer their membership to the Fund for
Jiutuals may do so, and the Corporation is instructed to pay all
assessments levied for the Temporary Fund less any debts of the
transferring bank to the Temporary Fund to the Fund for Mutuals.
The Temporary Fund and Fund for Mutuals have no liability on
account of or to each other except in case of a member transfer-
ring membership.
i</ i ,
A
—
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It is provided that the payment of depositors in closed
mutual savings banks that are members of the Fund for ltu.tu.als
shall be .as in the case of closed member banks of the Temporary
Fund. The same rules of liquidation and assessments shall apply
also
.
The law provides that a state bank in order to obtain the
benefits of the Fund for Mutuals after July 1, 1935, must sub-
scribe any pay for the same amount of Class A stock of the Cor-
poration as it would be required to subscribe and pay for upon
becoming a member of the Federal Reserve System. In cases where
the state laws do not allow the bank to make such subscriptions,
the bank must make a deposit with the Corporation equivalent to
the subscription.
. ederal Deposit Insurance Corporation in Operation
eposits Insured
A preliminary summary of the certified statements of Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation shareholders and participants as
184
of October 1, 1934, was published on January 17, 1935.
This summary showed that there were 14,125 banks actively
participating in the insurance funds of the Corporation. Througl
crtr°
these banks insurance was being provided to 51,245 depositors,A
of which 50,422,497 were being given full protection. The ratic
of fully insured depositors to the total number of depositors
was 98.390* This becomes a very significant figure when it is
learned that out of the total deposits in these banks of
037,019,742,000, only $16,452,433,000 or 44.4-4< is insured.
184
Preliminary Summary of Certified Statements, F.D.I.C.,
Issued by Statistical Division January 12, 1935 -- Re-
leased January 17, 1935

0(See Table on Page 179)
The banks participating in the insurance benefits of the
.185Corporation on October 1, 1954, were classified as follows
:
National Banks
State Banks (Members of Federal Reserve
System)
State Banks Not Members of Federal Reserve
System, Exclusive of Mutual Savings Banks
Mutual Savings Banks (Maximum Insurance :’-5000)
Mutual Savings Banks (Maximum Insurance ^2500)
5,450
969
7,638
44
24
Grand Total All Banks 14,125
The statement that only 44.44^ of the total deposits in
these banks is covered by insurance and that over 98% of the
depositors is being given protection is very significant. The
figure shows that the bulk of deposits in banks is small, that
in over 98fj of the cases the average deposits are below C-2500.
Fur thermore
,
the desired confidence in the banking system, on th
part of the majority of depositors, is achieved by assuming a
risk of much less proportion than would be the case if all de-
posits were insured one hundred per cent. (It will be remembere<
.
that in the case of the state guaranty plans deposit insurance
afforded one hundred per cent coverage to all depositors, regard
less of the size of the deposit involved.)
There v/ere originally one hundred and sixty-one additional
mutual savings banks in the Corporation. One hundred and thirty
three of these withdrew on June 30, 1934, because of the creatio
of a state-wide insurance fund in the State of New York where
these banks were located. These banks made application to with-
185 Ibid.
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draw prior to the passage of the amendment to the Act providing
for a separate fund for mutual savings banks.
The Fund
A report of the Corporation summarizing operations as of
June 30, 1934, stated that the Corporation had on deposit with
the Treasury $99,247,340.84, and investments in Government bonds
amounting to $227,782,343.36 on which there was an appreciation
of $7,478,101.23 as of June 30, 1934. 103
The interest earned on investments for the period was
2,338,788.62, while the expenses of the organization (including
organization, the failure of one bank closed during the period,
and a provision of '400,000 for estimated suspense items)
•[ 0*7
amounted to $3,207,365.15 °
At the close of business on June 30, 1934, the assessments
collected from banks which were members of the fund amounted to
$39,664,640.58. The cost of insurance was 5.8054 cents per
$1000 insured deposits, equal to 2.32$ of the assessment paid by
banks which are members of the Temporary Fund.
Withdrawals
The Corporation was prepared at the time of publishing its
report to meet refunds of $9,273,783.00 of 188 banks which were
making withdrawals in accordance with the provisions of the
regulations of the Corporation. The withdrawal of the New York
mutual savings banks has been mentioned already. Twenty-one of
188
the banks withdrawing were commercial banks.
1 PS
° Preliminary Report of the Chairman of the Board of Directors
of the F.D.I.C. on Operations to June 30, 1934 -- Page 2
187 Ibid.
,
Page 1
188 Ibid., Page 2

Failures of Insured Banks
Since the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has been in
operation there have been six bank failures among the insured
banks. The total deposit liabilities of these banks at the time
of closing amounted to $1 ,512, 000, and the total of insured de-
posits was $673,837. This insurance insured in full more than
ninety-nine per cent of the depositors. There were in the aggre
gate 13,123 depositors. -^
Assessments
Thus far in the operation of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation there have been no additional assessments to pay
depositors. A letter to the writer from G. B. '-'harton of the
Corporation dated February 14, 1935, states: "Failures of in-
sured banks have not been the occasion for any additional assess
rnents of insured banks, this being the answer to your question
on that tonic."
Address of the Honorable Leo T. Crowley, Chairman of the
Board of the F.D.I.C., Before the American Bankers’ Asso-
ciation Convention -- Page 8
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PART V
THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE LAW
Chapter One
Introduction
The significance of the creation of the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation is well stated In this quotation from the
American Bankers 1 Association Journal for October 1933: "The
inauguration of a system of deposit Insurance by the Banking
Act of 1933 of Itself forms a land mark in American Banking
Elistory, but it is probable that in the long run the provisions
as to Reserve membership and the control of banks incidental to
the operation of the plan will prove far more important. These
changes in the banking law are the most important made since the
passage of the National Banking Act of 1863. The old system has
cperated for seventy years. It is hardly possible that the new
phase in American banking history, ushered in by the Banking Act
of 1933, will endure so long.
The following pages will present the case for and against th<
federal Deposit Insurance Lav/. The writer will attempt to show
//hat might have happened had the law been in existence from 1920
until the National Bank Holiday; and, in addition, to point out
several defects of the lav/. In contrast, the case for Deposit
Guaranty on a national scale, as well as some of the possible
developments under the lav/, will be presented.
:
l-°
"The Price of Deposit Insurance", F. N. Lav/, American Banker
Association Journal, February 1933 -- Page 17
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Chapter Two
THE CASE AGAINST THE FEDERAL LAW
A Study of What Would Have Happened to
Bank Deposit Guaranty During the Years 1920-1932
Those who oppose the Federal bank deposit guaranty program
base their conclusions largely on the grounds of the previous
experience and results attained by bank deposit guaranty systems
It is pointed out that guaranty lav/s encourage unsound banking,
and that the expenses of paying depositors is borne in the larg-
est part by the soundly managed institutions. It is also pointed
cut that the guaranty programs do not insure the multitude of
individual deposits. In order to protect the depositors in a
few weak banks, the security of deposits in the remaining banks
is jeopardized. In substantiation of this assertion, one is
(asked to examine the results that would have been attained by a
191
ieposit guaranty program in effect as of the year 1920.
If a bank deposit guaranty program had been in effect in
[L920, applicable only to the member banks of the Federal Reserve
System, and if each member bank had paid an amount equal to ten
per cent of its paid-in capital to a guaranty fund, the results
would have been quite far from satisfactory. The answer is to
be found by an examination of the table on Page 184. This table
shows the amount of suspended banks together with the amount tha -
rcould have been in the fund from 1921-1929 (the years following
192
1929 are excluded because of heavy failures.).
The table shows that if the fund had been increased each
year by ten per cent of the reported increase in capital of raem-
ber banks., it would have been sufficient to pay all depo-sihons-
191
"Futility of Deposit Guaranty Laws'', Frederick A. Eradford,
Bankers’ Magazine, Volume 12G -- Page 537
192 Ibid.
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TABLE 1193
Date
Amount in
Assumed Fund
Deposits of
Suspended
Banks
Contributions of
Suspended
Banks to Fund
January 1921 $179,906,100 42,503,000 $ 536,900
1922 144,279,100 24,243,000 395,600
1923 127,345,600 51,228,000 684,500
1924 82,341,400 74,469,000 1,030,500
1925 11,315,100 67,264,000 992,000
1926 6,782,700 68,812,000 856,900
1927 9,813,900 66,336,000 803,400
1928 13,433,300 42,240,000 517,500
1929 13,644,300 57,135,000 712,500
Deficiency, End of 1929 -- $236, 797,700
194
TABLE 2
January 1930 275,711,300 380,440,000 5,041,000
1931 733,528,000 8,386,000
1932 270,782,000
193 Ibid., Page 538

of failed banks through 1924. Thereafter, the contributions to
the fund representing ten per cent of the increase in capital
of member banks would have served to pay but a small portion of
the deposits of member banks.
By the end of 1929 the deficiency would have amounted to
8236, 797,700, or an additional Q.6% of the paid-in capital of
member banks at that date. The fund would hnve been reimbursed
by the liquidated assets of failed banks, but it is highly im-
probable that these would have been enough to pull the fund out
195
of the red by the end of 1929.
Non-member bank failures were more than member bank failures
and if these banks had been included in the insurance program,
the fund would have been in the red in 1922. If non-member ban]
had been included the deficiency at the close of 1929 would have
196
amounted to $1,300,000,000.
These results are insignificant when compared to what would
have happened from 1929 to 1932. Assuming a fund had been
started in December 1929 paying depositors in 1930, the fund
would have been depleted before the end of that year. (See
Table on Page 184)
By the end of 1932 the deficiency In the guaranty fund would
have been more than $1, 000, 000, 000, or about 40^: of the paid-in
capital of existing member banks. Had all the banks in the
United States been Included instead of just member banks only,
the deficiency would have been close to $2,000,000,000.
The foregoing statistics indicate without question that a
1
195 Ibid., Page 537
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Ibid.
197
Ibid.
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national deposit guaranty system such as the one suggested would
have been futile. It can be seen readily that such an impairmen
of capital of member banks would have forced many honestly manage*
and otherwise solvent banks into insolvency. Surely this system
cannot be said to be in the interest of the deposits when con-
sidered in the aggregate.
A more detailed analysis of what might have been the cost of
a deposit guaranty system to participating banks has been com-
piled by the Commission on Banking Law and Practice of the Asso-
ciation of Reserve City Bankers. The cost to participating bank
is shown in the table on Page 187 for the period from 1921 to
1932. This table is for all banks, state and national."" 0 The
Committee believes these tables are significant in that the
federal law Imposes an unlimited contingent liability on all
participating banks. This table shows that the ratio of losses
to deposits of active banks would have risen from 0.15% in 1921
to l.lOfo in 1931. The ratio of losses to capital for these same
199
years would have been 0.85f> and 3 . 05%. It Is extremely doubt
ful if a great many banks could have withstood the losses shown
for the latter years. Hot only was the year one of adversity in
business, but it was also a time when the public confidence In
banks was at a low ebb. The sure test of a guaranty system
comes during such years. "It must weather the storms of panic
and depression if it is to prove its worth." Such depressions
and panics have occurred many times in the history of our coimtr
and there Is no reason to believe that there will be no more.
JJ
cd
;
-w
1
1
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"The Guaranty of Bank Deposits" (Bulletin No. 3), Commissior
on Banking Law and Practice, Association of Reserve City
Bankers, November 1933 -- Page 13
199 Ibid., Pages 14-15
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It is only when the country is in a period of depression and the
public confidence in banking is badly shaken that there is a
demand for deposit guaranty. It appears from these statistics
200
that the system is doomed to failure when it is most needed.
A more detailed analysis of the costs that would have been
borne by a guaranty fund had it been in effect during the period
1930-1932 is shown on Page 176A This table indicates that the
losses borne by the guaranty fund would have averaged annually
three-fourths of one per cent of all deposits, and 4.04 per cent
of capital funds of active banks. It is pointed out by the
Committee on Banicing Law and Practice that these losses are
understated because banks failing during a depression pay smalle
dividends to depositors than those failing in years of less
stringent business activity on the basis of which these statis-
tics were compiled. Furthermore, many of the banks closing in
recent years reopened by scaling down deposits, and the losses
to depositors would average higher than the statistical experi-
ences if reopenings in prior years would indicate. (During 1933
deposits were scaled down to the extent of sixty-five per cent
202in some instances .) In addition, as it is stated on the char
on Page 189 many insolvent banks were kept open temporarily by
various methods until the banking crisis in March 1933.
The Blanket Assessment Defect
One serious drawback to the Federal Deposit Insurance law
is that it imposes a blanket assessment upon all banks, failing
to recognize differences in risks among banks. Commercial banks
200 ibid.
^01 Ibid.
,
Pag
202 Ibid
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mutual savings banks, banks located in New England, banks locate .
in the southwestern states, urban and rural banks are all subjec ;
to the same assessments. Under such a system one bank pays for
the other regardless of whether or not the bank has been well
managed. Such a system only strengthens the hostility of the
banker toward the guaranty plan, and in his mind it encourages
bad banking.
An estimate of the geographical distribution of assessments
and losses from 1921 to 1932 is given below :^4
Per Gent of
Assessment to Per Cent of Loss to
Geographic Location Total Assessment Total Loss
New England States
Middle Atlantic States
North Central States
Southern Mountain States
Southeastern States
Southwestern States
Rocky Mountain
Pacific Coast
7.6# 3.7#
44.0 20.0
18.5 21.9
3.5 5.8
2.8 13.7
4.3 7.0
8.0 20.7
1.8 4.5
9.4 2.7
Unfortunately the economic defect of the banking system re-
mains as great as before since there is no attempt made to relat )
assessments to the risk. This removes a powerful incentive that
would otherwise exist to raise the banicing standards where they
are relatively low.
Another consideration which makes a uniform assessment an
undesirable feature of the Deposit Insurance law is that since
all banks pay exactly the same percentage of deposit liabilities ,
the large bank having large deposit accounts is protected to a
203
nThe Guaranty of Panic Deposits Under the Banking Act of 1933 ?
Guy Emerson, (Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1933,
Volume XLVIII, No. 2 -- Page 236
204 Ibid.
,
Page 237
/

much less degree than a small bank having small accounts for the
most part. The deposit insurance program provides one hundred
per cent temporary insurance for accounts of ('5000 or less, whil
under the permanent plan the maximum deposit insured to one hun-
dred per cent is $10,000. In a large metropolitan bank the de-
posit accounts of many bank depositors would exceed this sum,
while not many accounts in small banks in rural communities woul
exceed this sum. This means that the large bank gets less pro-
tection and still has to pay a larger portion of the bill. The
assessment made against the large bank in proportion to the amount
of insurance given the bank’s customers is much larger than is
205
the proportion for the small bank.
he Interest Argument
Some defenders of the federal deposit insurance law have
pointed out that the compensation provided by the prohibition of
interest on commercial deposits will be sufficient to offset a
considerable amount of the expense of deposit guaranty. In sub-
stantiation it is pointed out that the average interest payment
for the five years preceding the prohibition of paying interest
on commercial deposits amounted to $246,000,000 annually on de-
, , . , 206
mand deposits.
This contention does not seem to stand up under close exami-
nation. In the year ending June 30, 1930, the national banks of
the country paid $128,719,000 in interest on demand deposits,
and paid only $66,772,000 in the year ending June 30, 1932.
This figure was undoubtedly less in 1933.
205 Ibid.
206 Ibid., Pages 234-235

Because of the failure of commercial banks to pay interest
on demand deposits, corporations and individuals have drawn down
their demand deposit accounts to a minimum and in many instances
[these have been invested or converted into time deposit accounts
Furthermore, many banks have paid little or no interest on
demand deposits for years and will receive little or no benefit
in the way of a saving to assist in meeting the assessments unde:
a deposit guaranty scheme.
It may be pointed out also that this argument that demand
deposit interest savings will offset the expense of deposit guar
ty to a large extent does not take into consideration that the
best of investments of today pay a very low rate of return as
compared with the return of a few years ago thus making the net
return to a bank on an investment little if any different from
what it was when the bank paid interest on demand deposits.
Finally, this argument does not take into consideration the
necessity for many banks to build up earning power and thereby
replete reserves. Banks must set aside some earnings for a
cushion in times of distress or to absorb losses from bad in-
vestments.
It seems quite impossible to estimate any savings for any
group of banks because of net savings on demand deposits or pos-
sibly lower interest on time deposits. Above all else, one can-
not logically argue that the lack of the necessity of paying
interest on demand deposits will be of any appreciable help in
meeting deposit guaranty assessments, to say nothing of justify!
\
n-
:Lg

)the lav/ on these grounds.
The Reserve Factor
It has been pointed out already that those who oppose the
Federal Deposit Insurance law contend that it is weak in failing
to provide adequate reserves to meet losses. It was held by the
Commission on Banking Law and Practice of the Association of
Reserve City Bankers that in its failure to provide for reserves
the deposit guaranty lav/ failed to meet the requirements of an
insurance program (see Page 22).
Instead of providing reserves in good times against losses
in bad times the Federal Deposit Insurance laws provide for the
assessment of Class A stockholders of the Corporation at any tin
when the fund is drawn down by the payment of depositors. This
would have amounted to one-fourth of one per cent every second
20V
(year prior to 1930, and from two to four times that since 1930.
hr* Aldrich, Chairman of the Board of the Chase National Eah
in New York, says that this provision may check the flow of capi
tal into banks, weaken the confidence in banks, and defeat the
l , .
. A .
208
very purpose of the Act.
The failure to make provision for a reserve fund is un-
doubtedly a weakness of the deposit insurance law. Such a re-
serve fund would avoid the necessity of taxing banks at times
when they could stand the tax the least. It is in times of stre;
that bank failures occur.
?07p Ibid., Page 235
{203 ibid.

Chapter Three
THE CASE _ OR FEDERAL DEPOSIT GUARANTY
Several of the more outstanding arguments against deposit
guaranty on a national basis have been stated already. It is
only fair that the argument in favor of deposit guaranty be pre-
sented.
Burden of Loss Shifted From Shoulder of Depositor
The most important defense for deposit guaranty is found in
the argument that it is bound to reduce the losses of depositors
in closed banks. The losses to depositors resulting from bank
failures prior to the enactment of the deposit guaranty legisla-
tions had been serious. Therefore, from the point of view of the
depositor any system which indemnifies him against loss of his
bank account when a bank fails is better than no protection. It
is not surprising that the general public reaction is along this
, .
. .209line of reasoning.
The majority of depositors in banking institutions are un-
able to distinguish between barks as to their safety, management,
etc., and from the depositor’s point of view he is relieved of
this burden. It was this same type of situation which made it
necessary for legislation to protect the holders of bank notes
in the nineteenth century. (See Pages 64-74)
Restore Confidence
It is argued also that the deposit guaranty law enacted by
Congress will restore public confidence in the banking business.
This restoration of confidence
,
it is contended, ought to
209 Ibid.
,
Pages 238-239

compensate in part for the "burdens of the system contributing to
a revival of "business in which "both the public and the hank will
210benefit
.
Put an End to Bank Runs
A third benefit of federal deposit guaranty is found in the
benefits from putting an end to bank runs. Banks individually
and collectively should benefit from the' removal of the fear
that an unexpected and unwarranted run may so cripple the bank
as to make it necessary to liquidate its affairs. This is also
a benefit to the depositor. Y/hen a bank fails because of a run,
the depositor must share part of the burden of the loss.
The lessening of the run hazard in banking business has the
further advantage to bankers that it will not force them to keep
their investments in such a liquid condition as has been nec-
essary prior to deposit insurance. (It can be pointed out here
also that the lessened necessity for liquid investments may lead
to more lax banking methods as contended to those who oppose de-
.. ,
,211
posit guaranty.
)
Distribute the Losses
Bank deposit guaranty laws can prevent the distress which
foilow s bank failures. The losses suffered by state and nationa
bank depositors, particularly in certain localities, have been
substantial, especially in recent years. One effect of the
deposit guaranty laws would be to spread the losses from bank
212failures more equally and over longer periods of time.*'
210
211
212
Ibid.
Ibid.
"Theory and Practice of Banking", Harr and Harris, McGraw-
Hill, Pages 136-137

Improve Banking Practices
There are some who believe that when all banks are compelled,
to contribute toward a fund to meet bank losses, the bankers hav
:
an immediate and compelling motive to improve banking conditions
As a result, bank supervision will become more effective and the
undesirable bankers will be unable to stay in business. Self-
interest will bring about an improvement in banking practices.
Bank Deposit Guaranty and Check Currency
The proponents of bank deposit insurance have a favorable
argument in the part played by a deposit guaranty system in pro-
tecting the users of the so-called check currency.
As a medium of exchange bank deposits have replaced bank
notes for the most part. It Is estimated that over ninety per
cent of the business transactions in the United States are car-
ried on by means of checks against deposit accounts. The holder
of this check currency can have greater confidence in its value
as an exchange medium when there is- confidence that the deposit
account against which the check is written cannot be wiped out
because the bank upon which the check is drawn may fail before
the check can be presented for payment. It is argued that It is
just as necessary today to protect the holders of these checks
as it was to protect the holders of bank notes, when bank notes
213
made up the principal part of the medium of exchange.
In spite of the foregoing arguments, it is necessary to
recognize some arguments against the desirability of guaranteeiri
S15 Ibid., Pages 137-138
-
—
—
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.
bank deposits in order to protect the check currency in use todaHr.
Bank notes are accepted by anyone, and are used frequently
to settle transactions between individuals and firms whose iden-
tity is quite unknown to each other. This is necessary for small
transactions. Payments by check, on the other hand, are made
for the most part between people whose business integrity and
standing is known to each other, or about whom credit information
may be had. There are already guarantees of payment of bank
deposits against which checks are drawn, and to infer that de-
posit guaranty is needed because these are lacking is quite in-
correct. There is the capital, surplus, and undivided profits
of a bank and, in addition, the double liability of stockholders
affords a protective margin.

Chanter Four
- ..
POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENT Ul-TDER THE FEDERAL LAW
It is difficult for anyone to say what will happen to the
banking system under deposit guaranty, and it is just as hard to
forecast the outcome of the insurance program itself.
The deposit insurance lav/ may stand just as it is. If ther^
are no losses, the lav/ v/ill be hailed as the remedy; if there ar<
more failures. It will be held to be necessary to protect the in'
terests of depositors.
In any event, there should be a v/orking test to measure the
plan. If lax banking results as an outcome of the law, the pub-
1 ic should be informed as soon as possible. On the other hand,
if banking methods should improve under the lav/, It should be
214
iven credit as being the indirect cause of the improvement.
Potentially, the law is a national banking system. All the
banks of the country are more closely tied together than ever
before in our history. This may lead to the working out of some
better practices and greater exchange of knowledge among banks.
To an extent, the competitive factor is lessened and all banks
have mutual Interest in making a profit.
A second possible outcome of the law is that it may be
215
amended to do away with its undesirable features.
The unlimited liability of banks in the case of making
assessments might be removed. This provision can affect the flo'
of capital into banks, because unless removed it will become in-
creasingly difficult to forecast the earnings of banks, to say
21- trThe Guaranty of Bank Deposits Under the Banking Act of
1933", Guy Emerson, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Februar
1933, Volume XLVIII, Wo. 2, Pages 242-244
215 Ibid.

nothing of providing the reserves necessary for sound bank
management.
It may be possible to provide for the creation of a reserve
fund. This would give the lav/ a greater chance of success and
eliminate the danger to banks of having to pay excessive assess-
ments when the burden might prove disastrous to many banks.
It may be possible also to assess costs in accordance with
the risks involved. Banks should be assessed for payments to th
guaranty fund in accordance with their location, their size, the
type of business carried on by the bank, and the character of
banking policy of the bank. All of these factors affect the ris
element and ought to be recognized. A principle of scientific
insurance is the charging of premiums in accordance with the
risks involved.

)BANK DEPOSIT GUARANTY AND CREDIT IKS'TRANCE
There are many who feel that bank deposit guaranty resolves
itself into a matter of credit insurance, and state that the
problem of protecting the interest of depositors can be solved
indirectly by providing insurance against the failure of bor-
rowers to repay loans.
Before bringing to a close our discussion of bank deposit
guaranty, it is essential to examine the contentions of those
who think the solution lies in credit insurance.
It has been stated that a bank fails because the borrowers
(do not pay their loans. They are either unwilling to pay or un-
able to pay, thus being dishonest or insolvent credit risks.
The greatest hazard of the bank then is the credit of the
borrowers. To save banks from failure can we have a form of in-
surance to protect banks against the insolvency of the bank
debtors?
C. L. Jamison says, "The insurance of credit risk is so com-
plex that any contract which adequately protects the carrier is
so hedged about with exceptions that it is likely to give little
216protection to the insured except at a prohibitive premium. " J
Bank deposits can be insured in one of two ways: (1) Wait
until the bank closes its doors and then indemnify depositors
for the losses, or (2) prevent bark failures by indemnifying the
banks directly for credit losses as they are incurred.
The first method would deprive communities of their banking
216
"Bank Deposit Guaranties, the Insurance Aspects of the Prob-
lem", C. L. Jamison, Bankers 1 Magazine, Volume CXXVI,
January- June 1935, Page 452

services ancl make great inconveniences for bank creditors throng!
forced liquidation of assets. It is exactly what is done now
when a bank fails.
Under the second method, the bank carries on as a solvent
institution without disturbing the relation between the bank and
its customers. Is it true then that bank deposit insurance dif-
fers little from mercantile credit insurance as carried on in th
United States? If so, bank deposit insurance can be an indirect
benefit to depositors when the payment is made directly to the
bank by the borrower.
Deposit insurance, however, is blanket coverage and this
form of insurance has been found to be entirely impracticable
in the field of credit insurance. There is no reason to believe
therefore, that it would work better if applied to bank deposit
217insurance. (This does not mean that blanket coverage cannot
be carried on in certain insurance fields; it has been done suc-
cessfully in group insurance.)
If credit insurance were to be applied to bank deposits,
there would be the problem of selecting the risks. Once a policy-
holder is secured, he could not be relied upon to deal with even
reasonably safe debtors. The insurance company would have to
state the class of debts that were coverable under the policy.
The selection of risks would have to be done by means of
special investigations and by relying upon information furnished
by mercantile agencies. The first method is very expensive, and
the second is not altogether satisfactory because the information

is not sufficiently specific.
In the matter of credit risk insurance there is the problem
of diversification also. The risks must be spread over many
debtors and not too large in size. Bank deposit insurance on a
national scale would give the diversification needed, however,
and the problem would resolve itself into one of determining the
maximum size of coverage for insurance.
Another problem of concern to the banker is the matter of
bearing the cost of the insurance. If the banker had to carry
the burden, it would, sober his judgement, provided he were un-
able to shift the burden to the depositor; this is not altogethe
likely under a banking system where all banks will be faced with
the same problem, thus making possible little discrimination in
lending rates. However, the banker would have more information
about his risks if he were obliged to examine the risk of e ach
one.
There is the possibility that banks could pay the cost of
insuring the excess losses only. This immediately creates the
problem of deciding where excess loss begins and is not a likely
he c ompl ishment
.
There would be still be the "catastrophe hazard" even if
credit insurance were used to insure the doubtful loans. There
Ls no guarantee that when such insurance is most needed, as in
uimes of depression, that the insurance companies would be will-
ing to assume the risks.
Finally, there is the matter of proof of loss. In the case

of life insurance the loss is known when the insured dies, and
in fire insurance when there is a fire. Who knows when a bank
debtor can repay his loan? Who knov/s how much he can repay?
The loss is known only when every means known to press payment
has been used without success.
"The conclusion is inevitable that if any known method of
managing credit insurance were to be applied to a system of bank
218
deposit guaranties
,
the project would be so shot through with
complications, so honeycombed with vague uncertainties that its
successful operation is gravely doubtful. The most that can be
said for it is the confidence that such a guaranty would instill
into the minds of timid depositors; confidence in the security
of banks is a prime necessity, but let us find some other way if
219possible of inspiring that confidence."
"Bank Deposit Guaranties, the Insurance Aspects of the Prob-
lem", C. L. Jamison, Bankers’ Magazine, Volume CXXVI,
January- June 1933, Page 451
219 Ibid.
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Chapter Six
SUiaiARY AND COUCLUSICIIS
Summary
A summary of the conclusions and statements concerning bank
deposit guaranty in the United States made thus far is of great
assistance in formulating final conclusions on the subject*
It was concluded in Part I that bank deposit guaranty is
bank deposit insurance, being a kind of insurance called assess-
ment insurance.
It was stated in Part II that bank deposit insurance is one
step in the evolutionary growth of laws enacted by legislatures
to protect the interest of depositors in banking institutions.
The laws regulating bank organization, bank investments, and ban|;
supervision have been enacted to protect the public’s interest
in the banking business. Bank deposit insurance laws were shown
to be one of the more recent attempts at siich regulation.
It was shown in Part III that the deposit guaranty idea has
been practiced before on a state basis, eight of the western states
attempting to guarantee bank deposits by compulsory or voluntary
plans during the period from 1908 to 1930. It was shown how this
movement having its origin in the Populist Party of the west
failed in every instance. The reasons for this failure were
many, but among the outstanding reasons were the following:
Banks were admitted to the deposit guaranty systems which should]
hr ve been excluded; the plans were administered by politicians
whose training in the field of banking was far from adequate fori
.1
'
ithe proper functioning of the plans: and the banking practices
in all of the states became lax during the operation of the laws
It was shown how in each case economic conditions in the United
States during 1920-1921 brought a pressure on these systems whicjji
could not be borne by them.
In Part IV it was shown how that the economic conditions of
the country following the World War had such a serious effect
upon banking conditions in the country that the system collapsed
early in 1933 when the President proclaimed a national bank holi
day. Following the bank holiday the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation was created to insure bank deposits in national bank
members of the Federal Reserve System, and all non-member banks
wishing to participate. On July 1st, 1934, the Temporary Insur-
ance Fund went into effect. Its life has been extended.
In Part V an attempt has been made to show the futility of
deposit guaranty on a national basis in terms of what might have
happened had It been in existence from 1920 to 1932. In addi-
tion, some of the defects of the law have been pointed out. On
the other hand, the case for deposit insurance has been present
The possible development of banking reforms under a. national
guaranty law have been discussed and, finally, it was shown how
."credit insurance" could not cope with the problems of guarantee
ing deposits.
Conclusions
The foregoing brief summary of this study of bank deposit
guaranty in the United States furnishes background for the
(L
1*
'
.
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presentation of conclusions on the subject.
Deposit Insurance and Banking Reform
The prospect that losses to depositors will he deduced is
of great significance to the depositors, hut the realization of
this does not lessen the real problem. The real problem is to
eliminate the losses altogether
. The net loss is the same to
society whether the losses resulting from bank failures are borne
by the depositors, by the banks, or by the stockholders of bank-
ing institutions. It is very desirable to make a wider distri-
bution of the losses, but If society is to benefit, the losses
must be eliminated.
In the last analysis the deposit insurance legislation
enacted by Congress, must be judged on whether it lessens bank
failures. To distribute the losses is merely patchwork. Bank
failures can be eliminated only when the banking practices of
the nation improve, and when banks conduct themselves In the besb
interest of the depositor on a conservative basis.
There is real need for more professional bankers and less
conduct of banking by men to whom banking is an avocation rather
than a real vocation. Banking is a profession and should be
practiced only by those who regard It as such and who must,
therefore, live up to professional standards that are not con-
ducive to lax banking methods. Any reduction of losses must com:!
I indirectly, not directly. Deposit insurance as it exists now
cannot produce the desired results directly. It can afford the
incentive needed to reform the banking laws and imnrove the
i
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"The Guaranty of Bank Deposits Under the Banking Act of 1953"
Guy Emerson, Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1933,
Volume XLVIII, No. 2 -- Page 240
'
conduct of the business.
Sound banks have cause for forcing banicing reform. It can
be done and should be done before it is too late. There are
likely to be fev/er banking failures during the next few years
because of an improvement in the banking structure. The weaker
banks were forced into liquidation by the banking holiday, and
those that had been limping along have been greatly strengthened,
People are apt to think that the remedy for bank failures and
losses to depositors has been found, and if so, it will be hard
to press needed banking reforms. This will allow practices to
continue that may destroy the foundation of the banking structur
before the public realizes that the deposit insurance program is
merely a protective roof under which dishonest practices are
‘fostered.

sr
A GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BANKING
There is no way that sound, banking practices can be assured
any more definitely than to improve the calibre and business
integrity of the men and women who enter the banking business as
a profession.
A fundamental weakness of banking as practiced in the United
States today is that principle which allows men to enter the
banking profession regardless of the experience they have had in
the conduct of the business. It Is possible for any man who de-
sires to enter the banking business, provided he can satisfy the
requirements of the state laws regarding financial responsibilit'
dwelling place, and apparent honesty. There are practically no
laws which require that the would-be banker must have fundamental!
knowledge of banking principles, economics, law, etc., and al-
though a bank can be successfully operated by men whose training
in business, economics, and banking has not been carried on in a
formal manner, there are many bank failures caused through lack
of knowledge of these fundamental principles. This does not
mean that all bank failures are directly attributable to this
cause, but aside from dishonest management it is one of- the more
important contributory factors making for unsuccessful banking.
The conduct of banking is a profession. The business is
not one which can be managed by anyone to whom the business
appeals. It must be conducted on a basis of sound judgement
backed up by thorough knowledge and understanding. Experience
is a big factor, but experience alone cannot give one the fore-
1L-,

sight and vision necessary to avoid all the pitfalls. In foreig
countries hanking has been recognized as a profession for many
years. A man whose forefathers had not followed the banking bus
ness would stand but little chance of becoming a banker. In
England the conduct of the business itself is entrusted to men
who have served an apprenticeship of many years following a
Up.
period of formal training in banking principles. On the other
hand, in the United States the banking business is far from be-
ing a profession. Experience is only a desirable factor and men
are selected for important posts in banks for the size of the
account they can bring to the bank rather than for what real
knowledge of the business they possess. These men regard the
bank with which they are affiliated as an avocation rather than
a vocation.
In recognition of these facts a recent announcement made by
the American Bankers’ Association Public Education Commission
Chairman is of great significance and should have more influence
In bringing order out of chaos In the banking business than any
lav/s that could be enacted. The announcement was that of a
"Graduate School of Banking"
.
Mr. John H. Puelicher, the Chairman, says: "One of the
constructive trends in the business world during recent years
has been the evolution of banking as a profession. The
banker, of course, is fundamentally a combination of business
and professional man, although the professional aspects of banic-
ing have been obscured by the fact that bankers are not required
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"The Graduate School of Banking", John Puelicher, The Journal
of the American Bankers’ Association, February 1955, Pages
42-43

to pass a prescribed course of study. Also there has been the
i tradition which held that the best way to become a banker is to
"learn the business by experience". A practical knowledge of
economics, intelligent conservatism, personal integrity, skill
in handling men, and the sixth sense of sound judgement have beeh
and always will be considered essentials of the banker's back-
ground To this has been added a personnel trained in
theory as well as practical banking. In short, academic prepara
tion, necessitated to some extent by the ramifications of modern
business, has taken its place with practical experience, and
222
today the two are virtually inseparable."
The new school is to be opened at Rutgers University at New
Brunswick, New Jersey, on June 16, 1935, and is an outgrowth of
the work of the American Institute of Banking.
It is planned that the Institute will continue its formal
programs in its chapters. Enrollment in the Graduate School,
however, will be confined to properly qualified bank officers.
The courses will constitute an intensive study of managerial
policies extending over a period of two years with six weeks
spent in resident instruction at Rutgers, and twenty months in
extension work under supervision of the faculty of the Graduate
School of Banking.
The curriculum in the Graduate School will embrace three
major subjects: bank management
,
trust administration, and the
foank's investment portfolio. The courses will be taught on a
major and minor basis during resident sessions. Each subject is
A'
t
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to be offered as a major for two hours each morning during resi-
dent sessions, while on three afternoons of each week the same
subjects will be offered as minors. Ban!: officers in attendance
will have to take one major and one minor. In addition they wil
be required to study courses in banicing law, ethical and economii
phases of banicing.
This announcement has been given relatively little publicity
but so far as the conduct of American Banking is concerned, it
is one of the most significant announcement in decades. It is a
recognition that banking has evolved into a profession here as
well as in Europe. It is a first step toward better banicing
through self-discipline and training rather than by the imposi-
tion of well-meant legislation.
HOW A GUARANTY IAW COULD BE JUSTIFIED
The conditions in the banking world subsequent to the World
War and until the Banking Holiday of March 1933 are not likely
to recur again for a number of years. After the bank holiday
only the sound banks were allowed to r eopen and it was announced
by the administration in Washington that it would permit no more
223
epidemics of bank failures. ^ If this promise is carried out,
bank failures will be few in the years to come.
Under such conditions a deposit guaranty law would be
workable, and the same time it would be uncalled for. This is
the dilemma of deposit guaranty.
The only conditions under which the law is justified is one
wherein the agency paying all the bills (the solvent banks or
r
"The Futility of Deposit Guaranty Laws”, Frederick A. Eradfo
Bankers’ Magazine, Volume 126, 1933 -- Pages 537-539
i*d.

the Government) must he able to so regulate the banking business
}
as to stop bank failures. If this is done, there is no need for
deposit guaranty and, therefore, it becomes of no importance.
A parallel of this situation is found in the following case
The Federal Reserve notes of the United States are guaranteed,
yet the guaranty is a mere formality since the operation of the
Federal Reserve Banks is so regulated as to insure the soundness
of the notes issued. The deposits of the member banks in the
Federal Reserve Banks are not guaranteed, yet the safety of
these deposits is considered as good as the safety of the Federa'
Reserve note. Under such conditions a. guaranty becomes a matter
of indifference.^^
It is essential to have a soundness of bank assets before
any guaranty system can work.
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